

Arms Control - Disarmament

A QUARTERLY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
WITH ABSTRACTS
AND ANNOTATIONS

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Arms Control & Disarmament


A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH
ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



Prepared by the

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION
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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

Library of Congress Location Symbols

(Uncataloged and Unclassified Materials)

Chi Kor.....	Chinese and Korean Section
DNLM.....	U.S. National Library of Medicine
Hebr.....	Hebraic Section
Japan.....	Japanese Section
LL.....	Law Library
Newsp.....	Newspaper Reading Room
Nr East.....	Near East Section
P&GP RR.....	Periodical and Government Publication Reading Room
Sci RR.....	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm.....	Slavic Room

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

923

Ačimović, Ljubivoje. [NONALIGNED COUNTRIES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY] Die blockfreien Länder und die europäische Sicherheit. Europa-Archiv, v. 24, Dec. 10, 1969: 815-822.

D839.E86, v. 24

Nonalignment can be considered a foreign policy doctrine, a certain type of foreign policy behavior, an incipient international system. The policy of nonalignment resides not merely in a neutral attitude to or nonparticipation in blocs and military alliances; it consists of a constant effort toward a peaceful world order free of power politics, spheres of influence, and hegemony. This gives the movement a "universal function." There are two attitudes toward the establishment of European security. Those holding the first want to realize this goal within the existing division of the world into spheres of influence; the other group sees the solution only in a new international system devoted to the equality of all nations. There are many converging points between this second attitude and the policy of nonalignment. The nonaligned movement influences to a degree and is influenced by an interaction of developments on the global, regional, and national levels. It must therefore adapt its ideology and tactics to the present state of international relations. On the global level it has already contributed to checking the expansion of blocs and to the relaxation of tensions. Through autonomous initiatives and active participation in superpower initiatives the nonaligned and neutral nations can direct the process of European settlement toward a demolition of blocs and spheres of influence and secure a truly European solution.

924

Bergquist, Mats. TRADE AND SECURITY IN THE NORDIC AREA. Cooperation and conflict, no. 4, 1969: 237-246. P&GP RR

"Revised version of a lecture . . . to the Foreign Policy Association of the Younger Generation in Finland, at Godby, Åland Isles, Finland, 31 August 1969."

Examines the national security implications of bilateral trade relations, particularly with state-trading countries, and of membership in the European Free Trade Association, the European Economic Community, or the proposed organization for economic cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

925

Berkowitz, Leonard, comp. ROOTS OF AGGRESSION; A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION HYPOTHESIS. New York, Atherton Press, 1969. 136 p. illus. BF575.A3B44

Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--The frustration-aggression hypothesis revisited, by Leonard Berkowitz.--The frustration-aggression hypothesis, by Neal E. Miller.--Extinction-induced aggression, by W. H. Azrin, R. R. Hutchinson, and D. F. Hake.--Physical aggression in relation to different frustrations, by Arnold H. Buss.--Arbitrariness of frustration and its consequences for aggression in a social situation, by Eugene Burnstein and Philip Orbach.--A study of catharsis of aggression, by Shahbaz Khan Malik and Boyd R. McCandless.--Some conditions facilitating the occurrence of aggression after the observation of violence, by Russell G. Geen and Leonard Berkowitz.--Toward a theory of revolution, by James C. Davies.--Name index.--Subject index.

Examines the frustration-aggression hypothesis in the light of its implications for other social phenomena like civil disturbance and political revolution. Berkowitz states the need for certain changes in the hypothesis, noting that all aggressive actions do not stem from prior frustrations and that the correlation between frustration and aggression is not as close as had been thought.

926

Beswick, D. G., and M. D. Mills. AN AUSTRALIAN ETHNOCENTRISM SCALE. Australian journal of psychology, v. 21, Dec. 1969: 211-225.

BF1.B74, v. 21

To form a scale of ethnocentrism, 32 items were selected according to both their power of discrimination between criterion groups of subjects and their internal consistency in a pilot study of 192 subjects. The original pool of items was set up to comply with various facets of ethnocentrism as defined by Levinson and illustrated in the California E scale and the British Ethnocentrism scale. Validity was demonstrated in the main study of 273 subjects by highly significant differences between criterion groups selected according to age, socioeconomic status, student-nonstudent, levels of education, income, religion and other criteria in accord with the theory and previous findings in Britain and the U.S. Partitioning of the main sample revealed the predominance of education as a determinant. (Abstract supplied)

927

Bigelow, Robert S. *THE DAWN WARRIORS; MAN'S EVOLUTION TOWARD PEACE*. Boston, Little, Brown [1969] 277 p. BN106.B5
 "An Atlantic Monthly Press book."

Contents.--Author's note.--Cooperation-for-conflict.--Socialized monkeys and apes.--Hand-axe to H-bomb.--Population explosions.--Harems and natural selection.--Cavalry and battleships.--Prehistoric peace.--Golden rules and promised lands.--Biology and culture.--Cooperation-for-survival.--References.--Index.

"A possible approach to the study of human evolution and human nature which has not yet been fully explored." The trebling in volume of man's brain since his emergence from his ape-australopithecine ancestors can have been caused only by very powerful natural selection pressure in favor of brains endowed with more intelligence, which would permit better communication and more effective cooperation between individuals in social groups. The selection pressure could have been maintained only if these groups were increasingly at war with each other. Cooperation or love within the group is cooperation for the conflict against other groups. The course of history shows the expansion to clan, tribe, nation, and super-power bloc of the group in which men cooperate in love and suggests the necessity of making the next step, international cooperation against the global threat of nuclear annihilation.

928

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, and Simone Dreyfus. [THE AFRO-ASIAN MOVEMENT] *Le mouvement afro-asiatique*. Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1969. 192 p. (Travaux et recherches de la Faculté de droit et des sciences économiques de Paris. Série "Afrique," no. 6) JX1582.27A83
 Bibliography: p. [179]-183.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Large currents of the Afro-Asian movement: Asianism. Pan-Islamism. Arabism. Pan-Africanism. Marxism. Contribution to a definition of Afro-Asianism.--pt. 2. Afro-Asian conferences: The Conference of Bandung. Afro-Asian and neutralist conferences. Failure of the Algiers conference and the crisis of Afro-Asianism.--pt. 3. Afro-Asian organizations: League of Arab States. Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee. Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation. Afro-Asianism in the United Nations.--General conclusion.--Annexes.

Studies Afro-Asianism as two originally separate but parallel movements that find common ground in the war against neocolonialism and the need for neutralism and economic development. The political, ideological, and religious forces involved are analyzed in view of the Afro-Asian doctrine formulated by other writers and a new definition proposed. Boutros-Ghali thinks that while the bi-continental movement has made no great progress recently, it has served its historical purpose of advancing the prestige of the disadvantaged nations on the international scene.

929

Burton, John W. *CONFLICT & COMMUNICATION: THE USE OF CONTROLLED COMMUNICATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*. New York, Free Press [1969] xvii, 246 p. illus. JX1952.B823 1969b

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Controlled communication: The research setting. Conflicts, parties and issues. The representatives of parties. The establishment of communication. The control of communication. Functionalism and regionalism. Conflict avoidance. Political willingness to resolve conflict.--pt. 2. Assessment: Trends in the analysis of world society. Trends in the control of conflict. The philosophical basis of settlement. The philosophical basis of resolution. Assessment.--Bibliography.--Index.

"Controlled communication" is a technique by which political and social scientists exercise control of discussion between representatives of nations and states involved in conflict. "The distinctive hypothesis is that the conflict behaviour of communities and states comprises alterable components such as perception of external conditions, selection of goals from many possible values, choices of different means of attaining goals, and assessments of values and means in relation to assessments of costs of conflict." Experience and knowledge can alter these components, thus altering relationships. In controlled communication relevant theoretical and empirical knowledge are introduced to dispel the misperceptions that parties to a dispute have of each other. While no bargaining or negotiation takes place, the preconditions of agreement may be established by preliminary controlled communication.

930

Burton, John W. *SYSTEMS, STATES, DIPLOMACY AND RULES*. London, Cambridge University Press, 1968. 251 p. illus. JX1395.B863

Contents.--pt. 1. Systems and states: Systems. The needs of states. Legitimized behaviour. Decision-making. Conflict.--pt. 2. The behaviour of states: The systemic behaviour of states. Non-systemic behaviour. Reactions to non-systemic behaviour.--pt. 3. Diplomacy: The role of theory in decision-making. An alternative system of thought. The responsibility of states. On diplomacy.--pt. 4. Guide-lines: International guide-lines. Restatement and propositions.--Bibliography.--Index.

Outlines a theory of state behavior to determine policy guidelines for the minimization of dysfunctional interstate conflict. The solution to dysfunctional conflict is to be found not in coercion, normative law, or any other agent from outside the system, but in the discovery of theories, insights, and rules that will enable states to avoid non-systemic, inherently conflictual behavior.

931

Cho, M. Y. [ASIA'S COMMUNIST PARTIES BETWEEN PEKING AND MOSCOW] Asiens kommunistische Parteien zwischen Peking und Moskau. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Jan. 25, 1970: 71-79.

D839.E86, v. 25

Notes that the Sino-Soviet rift has produced different attitudes toward Moscow and Peking in Asian Communist Parties, depending on the nation's colonial past and international and domestic situation. Many of the parties are attracted ideologically by Peking's brand of communism, which appears to them tantamount to nationalism. Cho discusses primarily the Communist Parties of North Vietnam, North Korea, Japan, and India.

932

Colton, Timothy. THE "NEW BIOLOGY" AND THE CAUSES OF WAR. Canadian Journal of political science, v. 2, Dec. 1969: 434-447.

P&GP HF

Traces the history of the "new biology"; analyzes the work of its spokesmen, Konrad Lorenz and Robert Ardrey; criticizes the thesis linking man's tendency to war with his evolutionary heritage; and evaluates the implications of this premise.

933

Columbia University. Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe. FINANCIAL AND FISCAL SYSTEMS . . . Prepared for U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by Columbia University. New York (Columbia University) 1968.

HG186.C9C6

Stamped on t.p., v. 1: By Thad P. Alton, Frank Bendor, Elizabeth M. Bass, and Jaroslav Dusek.

Stamped on t.p., v. 2: By László Cairjak and George Pall. Edited by Thad P. Alton and Elizabeth Bass.

"Contract ACDA/E-45."

Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--v. 1. Czechoslovakia.--v. 2. Hungary.

Portrays Czech and Hungarian financial systems as they have actually appeared, with secondary attention to past and possible future developments.

934

Freund, Ludwig. (THE QUESTION OF DEFENSE-WORTHY VALUES AND THE INSTABILITY OF ALLIANCES IN "RELAXED" TIMES) Die Frage verteidigungswürdiger Werte und die Labilität von Bündnissen in "entspannten" Zeiträumen. Wehrkunde, v. 18, Nov. 1969: 564-568.

U3.W396, v. 18

Ascribes the success of Communist psychological warfare to the absence of effective counterpropaganda. Freund evaluates present peace research, discusses the motivational value of "national consciousness" and patriotic feelings for a nation's defense morale and an alliance's unity of purpose, and points to the influence of offense on alliance instability.

935

Graham, Hugh D., and Ted R. Curr. VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES; A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1969. 2 v. (xxii, 644 p.) illus. (U.S. National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence) Task force reports)

HM57.065 1969

Report of the Task Force on Historical and Comparative Perspectives.

Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction, by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Curr.--Acknowledgments.--pt. 1. A historical overview of violence in Europe and America.--pt. 2. Immigrant societies and the frontier tradition.--pt. 3. The history of working-class protest and violence.--pt. 4. Patterns and sources of racial aggression.--pt. 5. Perspectives on crime in the United States.--pt. 6. International conflict and internal strife.--pt. 7. Comparative patterns of strife and violence.--pt. 8. Processes of rebellion.--pt. 9. Ecological and anthropological perspectives.--Conclusion, by Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Curr.--Figures.--Tables.

Papers on the sources, causes, patterns, extent, conditions, and processes of violence in the United States compared with similar phenomena in other countries, particularly those of Western Europe.

936

Curr, Ted R., and Charles Rittenburg. CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES OF CIVIL VIOLENCE. Washington, American University, Center for Research in Social Systems, 1969. 214 p.

JC328.5.G85

Contents.--pt. 1. Introduction: Theory and methodology.--pt. 2. First tests of a causal model: Introduction. The theoretical model. Research design. Measures of civil violence. Results: a statistical summary. Direct measures of relative deprivation. Measures of value capabilities. Measures of value expectations. Mediating variables. The predictive equations.--pt. 3. New error-compensated measures for comparing nations: Introduction. The optimum interval; an error-reporting and scaling. New indices for cross-national analyses. Notes. Bibliography. Glossary. Appendices. List of tables.

Evaluates "a general, explanatory theory of the conditions of violent civil conflict by applying complex and powerful statistical techniques to data from a large number of nations."

937

Harrigan, Anthony. THE CHALLENGE OF THE NORTHERN REGIONS. Revue militaire générale; general military review, Mar. 1970: 365-372.

U2.R48, 1970

Includes summaries in French and German.

Assesses the strategic and economic importance of the northern regions of the Atlantic Ocean. The northern world is destined for development at the end of the century when its resources will be exploited by refineries in the Atlantic countries. Harrigan asserts the lack of a new frontier may account for the discontent that has overtaken democratic societies and that the far north offers the same challenge to adventurers today as to past European explorers.

938

Hopkins, Terence K. **THIRD WORLD MODERNIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE.** In *American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system.* Philadelphia, 1969. (*Int. Annals*, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 126-136. H1.A4, v. 386

"Modernization" is the progressive organization of societies at the national level in the context of an evolving global network of such societies. This formulation raises a number of questions, for example: how we think about change at the individual level in relation to societal change; contrasts between "organic" and "technological" evolution (borrowing the terms from the biologist Wald); and the causal relevance of a society's position in international networks, and of the characteristics of those networks, to its modernization. The fundamental hypothesis is that the modernization of today's Third World countries--in the sense of their development as national societies--is unlikely within the context of the Western-centered or capitalist portion of the international political economy. Moreover, our theories of modernization may well obscure the key problems of Third World development. (Abstract supplied)

939

Javits, Jacob K. **COOLING IT IN ASIA.** New leader, v. 53, Apr. 13, 1970: 14-17.

H1.L.N37, v. 53

Adapted from a recent address to the World Affairs Conference in Peoria, Ill., sponsored by the University of Illinois.

Four probable developments during the next decade may contribute toward a lessening of U.S.-Chinese hostility and provide the basis for a peaceful and prosperous Asia. The "power vacuum" of the 1950's will be replaced by a more stable four-power strategic balance made up of China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. There will be a reduced U.S. military presence in Asia, although the United States will continue to provide a nuclear shield for its Asian allies. Both Communist and Nationalist China will undergo leadership changes that will reduce the revolutionary fervor of the former and make more likely a resolution of Taiwan's status on the basis of self-determination. Regional economic development involving the participation of Japan and the United States as well as China will open up new opportunities for cooperation. The United States can encourage these developments by focusing on the

causes of Sino-American tensions instead of trying to resolve differences through direct negotiations, by seeking to improve China's standard of living, by recognizing that Peking is not the cause of all the conflicts in Asia, and by making it clear that the United States is not joining with the Soviet Union in a nuclear pact against China.

940

Johnson, U. Alexis. **ASIA IN THE 1970'S; THE NEED FOR SECURITY.** Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, Apr. 15, 1970: 386-389.

PH6121.V52, v. 36

Delivered before the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, Cleveland, Feb. 20, 1970.

The great progress made by the non-Communist countries of East Asia in the past decade is often overlooked because of preoccupation with conflicts in Laos and Vietnam. U.S. interest in Asian affairs is not a recent phenomenon, and Asians need not fear that the United States is about to withdraw from the area. Japan is already the strongest nation in East Asia and will continue to prosper as long as the free world economy remains healthy. Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and even South Vietnam, once the war is over, can look forward to rapid economic progress. Security in the area may proceed at a slower pace, although it would be greatly bolstered by a more active Japanese role.

941

Kielmannsegg, Johann A., Graf. **[BALANCE OF POWER IN SPITE OF CHINA?] Gleichgewicht trotz China?** Volkswirt; Wirtschafts- und Finanz-Zeitung, v. 23, Dec. 24, 1969: 50, 55.

HC281.V74, v. 23

Forecasts the continuation of the bipolar balance of power, despite its growing instability, for the next two decades, China's emergence as a nuclear power, and possible Third World influence. Only an unlikely big gain by one superpower could really destroy the balance before its replacement by a tripolar system with China as a third superpower, which is possible no earlier than the eighties. The existing balance is changing in character, however, because of the growing sophistication of new weapon systems, which makes it increasingly difficult to assess the enemy's military potential and adds to the instability of the nuclear balance, and the new role of the Soviet Union as a world sea power. It is unlikely in the next decade that any two nuclear powers will unite against the third.

942

Köhle, Klaus, and Eckhard Spemann. **(INSTITUTIONAL CENTERS OF PEACE RESEARCH)** Institutionelle Schwerpunkte der Friedensforschung. Politische Studien, v. 21, Jan./Feb. 1970: 102-112.

H35.P66, v. 21

Lists names and addresses of over 100 peace research institutes in 20 countries.

943

London. Institute for Strategic Studies. SURVEY OF STRATEGIC STUDIES. London, 1970. 24 p. (Its Adelphi papers, no. 64)

U162.A3, no. 64

Reference guide by country to institutions and university departments conducting strategic studies. This term includes modern military organization; the study of contemporary international and internal armed conflicts in their political, economic, and military aspects; the role of alliances and other security systems; disarmament and arms control; and strategic doctrines and national defense policies. Information includes number of research staff, main focus of research, publications, library, and source of income.

944

Lyon, Peter. EUROPE AND THE THIRD WORLD. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 137-147.

H1.A4, v. 386

Europe and the Third World are both richly evocative, rather than exact, terms, as immediately becomes apparent if we trace--however lightly--some of their varying connotations from their origins to today. The idea of Europe is ancient, ambiguous, and multivariable. The Third World is a powerful myth and a practical anachronism. European colonialism and decolonization--especially that of Britain and France--have left many legacies which provide opportunities for continuing ties today and help or hinder new definitions, declaratory and operational, of purposes, policies, and procedures. The future of Europe and the future of the Third World are two profoundly open and complex sets of possibilities which will, in some manner, undoubtedly interact. Any substantial political rearrangements in Europe will, it is most likely, be inaugurated and practiced without any substantial influence from the Third World. If greater European unity is accomplished, then Europe could become a great benefactor to some, or most, of the countries of the Third World. Europe and the Third World are, in many important senses, members of one world. (Abstract supplied)

945

Mendershausen, Horst. THE DIPLOMAT'S NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL COMMITMENTS. Foreign service journal, v. 47, Feb. 1970: 20-22, 31-33.

JX1.A53, v. 47

Explores the divided commitments of the diplomat who must live and work in two or more collectivities and be accepted by them. These commitments may be national or transnational; that is, to states and international organizations or to complex governments and more than one government at a time. Mendershausen identifies situations that demand maximal congruity of the diplomat's commitments or accentuate their incongruity and so impede the performance of the diplomat's function.

946

Miller, Linda B. THE NEW STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 102-112.

H1.A4, v. 386

The expectations of the new states toward the international society are shaped by their relationships with each other and with the super-powers. Neither set of relationships has proved to be stable in the decolonization era. Increasing cleavages in the group of new states and shifting priorities in the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union attest to the fluidity of the contemporary environment. As the new states press their demands for social justice and economic development in the councils of international organizations, they reject *ad hoc* procedures and seek "legislative" outcomes. If issue-areas become more autonomous in the next two decades, the fate of established "trade-off patterns" will become uncertain, although some form of inter-regional or interfunctional bargaining is likely to persist. The authority of international organizations will remain contingent during the period of the 1970's when the new states will concentrate on consolidating the gains of the immediate postindependence years. (Abstract supplied)

947

Morse, Edward L. THE TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES; MODERNIZATION, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND EXTERNALIZATION. World politics, v. 22, Apr. 1970: 371-392.

D839.W57, v. 22

Modernization is effecting a continuous transformation of the domestic and international settings in which foreign policies are formulated and conducted. Domestically, modernization is accompanied by centralization of decisionmaking and increased attention to socioeconomic wants; internationally, it is associated with increased levels and types of interdependencies among national societies. The general results are a breakdown of the line of demarcation between foreign and domestic affairs, greater emphasis on the individual citizen's welfare, and a decrease in the ability to control events that are either internal or external to modernized states. The chances of instability for international society as a whole have been augmented since interdependence has advanced beyond the instruments capable of controlling it or the available knowledge of its effects.

948

Munk, Frank. COMMUNIST HERESIES: HOPES AND HAZARDS. Western political quarterly, v. 22, Dec. 1969: 921-925.

JAL.W4, v. 22

Speculates on the consequences of Communist heresies. Munk compares the present situation to that which existed in Europe during the Reformation, when the disintegration of the universal church released a flood of violence that lasted

for several centuries and engulfed heretic, Catholic, and innocent bystander alike, and warns that the breakdown of Communist bloc unity may have freed the West from one serious danger only to expose it to another.

949

MYTHS, PERCEPTIONS, AND POLICY: A SYMPOSIUM. Problems of communism, v. 19, Jan./Feb. 1970: 1-27; Mar./Apr.: 1-13. HXL.P75, v. 19

Contents.--v. 1. "Monolithic" vs. "crumbling" communism, by Andrew Ezergailis. Commentaries, by Michel Tatu, Hugh Seton-Watson, Bernard S. Morris, Rodger Swearingen, Klaus Mehnert, Alec Mow, Donald W. Treadgold, Masamichi Inoki, Rex Mortimer, Joseph Starobin.--v. 2. Commentaries, by William E. Griffith, Seweryn Bialer, Tibor Szamuely, Renato Mieli, Leo Labedz. In reply, by Andrew Ezergailis.

Symposium initiated by Ezergailis' examination of the rival "myths" of monolithic and crumbling communism and the Western belief that the declining ideological cohesion of the Communist world reduces the dangers facing the West. Commentators address themselves to such questions as the past and present applicability of the monolith characterization to international communism, the real existence of an "international Communist movement," and the effect of the growing independence of some national Communist Parties on their internal organizational structure and overall policies.

950

NATIONS OF THE PACIFIC. Current history, v. 58, Apr. 1970: 193-239, 243-246. D410.C82, v. 58

Contents.--The United States as a Pacific power, by William C. Johnstone.--The Philippines under Marcos, by Richard Butwell.--The U.S.-Japanese treaty crisis, by Robert Epp.--The two Koreas, by Byung Chul Koh.--New Zealand in the 1970's, by W. Keith Jackson.--Australia as an Indo-Pacific power, by Harry G. Gelber.--The future of North Vietnam, by Arthur J. Dommen.--The trust territory of the Pacific islands, by Donald D. Johnson.

Reviews the internal developments of the major Asian countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean, excluding the Soviet Union and China, and assesses their respective roles in regional affairs.

951

Nelson, Janice D., Donna M. Gelfand, and Donald P. Hartmann. CHILDREN'S AGGRESSION FOLLOWING COMPETITION AND EXPOSURE TO AN AGGRESSIVE MODEL. Child development, v. 40, Dec. 1969: 1085-1097. HQ750.A1C45, v. 40

Aggressive behavior was studied in 96 5- and 6-year-old children who observed either an aggressive or a nonaggressive adult model. Subsequent to viewing the model each child either succeeded or failed in competitive games or engaged in non-

competitive play. Results based on observation of free-play behavior were: (a) participation in competitive games increased aggression, and the predicted group ordering for aggressiveness (failure, success, no competition) was obtained in 3 of the 4 possible comparisons; (b) exposure to the aggressive model increased girls' but not boys' aggressiveness; (c) boys were more aggressive than girls, but only after witnessing the nonaggressive model. Boys and girls exposed to modeled aggression were equally aggressive. (Abstract supplied)

952

Rabier, Jacques René. [SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE IN REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION] La psychologie sociale, la sociologie et la science politique devant l'intégration européenne. Politico, v. 34, Dec. 1969: 701-708. JAL8.P65, v. 34

The literary-historical approach, which is dominant in the study of European integration because of the early prevalence of jurists and economists, should be replaced by comparative or international studies that are multidisciplinary in methodology and emphasize the dynamics of the historical succession of events. The creation of a European research center on public opinion to act as a clearinghouse should be given priority.

953

Rapoport, Anatol. N-PERSON GAME THEORY; CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press [c1970] 331 p. QA270.R34 1970

Contents.--Introduction: some mathematical tools.--pt. 1. Basic concepts: Levels of game-theoretic analysis. Three-level analysis of elementary games. Individual and group rationality. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. The Shapley value. The bargaining set. The kernel. Restrictions on realignments. Games in partition function form. N-person theory and two-person theory compared. Harsanyi's bargaining model.--pt. 2. Applications: Introduction to part 2. A small market. Large markets. Simple games and legislatures. Symmetric and quota games. Coalitions and power. Experiments suggested by N-person game theory. "So long sucker"; a do-it-yourself experiment. The behavioral scientist's view. Concluding remarks. Notes. References. Index.

Presents "the essential ideas developed in the original formulation of N-person game theory by Von Neumann and Morgenstern and the subsequent extensions by the present generation of game theoreticians."

954

Raupach, Hans. [ANTAGONISM, COEXISTENCE OR CONVERGENCE OF WESTERN AND EASTERN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS] Antagonismus, Koexistenz oder Konvergenz west-östlicher Wirtschaftssysteme. Politische Studien, v. 21, Jan./Feb. 1970: 33-40. H35.P66, v. 21

Considers a comparative theory of politicoeconomic systems and the spontaneous synthesis between capitalism and socialism. History shows that an agreement or difference in principle between social orders is unimportant for power-politics relations and, consequently, for peaceful coexistence."

955

Russett, Bruce M. INDICATORS FOR AMERICA'S LINKAGES WITH THE CHANGING WORLD ENVIRONMENT. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Political intelligence for America's future. Philadelphia, 1970. (*Its Annals*, v. 388, Mar. 1970) p. 82-96.

H1.A4, v. 388

Many variables are thought to be relevant to international politics. Better theory is needed to increase parsimony, but meanwhile a *tour d'horizon* of possible data-gathering efforts is offered. Collection costs could be eased by sampling nations according to level of development, region, or policy importance, and many highly correlated measures could be eliminated. A list of indicators for American linkages to the world is given, with indicators distinguished between stock and flow; over-all linkages and links to particular states; and ratios of foreign links to domestic equivalents. The world environment should be documented according to national-attribute data on politics and social conditions; the world-wide distribution of value-achievement; value-aspirations; and the level and pattern of linkages of a world society. All indicators are labeled as to current availability or potential cost of collection. More effort should go to collating and distributing existing information than to new data-gathering, except for variables of exceptional theoretical interest. (Abstract supplied)

956

Sidjanski, Dusan. [NEW DIRECTIONS IN STUDIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION] Nouvelles orientations des recherches sur l'intégration européenne. *Politico*, v. 34, Dec. 1969: 680-689.

JA18.P65, v. 34

Categorizes European and American studies of European integration by the research methodologies that are employed. Sidjanski concludes that the institutional approach predominates and that European scholars lag behind Americans in the exploitation of quantitative methods.

957

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS; "AGENDA FOR EUROPE" INTERNATIONAL WEEKEND MEETING: May 2/4, 1969. *Journal of Common Market studies*, v. 8, Dec. 1969: 133-159.

HC241.J6, v. 8

The significance of West European integration for planning, industrial democracy, education, and participation in political decisionmaking.

958

UNDERSTANDING MODERN CHINA. Edited with an introd. by Joseph M. Kitagawa. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1969. 284 p. maps.

DS703.4.U5 1969

Essays presented to a seminar at Solvang, Calif., in March 1968 on the theme "After Mao and Chiang: Two Chinas?" sponsored by the Council on Religion and International Affairs.

Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Introduction: Western understanding of the East, by Joseph M. Kitagawa.--The geography of China, by Norton Ginsburg.--The unity of China, by E. G. Pulleyblank.--Political leadership and modernization in Communist China, by Henry G. Schwarz.--Economics, ideology, and the cultural revolution, by Yuan-li Wu.--The style of politics and foreign policy in Communist China, by Melvin Gurtov.--The Taiwanese in Taiwan, by Stephen Uhalley, Jr.--Chinese in Southeast Asia, by Claude A. Buss.--On being Chinese: a philosophical reflection, by Vincent Y. C. Shih.--China in Asia, by Joseph M. Kitagawa.--Two realities, by Mark Mancall.--American perceptions of China, by Seth Tillman.

Designed to stimulate popular discussion on the problems of the present and future of mainland China and Taiwan and to introduce concerned laymen to "the seemingly incomprehensible and perhaps irremediable problems" posed by China.

959

Vernon, Raymond. MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND THE NATION STATE; PROJECT REPORT FROM THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL. *Journal of Common Market studies*, v. 8, Dec. 1969: 160-170.

HC241.J6, v. 8

Third annual progress report on the study of multinational enterprises. The project was designed to evaluate problems of the multinational enterprise in finance, marketing, organization, and business-government relations and its role in international trade, capital movements, and technology transfer.

960

Wilcox, Wayne. THE PROTAGONIST POWERS AND THE THIRD WORLD. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system. Philadelphia, 1969. (*Its Annals*, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 1-9.

H1.A4, v. 386

The international system has undergone great changes since the nineteenth-century European balance of power. Central in its dynamics has been the changing number, nature, and power of the protagonists in world politics. Some of the disorganization of the interwar period may be explained by the reluctance of the United States and the Soviet Union to play key roles in the postwar world. After World War II, Soviet reconstruction and preoccupation with East European and Chinese

allies kept the Soviet Union from challenging America's *de facto* hegemony outside the socialist countries. United States policy toward the Third World was to favor nationalism and to strengthen new states by transferring arms and economic resources to them. This pattern of diplomacy stabilized the international system and led to the emergence of confident Third World governments that became protagonists in the new system. The special American role in ensuring this form of world order is now diminishing, for a variety of political and strategic reasons; and Russian capabilities, while much greater, are also heavily invested in regional and domestic commitments. Third World states are, therefore, the most dynamic elements in the changes in world politics. Their role as protagonists is accelerated by technological change and by the entrance of world corporations and other transnational actors into global politics. (Abstract supplied)

961

Wilcox, Wayne, ed. PROTAGONISTS, POWER, AND THE THIRD WORLD: ESSAYS ON THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 1-137. H1.A4, v. 386

Contents.--The protagonist powers and the Third World, by Wayne Wilcox.--The great powers as protagonists: Presidents, politics, and international intervention, by Paul Y. Hammond. A view from Washington, by Thomas Perry Thornton. The Soviet Union in the Third World: purpose in search of power, by Fritz Ermarth. "One percent"; the problem of economic aid, by Lev Stepanov.--The Third World states as participants: The Third World and the great powers, by Sisir Gupta. Peking's revolutionary strategy in the developing world; the failures of success, by Thomas W. Robinson. India and the Soviet Union, by Dietmar Rothermund. Can a ministate find true happiness in a world dominated by protagonist powers?; the Nepal case, by Leo E. Rose and Roger Dial.--New factors in the world system: The new states and the international society, by Linda B. Miller. Nuclear technology, weapons, and the Third World, by Ciro Zoppo. Third World modernization in transnational perspective, by Terence K. Hopkins. Europe and the Third World, by Peter Lyon.

Examines changes in the international system brought about by changes in the composition and role of the great powers and the rise of new protagonist states in the Third World.

962

Wilczynski, Josef. THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF EAST-WEST TRADE. New York, Praeger [1969] 416 p. HF1411.W55

Contents.--List of tables and diagrams.--Foreword, by Professor Harry G. Johnson.--Preface.--pt. 1. East-West trade in perspective: East-West trade. Structure. Changing patterns of direction.--pt. 2. Principles, policies, practices:

Ideological and theoretical background. Organization. Prices, exchange rates and tariffs. Weapons of trade policy.--pt. 3. Major issues in East-West trade: Equality of trading opportunity. Dumping. Payments and finance. Politics in partnership with trade. Strategic embargo. Trade disputes. Gains and waste. East-West trade as an avenue of convergence.--A selected bibliography.--Index of names.--Subject index.

Study of trade between two antagonistic economic and political systems, which emphasizes the economic processes but brings out political considerations where warranted and assesses their extent, relative importance, and effects. Wilczynski evaluates the proposition that East-West trade may be a factor in promoting the convergence of the two systems.

FOREIGN POLICIES

963

Albinski, Henry S. POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN AUSTRALIA; THE IMPACT OF VIETNAM AND CONSCRIPTION. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1970. 238 p. DU117.A7

Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--The Australian public and the salience of external affairs: a perspective.--The clash of party positions on Vietnam-conscription.--Stylistic characteristics of the party dialogue over Vietnam and conscription.--Vietnam and conscription as reflections of labor's internal problems.--Organized public protest activity: general characteristics.--The churches, veterans, and Vietnam-conscription.--Vietnamese protest among academics, artists, and university students.--Some observations on the Australian political process: party politics, foreign policy, and civil liberties.--The Australian public and Vietnam-conscription: some measures of interest, opinion and electoral behavior.

Studies the Vietnam and conscription themes in recent Australian foreign policy to interpret the interplay between external affairs and domestic policies in the Australian political process.

964

Ali, Picho. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NON-ALIGNMENT. East Africa Journal, v. 6, Oct. 1969: 19-29. DT421.E28, v. 6

Nonalignment can be a dynamic, positive policy to maintain the independence of the small state in conformity with the U.N. Charter and in the spirit of active international cooperation for world peace and security. In the contemporary world nonalignment rejects commitment to the military blocs and actively supports the anti-imperialist liberation struggle. "For Africa, non-alignment must stand on a progressive, socialist economic, social and political order if it is to be a vital, meaningful, and real instrument in the hands of Africans for political, economic and social liberation."

965

Allison, Graham T., Ernest R. May, and Adam Yarmolinsky. LIMITS TO INTERVENTION. Foreign affairs, v. 48, Jan. 1970: 245-261.

D410.F6, v. 48

First article in a section entitled "U.S. Military Policy."

Present discontents about the U.S. role in world affairs offer the opportunity to set a new course in American foreign policy and lay down new rules to govern the use of nonnuclear forces. One can readily distinguish three categories of cases that raise the possibility of nonnuclear intervention abroad. The first category covers instances in which a major Communist power commits overt aggression against a U.S. ally. For this category, the President should establish a presumption that the United States will intervene but only after he has made an intensive review of all existing U.S. treaties of alliance and reaffirmed or revised each of them accordingly. The second category covers cases in which any state commits overt aggression against a state not allied with the United States. In these cases, the degree of U.S. interest will depend largely on whether other major powers are involved. When they are not, there should be a presumption against U.S. intervention. The third category covers instances of "internal violence jeopardizing a friendly state, perhaps aided from outside but not involving significant overt action by foreign ground, air or naval units." For these cases, the United States should establish a strong presumption against intervention. Even with the suggested presumptions in effect, the United States would have to maintain substantial nonnuclear, or general purpose, forces. The administration should set as its goal the reduction of general purpose forces to the levels maintained during the Eisenhower period. Besides saving substantial amounts of money, sharp cutbacks in general purpose forces would make it easier for the President to put the new policy presumptions into effect. As long as the United States maintains nonnuclear forces greater than it needs to fulfill its basic treaty commitments, others will be skeptical about the new presumptions, and the bureaucracy will be encouraged to keep its attention focused on solutions requiring the use of force.

966

ASIAN DILEMMA: UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND CHINA. A SPECIAL REPORT FROM THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. Edited by Elaine H. Burnell. Santa Barbara, Calif., Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions [1969] xvi, 238 p. (Center occasional paper, v. 2, no. 5) E183.8.C5A75

Contents.--Preface, by Elaine H. Burnell.--pt. 1. An isolated China; threat to world peace: The three teachers of Mao Tse-tung. The influence of United States China policy on Sino-Soviet and Soviet-American relations. Barriers to stability and prosperity in Asia.--pt. 2. The making of an impasse: The United States and China, 1945 to

1969. Japan's changing focus. The aggressive People's Republic of China, menace or myth? The Vietnam War in perspective.--pt. 3. The critical questions; a time for entrenchment or an opportunity for modification? Security for East and West. Recognition of Communist China, points for consideration. Taiwan. Chinese representation in the United Nations.--pt. 4. A new age for Asia: Trade and development, keys to Asian stability. The importance of cultural exchange. The prospects for the future. Fresh approaches to ancient problems.--Acknowledgements.

Position papers and discussions on Communist China and its relations with Japan and the United States by prominent Japanese legislators and their American counterparts and others. Among the specific issues discussed are the renewal of the U.S.-Japan security treaty and Japanese rearmament.

967

Aspaturian, Vernon V. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS: CONFLICT AND/OR COLLABORATION? International organization, v. 23, summer 1969: 589-620. JX1901.I55, v. 23

The decisiveness with which the Soviet Union intervened in Czechoslovakia was a notable exception to the vacillation and drift that have characterized Soviet foreign policy since the Brezhnev-Kosygin takeover. The more eccentric and unpredictable behavior of Khrushchev has given way to the cautious and bland policies of his successors, but the basic conditioning factors remain the same: "the erosion of ideology and the consequent loss of the sense of purpose and direction which has always been a strong point in Soviet decision-making; . . . the fragmentation of the decision-making process which has contributed to the erosion of ideology and which in turn has been accelerated by it; and . . . the globalization of Soviet commitments in world affairs at a time when that country has suffered both a loss of purpose and a weakening of will." Khrushchev sought a détente with the United States and even hinted at the establishment of a joint Soviet-U.S. condominium with recognized spheres of influence, anticipating that such a condominium would lead to arms control agreements and other reductions in defense expenditures, enable the Soviet Union and the United States to deal more effectively with threats to their hegemony, and make possible a rise in the Soviet standard of living. Brezhnev and Kosygin pursued a modified version of Khrushchev's détente policy in their first years in power but faced growing opposition within the Soviet leadership as defense of the status quo appeared to surrender the political and diplomatic initiative to the United States. While its relationship with the United States remains of paramount importance, however, the Soviet Union must increasingly take account of the growing power and aspirations of China. None of these considerations is likely to affect Soviet policy toward the United Nations.

968

Axen, Hermann. [ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS] Zur internationalen Lage und zur Entwicklung des Kräfteverhältnisses. Berlin, Ditz, 1967. 61 p. (Der Parteiarbeiter) D1058.A94

Revised text of speech given to a seminar of the Central Committee, Socialist Unity Party, and first secretaries of the District Administrations, Brandenburg, Oct. 9-13, 1967.

Depicts the conformance with social laws of the development of the international class struggle and world power relationships since the seventh congress of the East German Socialist Unity Party. Axen discusses these trends in connection with the party's international relationships and the present problems of East Germany's foreign policy.

969

Balabushevich, Vladimir V., comp. Edited by V. V. Balabushevich [and] Bimla Prasad. INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION; A SYMPOSIUM. Delhi, People's Pub. House [1969] 228 p.

DS450.R8B3

Contents.--The background of Indo-Soviet friendship, by Bimla Prasad.--Steady growth of relations, by K. P. S. Menon.--The USSR and India in the struggle for peace, by V. Pavlovsky.--Indo-Soviet friendship as a catalyst in world politics, by D. N. Mallik.--Soviet-Indian economic ties, by M. Alexandrov and O. Mayev.--Indo-Soviet economic cooperation: retrospect and prospect, by M. Dubey.--Soviet impact on Indian planning, by V. B. Singh.--The USSR Academy of Sciences and Soviet-Indian scientific ties, by S. G. Korneyev.--Soviet-Indian cultural relations, by M. P. Babkina and S. I. Potabenko.--The ideal of October and India's progressive thought, by E. N. Komarov.--Indology in USSR, by V. V. Balabushevich and A. H. Wafa.--Soviet studies in India, by R. Vaidyanath.

"A tribute to the friendship and unity between the two peoples and countries and an effort to strengthen the bonds of their mutual understanding and amity."

970

Bechtoldt, Heinrich. [THE BILATERALISM OF GERMANY'S EASTERN POLICY] Der Bilateralismus deutscher Ostpolitik. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, Jan. 1970: 5-8. D839.A885, v. 21

Asserts that, without any change in West German alliances, West Germany's political environment now allows Bonn to conduct an active Eastern policy, which will eventually lead to a well-balanced foreign policy. The general intensification of bilateral East-West talks and West Germany's growing economic potential constitute a favorable combination of circumstances for new initiatives in Germany's Eastern policy.

971

Beebe, Lucius. THE CHINA FORMULA. Cosantoir, v. 29, Oct. 1969: 343-346.

U1.C8, v. 29

Reprinted from Revue militaire générale. U2.R48

Describes the unofficial aspect of Communist China's diplomacy, the effort to penetrate into the grassroots of the developing nations. According to Lin Piao, Maoism will reach a vast and receptive mass, and Chinese Communist stewardship will be followed by Chinese suzerainty.

972

Brandt, Willy. A PEACE POLICY FOR EUROPE. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1969] 225 p. DD259.4.B67313 1969

Translation of Friedenspolitik in Europa, which was cited as item 460 in v. 5, no. 2, of this bibliography. DD259.7.B7A5

Underlines the overriding importance of an East-West settlement in Europe for global interbloc accommodation and contends that détente in Europe and development of West European economic and political cooperation would more likely solve European problems than would the political integration of Western Europe within the Atlantic framework. The German Federal Republic shares the American goal of strengthening peace through arms control agreements.

973

Brandt, Willy. REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE NATION. In Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-) Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin, a weekly survey of German affairs, v. 18, Jan. 20, 1970: suppl., 1-8. DD259.A35, v. 18

Submitted to the Bundestag, Jan. 14, 1970.

Underlines the oneness of the German nation, whose reunification in a European peace arrangement remains the German people's long-range goal. In the meantime, the German Federal Republic (GFR) seeks regular relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) but always rejects the condition that the two states be considered countries foreign to each other. Such relations must not adversely affect the right of the German people to self-determination; West Berlin's ties with West Germany and the Four Powers' responsibility for the whole of Berlin; the Three Powers' rights and commitments in regard to Germany as a whole, the German Federal Republic, and Berlin; and West German rights and obligations toward the Three Powers. Poland does not seem to agree with East Berlin that East German recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line as a final peace boundary was made in the name of all Germans, nor do the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty Organization countries support the GDR demand that the GFR loosen its ties with NATO. GFR commitments to NATO cannot be the subject of GFR-GDR discussions. Bonn seeks to improve relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the GDR through bilateral renunciation-of-force agreements and supports the Three Powers' intention to talk with Moscow about Berlin.

974

Brinkley, George A. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED NATIONS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Review of politics, v. 32, Jan. 1970: 91-123. JAL.R4, v. 32

Examines recent changes in the important triangular relationship between the Soviet Union, the United Nations, and the developing countries, as exemplified in statistics on U.N. voting, budgeting, and other business. The present Soviet leaders have adopted a policy toward the United Nations and the Third World that some observers describe as a "return to Stalinism" but which might be better characterized as a policy of "skeptical conservatism." By pursuing détente with the United States on the one hand and seeking to preserve its role as spokesman for the developing countries on the other, the Soviet Union may succeed only in alienating both parties. However, the issue is still in doubt, and Soviet diplomacy, which has had a long experience with putting ambivalence to good use, should not be discounted.

975

Cameron, Duncan H. THE PANAMA CANAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. Midwest quarterly, v. 11, winter 1970: 141-152. AS30.M5, v. 11

The 1964 Canal Zone riots led to several changes in the control and regulation of the Panama Canal but left unresolved important questions concerning U.S. interests there. "The existing lock canal is inherently indefensible" despite its acknowledged military and economic importance to the United States and Latin America. The threat of internal violence remains greater than the threat of foreign aggression, but either could render it inoperative with relative ease. The proposed sea-level canal now under study could not only handle a great volume of military and commercial traffic but also would be difficult to destroy. U.S. interests in the isthmus might better be served by a binational U.S.-Panamanian authority than by the present Hay-Varilla Treaty structure, which frequently obscures the basic U.S. interest of maintaining the efficient and continuous flow of all traffic at reasonable cost.

976

Church, Frank. TOWARD A NEW POLICY FOR LATIN AMERICA. Christianity and crisis, v. 30, Mar. 2, 1970: 31-36. BR1.C6A17, v. 30

Adapted from a speech to the Catholic Inter-American Cooperative Program conference in Washington, D.C.

Calls for a low profile approach to U.S.-Latin American relations, emphasizing that "the more gently we press our neighbors, the greater our influence is likely to be." Church traces America's unrestrained involvement in Latin America since 1898 and lists guidelines for U.S. policy for the 1970's.

977

Clubb, O. Edmund. THE GLOBAL TRIANGLE. Progressive, v. 34, Mar. 1970: 19-21. AP2.P8655, v. 34

The present thaw in Chinese foreign policy will manifest itself in Peking's relations with the Third World and Europe. The possibility of a rapprochement with the United States is less than with any other country. Mao's anti-imperialism and American anticommunism are both too rigidly held to permit reconciliation. China cannot amicably accept an American presence that denies access to Southeast Asia and the South Seas. China will maneuver to attain a position from which it can play the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan against each other. In the long run, China must always remain closer to Communist "revisionists" than to American "imperialists."

978

THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS, 1968. Edited by Robert R. James. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969. 203 p. map. DB215.6.C87

Expansion of a background paper prepared for a conference organized by the Institute for the Study of International Organization, University of Sussex, October 14-16, 1968.

Contents.—Preface.—The Czechoslovak background.—The Soviet dilemma.—The role of the Warsaw Pact.—NATO and the crisis.—The United Nations and the crisis.—Interpretations and conclusions.—Selected chronology, January-December 1968.—Appendix 1: The Warsaw Pact.—Appendix 2: The Warsaw letter and the Czechoslovak reply.—Appendix 3: Security Council resolutions, 22 and 23 August.—Appendix 4: The Moscow agreement, 27 August.—Appendix 5: Legal aspects of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.—Select bibliography.—Index.

Analysis of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and its implications for the Warsaw Pact, NATO, and the United Nations. The intervention revealed that the Warsaw Pact's prime importance is as an instrument for Soviet control of the "Socialist Commonwealth" and revived Western interest in NATO. Operating within its limits, the United Nations acquitted itself reasonably effectively. The most important lesson for the West is that it should not expect any of the East European countries to move substantially ahead of what the Soviet Union will sanction. "and it is here argued that such a conclusion is not necessarily a depressing one."

979

Ermarth, Fritz. THE SOVIET UNION IN THE THIRD WORLD: PURPOSE IN SEARCH OF POWER. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system. Philadelphia, 1969. (1st Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 31-40. MI.A4, v. 386

Although the Soviet Union inherited its ideological commitment to revolution in the Third World from Lenin, it was only in Khrushchev's time, after industrialization and victory in World War II had made the Soviet Union a world power, that this commitment became an important component of Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev envisaged a fairly rapid transition by postcolonial states toward Soviet-type "socialism." This process was to be guided by the example of Soviet national development, protected by the deterrent shield of Soviet strategic power, and accelerated by a modicum of Soviet economic and military aid. But Khrushchev's vision exceeded the Soviet Union's power to fulfill it. Nationalists in power throughout the Third World advanced their own visions of the future, often at variance with Soviet views. And the Western powers were not restrained from intervening actively in the Third World where their interests were at stake. Khrushchev's successors have been less sanguine. They have tended to concentrate on specific areas of the Third World and have also been more willing to intervene in Third World military conflicts involving the United States. Only the future will show whether they use their increased power with the restraint that weakness imposed upon them in the past. (Abstract supplied)

980

Fenyvesi, Charles. REPORT FROM EASTERN EUROPE. Prevent world war III, no. 75, winter/spring 1970: 10-11. D731.P75, 1970

The Soviet Union prefers the present limited war in the Middle East, which requires increasing Arab dependence, to another full-scale war. Israel is replacing West Germany as the object of Soviet hate propaganda because an anti-Israeli campaign increases Moscow's influence among the Arab States and the Chinese dispute is forcing the Russians to search for détente in Europe, which requires better West German relations. A thaw in Soviet-Israeli relations is "out of the question" until Israel withdraws from the occupied territories. The most Israel could hope for, however, would be freedom of navigation of the Straits of Tiran and possibly the Suez Canal. In the satellite countries there is much sympathy for Israel outside the Communist Party and even within the party in Hungary and Yugoslavia.

981

Freeth, Gordon. AUSTRALIA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH ASIA. In Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, v. 40, Oct. 1969: 572-578. JX1162.A33, v. 40

Australia's participation in regional security pacts aims to assist legitimate governments that are or are likely to become the targets of externally supported subversion to defend themselves eventually. In accordance with the keystone of Australian security, the ANZUS Treaty of 1951, as supplemented by the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, Australia has sent troops to Korea,

Malaysia, and Vietnam and has pledged forces to Malaysia and Singapore after the British withdrawal. Australia has played an important and constructive role in the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the Asian and Pacific Council, the Colombo plan, and other regional institutions strengthening self-help and cooperation. Australia's willing involvement in economic cooperation is evidenced by the fact that in terms of gross national product Australia is second or third among donor countries overall. Trade with the countries of Asia, particularly Japan, is quantitatively and qualitatively important for Australia, whose Government actively encourages the concomitant establishment of joint enterprises by its investment insurance system. The expansion of cultural relations with Asian and Pacific countries is also reflected in a great variety of ways.

982

Gelber, Harry G. [POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF A NEW AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA] Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer neuen amerikanischen China-Politik. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Feb. 25, 1970: 119-128. D839.E86, v. 25

Contents that improved Sino-American relations could make the U.S. Asian policy more flexible and lead to arms control talks with China. However, the achievement of a modus vivendi with China is not a near possibility; even after Mao's death Peking's absorption with China's domestic affairs will continue to dominate its foreign policy. Any important move by the United States toward China is bound to influence directly American relations with Japan and the Soviet Union, open the question of China's admission to the United Nations, and adversely affect the American presence in Asia. To be realistic, America's China policy must not be rigid but try cautiously and patiently to work for Sino-American agreements in areas of nonideological concern. These may even relate to security and lead to war prevention talks.

983

Ghosh, Manomohan. CHINA'S CONFLICT WITH INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. Calcutta, World Press, 1969. 143 p. DS740.5.I505

Contents.--pt. 1. China-Soviet relations: Introduction and relations (1639-1927). Relations from 1927 to 1964.--pt. 2. China-India relations: Revival of cultural contact. The Tibetan question. Leadership of Asia and the Soviet aid. Powers interested in China-India conflict. Intrigues on Tibet and the Sino-Indian disaster. The conclusion. The postscript.--Notes.--Important dates.--Select bibliography.

Pro-Soviet, anti-Maoist discussion of the India-China-Soviet Union triangle. India is endangered not by internal communism but by a Sino-American alliance inspired by jealousy of India's growing industrialization.

984

Graff, Henry F. PARTICIPATORY FOREIGN POLICY. New leader, v. 53, Mar. 2, 1970: 10-15. illus. HXL.N37, v. 53

Senate Resolution (S. Res.) 85 in effect asserts that Congress must be recognized as an equal partner of the President in shaping foreign policy. Support for S. Res. 85 came from "internationalists" and "isolationists," who are united in thinking that inordinate growth of presidential power has occurred through default of Congress. The effort to alter the present relationship is one aspect of America's discontent with its own foreign policy performance. While not in itself a movement to isolation, although it may foreshadow such a move, S. Res. 85 expresses the hope of "discovering a fresh way of defining such unavoidable concepts as 'national interest' and 'international responsibilities.'"

985

Haas, Ernst B. THE WEB OF INTERDEPENDENCE; THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. (America's role in world affairs series) Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall (1970) 115 p. JX1977.2.U5H2

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Nations and statesmen in the international system.--American democracy and the international system.--National security, world peace, and disarmament.--World economic development, trade, and finance.--The next challenge: human rights, science, and technology.--The future international system.--Agencies.--Index.

Examines "the network of short- and long-range forces, the constraints and institutions devised to channel them, and the immersion of the national interest of the United States in this pattern," which comprise the international "web of interdependence." The manner in which Americans formulate specific policy demands on international organizations is illustrated in the areas of collective security, regional defensive alliances, arms control, aid and technical development, trade and finance, human rights, decolonialization, science, technology, and international planning. Assuming the acceptance by policymakers of existing trends and the continuation of systemic learning, Haas sketches the future of the international system.

986

Hadik, Laszlo. FRANCE'S NEW APPROACH TO WESTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY. World affairs, v. 132, Dec. 1969: 209-218. JX1901.W7, v. 132

De Gaulle made important changes in emphases and priorities before passing on his alliance and security policies to Pompidou. He had been forced into rethinking his concepts of Soviet-bloc inner relationships and of France's place in Europe by the Czech invasion and the June 1968 riots. In addition, the United States seemed to him to be pursuing a course that endangered the room for maneuver France required to construct a new European secu-

rity system. The American emphasis on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty precluded nuclear sharing, and the strategic arms limitation talks implied acceptance of Soviet-American parity. This doubt about the effectiveness of an American nuclear commitment to Europe previously taken for granted upset De Gaulle's timetable. The superpower standoff had come prematurely; that is, before Europe would be able to protest effectively against having its future shaped in possibly inappropriate ways. The idea of "European caucus," the interest in multilateral development and production of weapon systems, and the change in French strategic policy away from the "all-asimuths" theory are signs of a new French attitude toward alliances. These signs do not mean that France will accept or promote a united Europe closely tied to the United States or return to NATO. The French objective is to mesh its military power into the NATO system independently. The successful dovetailing of a small independent deterrent force with NATO would give Western Europe the assurance it requires while searching for a new security system.

987

Hamaond, Paul Y. PRESIDENTS, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 10-18. H1.A4, v. 386

In repudiating isolationism after World War II, the internationalists did not specify any principle of discrimination for our involvement beyond an undisputed interest in saving Europe. Two conditions prevented a thoughtful sifting of American interests and opportunities after World War II: the need to mobilize American political consent for an international role and the obtrusiveness of the Soviet Communist enemy. Furthermore, the political costs that the Truman administration incurred after 1948 by appearing to let Nationalist China fall led every presidential administration since then to adopt a cover-all-bets strategy toward the Communist world. The Korean war predisposed the voting public to want some solution, and they turned to Eisenhower. The election of 1956 indicated a broad public confidence in him; yet, his critics were able to capitalize on anxieties over his apparent complacency about the foreign developments that Sputnik triggered in 1957. Kennedy used foreign policy as a political opportunity, capitalizing on the demands of foreign policy to expand his popularity quickly. Johnson gave himself over to a military solution in Vietnam in an effort to keep ahead of public impatience over the war. The Nixon administration's early strategy seems to be to encourage a reduction of public attention to Vietnam and other foreign-policy issues and a return to deferential public attitudes reminiscent of Eisenhower's first term. That may be essential to win public acceptance of any feasible Vietnam settlement. As for the future, Vietnam makes it possible now to abandon the cover-all-bets strategy. (Abstract supplied)

988

Huopaniemi, Jukka. **THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN FINNISH FOREIGN POLICY.** Review of international affairs, v. 20, Dec. 5, 1969: 26-28. D839.R4, v. 20

Neutral and nonaligned states increasingly see their optimal policy as a combination of impartiality and constructive activity. Organizations like the Economic Commission for Europe, which promote East-West cooperation, are of interest to Finland. Limited regional cooperation of the kind into which Finland has entered with the other Scandinavian countries is a transitional measure toward European security. The Finnish relationship with the Soviet Union is an example of the possibility of peaceful coexistence of countries with different political and social systems. In this Finland has been careful to honor the spirit of neutralism. When Finland became an associate member of the European Free Trade Association, the same commercial privileges were awarded the Soviet Union, and Finland does not contemplate joining the Common Market, with its pronounced political emphasis. In May 1969 Finland expressed the positive aspect of neutrality by announcing its willingness to host a European security conference.

989

Jha, D. C. **ATTITUDE OF COMMUNIST CHINA TOWARDS THE INDO-PAKISTANI SUBCONTINENT.** Indian journal of political science, v. 30, July/Aug. 1969: 249-259. JA26.I5, v. 30

Surveys Communist China's relations with India and Pakistan, emphasizing Sino-Pakistani collaboration against India. Jha concludes that Chinese policy toward the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent is shaped by regional Sino-Indian competition and Sino-American and Sino-Soviet rivalries.

990

Kals, Wolf. **(U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA)** Sicherheitspolitik der USA in Lateinamerika. Ausenpolitik, v. 20, Dec. 1969: 756-762. D839.A885, v. 20

The United States considers Latin America an outpost of its security policy, but its methods have changed in recent years. "Big stick" measures have become impractical since the last intervention in the Dominican Republic. Washington now aims for the domestic security of Latin America against rebellion and revolution. Kals here analyzes contractual arrangements and methods to accomplish this. The present change in American policy methods coincides with the growing number of military regimes in the region. Military aid and arms trade play an important role in U.S. efforts to improve Latin American security. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

991

Koh, Byung Chul. **THE FOREIGN POLICY OF NORTH KOREA.** New York, Praeger (1969) xxi, 237 p. (Praeger special studies in international politics and public affairs; D8935.5.K6

Contents.--Preface.--List of abbreviations.--List of charts.--Introduction.--The internal setting of North Korea's foreign policy.--North Korea and the Sino-Soviet rift.--North Korea and Korean unification.--North Korea's relations with the Third World and beyond.--Summary and conclusion.--Bibliography.--About the author.

Analyses North Korea's policy toward the Soviet Union, China, the Third World, and the West and examines the goals and tactics of its unification policy.

992

Koh, Byung Chul. **NORTH KOREA AND THE SINO-SOVIET SCHISM.** Western political quarterly, v. 22, Dec. 1969: 940-962. JAL.W4, v. 22

Asserts that national self-interest and personal political ambitions are the major determinants of North Korea's approach to the Sino-Soviet schism. The practice has been to exploit the schism to increase North Korea's autonomy within the Communist camp and exact a maximum of bloc assistance for industrialization in the north and communization in the south.

993

Kudriavtsev, V. **AGNEV EXPLAINS.** Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 22, Feb. 3, 1970: 23-24. D839.C87, v. 22
Translated from *Izvestia*, Jan. 2, 1970. Slav Ra

Vice President Agnev's Asian tour underlined that the "Osum Doctrine" does not alter the aggressive intentions implicit in former President Johnson's "Asian Doctrine." While the President presents Vietnamization as a panacea, the Vice President makes it clear that Vietnamization means that the United States will now try to stifle national liberation movements with native reactionary forces.

994

Lebedev, I. **THE NEW POLITICAL GEOMETRY IN THE PACIFIC.** International affairs (Moscow) no. 1, Jan. 1970: 50-55. D839.L465, 1970

Because of the anti-Americanism that increasingly characterizes the Third World struggle against imperialism, U.S. policymakers would like to disguise their fight against the national liberation movement by simulating a political and military withdrawal from Southeast Asia. The brunt of the offensive burden would then fall to the Asian states associated with the United States, primarily Japan and Australia.

995

Levi, Werner. **IDEOLOGY, INTERESTS, AND FOREIGN POLICY.** International studies quarterly, v. 14, Mar. 1970: 1-31. D839.L27, v. 14

Analyses the relative importance of ideology and national interests as determinants of foreign policy. Levi contends that "ideology plays a subordinate and minor role in deciding the state's objectives and plan for action to reach them, and a more important role in justifying the decision once it has been made."

996

Lodge, George C. **ENGINES OF CHANGE; UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA.** With an introd. by Samuel P. Huntington. New York, Knopf, 1969. xv, 411, xvi p.
HW110.5.A8L59 1970

Partial contents.--The economy: the structures of power and poverty.--Politics: problems of legitimacy and integration.--The culture: a crisis of purpose.--A doctrine about change and the environment.--Applying the doctrine: Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil.--The military.--Communists and revolutionaries.--The interests of the United States.--A commitment to change.--New structures for the revolutionary process.--Index.

Reassesses U.S. policies in the Third World, especially Latin America, exposes the contradiction in America's foreign policy between commitments to change and stability, and outlines a new ideology for U.S. foreign policy to replace anticommunism.

997

MacDougall, Colina. **AFTER THEY'RE FRIENDS.** Far Eastern economic review, v. 66, Dec. 23, 1969: 701-702. illus. HC41.F18, v. 66

Analyses Sino-Canadian relations, focusing on trade and the current diplomatic negotiations in Stockholm. Since the talks are proceeding smoothly and the Taiwan issue appears negotiable, it is only a matter of time before China and Canada establish diplomatic relations.

998

Malaviya, Harsh D., comp. **AID FOR FREEDOM; ESSAYS ON INDO-SOVIET ECONOMIC COOPERATION.** Foreword: K. P. S. Menon. Pref: Prem S. Gupta. New Delhi, Indo-Soviet Cultural Society (1968) 76 p.
HF1590.15.R8M34

Contents.--Planning in Soviet Union and in India, by Gyan Chand.--Economic and cultural relations of USSR and India, by N. M. Pogov.--Soviet Union and the story of Indian oil, by K. D. Malaviya.--Soviet-Indian economic and technical cooperation, by S. Shachkov.--India and Soviet economic aid, by S. Satrajan.--U.S.S.R. and India: good trade partners, by V. Sobolev.--Fifteen years of Indo-Soviet economic cooperation, by S. Khren.--The growth of Soviet foreign trade with developing countries, by Y. A. Ershov.--Soviet printing and publication, by A. Sidorov.--Indo-Soviet economic ties: the beginnings, by H. D. Malaviya.

Articles collected by the Economic Cooperation Committee of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society to

demonstrate that Soviet aid to India is without political strings, while imperialist aid is a form of economic blackmail. Menon's foreword calls the growth of Indo-Soviet friendship and cooperation "a remarkable occurrence" that may be expected to endure.

999

Martinez, Lucian C. **COMMUNIST CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA.** Naval War College review, v. 22, Mar. 1970: 79-98. illus.

PAGE 88

Bibliographical references in "Footnotes": p. 95-98.

Surveys China's policy, focusing on Chinese methods of infiltration and Sino-Soviet rivalry for ideological leadership of the Latin American Communist Parties, and concludes that Peking has failed to increase its influence in the region.

1000

Marx, Werner. **(THE PREREQUISITES AND LIMITATIONS OF A REASONABLE EASTERN POLICY)** Voraussetzungen und Grenzen einer vernünftigen Ostpolitik. Politische Welt, v. 12, Dec. 1969: 2-4.

D639.P65, v. 12

Questions the belief of the new Government of the German Federal Republic that imminent factors of political differentiation indicate an impending liberalization in the Soviet bloc and possibilities for improved relations with West Germany. Marx points to the continuation of Soviet control over East Germany and Eastern Europe as a most important factor in Moscow's German policy and suggests that Bonn reappraise Soviet policy goals and formulate a new Eastern policy.

1001

Matthies, Volker. **(CHINA AND AFRICA)** China und Afrika. In Institut für Asienkunde. Mitteilungen, no. 26, 1969: 1-78.

PAGE 88

Contents.--Preamble.--Introduction: Chinese-African relations; a research and bibliographical report.--China's African policy from the Bandung Conference till Chou En-lai's journey of 1963-64.--The African journey of Chou En-lai, 1963-64.--China's African policy after Chou En-lai's journey.--The institutional basis of China's African policy.--The means of China's African policy.--The aims of China's African policy.--Problems of China's African policy.--Bibliography.

Reviews works on Sino-African relations and traces the development of Peking's African policy. Matthies considers Peking's military aid to revolutionary African groups, including the training of Africans in guerrilla warfare. Although China lacks the economic prerequisites to replace Western and Soviet influence in Africa, it has succeeded in a relatively short time in establishing a potentially lasting presence there.

1002

Malchior de Molènes, Charles. [DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY: U.S. ACTION AROUND THE WORLD] Défense et diplomatie: l'action des États-Unis dans le monde. Revue militaire générale; general military review, no. 10, Dec. 1969: 673-695.

U2.R48, 1969

Includes summaries in English and German.

Examines U.S. policy toward Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. The United States would like to ease relations with Paris to strengthen NATO, but philosophical differences remain. The author maintains that America's Middle Eastern policy may become more balanced to ensure oil investments and offset Soviet influence. American leaders hope to obtain Soviet support for a fair Vietnam settlement, but Moscow's price may be high.

1003

Mel'nikov, Daniil. ["I AM FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF RAPALLO"; SPIEGEL'S INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR DANIIL MEL'NIKOV, A SOVIET EXPERT ON GERMANY] "Ich bin für die Prinzipien von Rapallo"; SPIEGEL-Gespräch mit dem sowjetischen Deutschland-Experten Professor Daniil Melnikow. Spiegel, v. 24, Jan. 19, 1970: 90, 92, 94-95, 100. illus.

AP30.866, v. 24

As long as Europe is divided into military and economic blocs, it will remain a powder keg and a threat to world peace since European wars are traditionally difficult to localize. A solution to the present predicament would be détente, reduction of the arms race, and a liquidation of the blocs, all aimed at the establishment of a European security system. Since the blocs cannot be abandoned overnight, the countries should start with smaller steps like increased economic cooperation. American participation in the European security system would depend on a decision by an all-European conference. Within the European security system the two German states could develop closer cooperation with each other than with ethnically different states. Their confederation is, however, impossible, given their different political systems. The 1959 Soviet draft of a German peace treaty still stands as an offer in principle. The German Federal Republic must finally recognize the German Democratic Republic and the present boundaries in international law. The Soviet Union's interest in a possible renunciation-of-force agreement with Bonn stems from its desire to have such accords with all European states. Such a bilateral agreement could grow into a friendship pact like the Treaty of Rapallo, which was very profitable for Germany and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union does not want to alienate West Germany from its Western neighbors. As an economic great power, West Germany could play a much stronger role politically if it had closer economic relations with Eastern Europe, did not load foreign forces, and unshackled itself from restrictive American influence. In principle, the possibility of a "special" relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union exists.

1004

Miller, Thomas B. AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. [Sidney] Angus and Robertson [1968] xiv, 361 p. map (on lining papers)

DUL13.M49

Bibliography: p. [347]-351.

Contents.—Introduction.—The inheritance.—The context of foreign policy decisions.—Australia and Asia: I. The nearer neighborhood.—Australia and Asia: II. The continent and region.—Australia and the United States.—Australia, Britain and "the Commonwealth."—Europe, West and East.—Areas of developing diplomatic interest.—Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific.—Australia and the United Nations.—Some economic aspects.—Immigration and foreign relations.—The way ahead.—Appendices.—Index.

Examines Australia's foreign policy within the framework of its foreign relations, role in the United Nations, and immigration policy. In light of Great Britain's withdrawal East of Suez and America's Far East policy, Miller contends that Australia should develop political attitudes toward China that are more consistent with its trade policies, involve itself in Indonesia's reconstruction, and coordinate, in cooperation with New Zealand and the United States, a developmental aid program for the South Pacific islands.

1005

Neuhouser, Charles. THIRD WORLD POLITICS; CHINA AND THE AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLE'S [sic] SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION, 1957-1967. Cambridge, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University; distributed by Harvard University Press, 1968. 99 p. (Harvard East Asian monographs, 27).

DS740.A.N46

Bibliographical references included in "Notes": p. 79-94.

Contents.—Introduction.—Delhi and Bandung.—Cairo and West Asia.—Congo to Moshi: the African phase.—Moshi and after: Peking vs. Moscow.—Winnipeg to Algiers: the downward slope.—The end of a policy.—Conclusion.—Appendix I: National affiliates of the AAPSO.—Appendix II: Countries represented on the AAPSO Executive Committee and Permanent Secretariat.

Examines the history, role, and effectiveness of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization and its relationship to Chinese foreign policy.

1006

Hsu, Hsien-chong. JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Dec. 1969/Jan. 1970: 80-83, 85-86. UAG46.F5, v. 14

The influence of Japan's geography and modern diplomatic experience on Japanese perceptions of current foreign policy issues. Hsu predicts a continuation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty beyond 1970 and a slow but steady increase in Japan's Armed Forces.

1007

Nixon, Richard M., Pres. U.S. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S; A NEW STRATEGY FOR PEACE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 62, Mar. 9, 1970: 273-332.
JX232.A33, v. 62

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The National Security Council system --pt. 2. Partnership and the Nixon doctrine: Europe. The Western Hemisphere. Asia and the Pacific. Vietnam. The Middle East. Africa. International economic policy. The United Nations.--pt. 3. America's strength: Shaping our military posture. The process of defense planning. Strategic policy. General purpose forces.--pt. 4. An era of negotiation: The Soviet Union. Eastern Europe. Communist China. Arms control. Issues for the future.--Conclusion: A new definition of peace.

The U.S. President's 1970 report to the Congress on the state of the world and U.S. foreign and defense policy.

1008

NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORT: AN INADEQUATE VISION OF PEACE [editorial] War/peace report, v. 10, Mar. 1970: 12-13. JX1901.W38, v. 10

President Nixon's foreign policy report reflects some progress in relations with Communist China, chemical and biological warfare, and international trade and recognizes that the United States can no longer play "world policeman" nor pursue nuclear superiority. However, the "Nixon Doctrine" in part "contains weasel words which would permit U.S. intervention virtually at will," and the deployment of the ABM and the multiple independent reentry vehicle contradict President Nixon's rhetoric on nuclear "sufficiency." The President's position on Vietnam has been politically clever, but long before the 1972 elections it will be obvious that his policy is only prolonging the war. Instead of suggesting that peace requires world law, President Nixon has based his concept of peace on the same system of states that has bred war for centuries.

1009

Northedge, F. S. BRITAIN AS A SECOND-RANK POWER. International affairs (London) v. 46, Jan. 1970: 37-47. JX1.I53, v. 46

Political nostalgia is shaping Great Britain's foreign policy. The Commonwealth and the Anglo-American "special relationship" have fostered Britain's illusions of global power. Great Britain must refrain from acting as a world mediator, treat second-rank powers as equals, rethink its nuclear policies, and recognize its impotence in shaping the balance of power. Britain's only interests in the Soviet-American détente lie in successful arms limitations talks and ensuring that the superpowers "do not manage the détente in such a way as to damage British or West European interests." Since Britain will have even less influence on Chinese relations, it should discuss

China's international role with its West European partners whether its negotiations to join the Common Market are successful or not. As a second-rank power Great Britain will have to create an efficient and resourceful foreign service by increasing the contacts between officials and scholars and making full use of potential intellectual resources.

1010

Ray, Hemen. CHINA'S INITIATIVES IN EASTERN EUROPE. Current scene, v. 7, Dec. 1, 1969: 1-17. DS701.C9, v. 7
Bibliographical references included in "Notes": p. 16-17.

Assesses Peking's East European policy, focusing on initiatives since the Czechoslovak invasion. China's attempts to mobilize support in Eastern Europe may be designed to prevent a Soviet invasion of China and seize the political and ideological leadership of the Communist movement.

1011

Reischauer, Edwin O. THE HIDDEN CRISIS IN ASIA. Reader's digest, v. 96, Feb. 1970: 77-81. AP2.R255, v. 96

The possible termination of the mutual security treaty has produced a crisis in Japanese-American relations. Although retention of the treaty is to Japan's advantage, some Japanese opponents could force their Government to reject it if public pressure continues to mount. While Americans are unaware of the crisis, U.S. commitments in East Asia hinge on the existing relationship with Japan and access to military bases there and on Okinawa. Abrogation of the treaty and rearmament would bring internal political turmoil to Japan, diminish the possibilities for regional security and cooperation, and cause greater uncertainty in the prospects for world peace. Increased defense expenditures would probably slow Japan's rate of economic growth and curtail its economic aid programs. It would be a tragedy for Japan and the United States to compete militarily in the Pacific again.

1012

Richardson, Elliot L. UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE; SECURITY. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, Feb. 15, 1970: 258-260.

PN6121.V52, v. 36

Delivered before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 20, 1970.

Despite the prosperity and stability of Western Europe and some relaxation in East-West tensions since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the security of Western Europe remains firmly linked to that of the United States. NATO's strategy of flexible response depends for its effectiveness on an adequate U.S. military presence in Europe, drastic reduction of which would seriously weaken the alliance and contribute to European instability. Reliance on large-scale troop airlifts is not yet

feasible, and the savings that would result from withdrawing U.S. troops from Europe would be negligible. Cooperation between the United States and Western Europe is also essential if progress is to be made toward reducing tensions in Europe and improving the economic position of NATO countries. The United States supports current moves toward European integration but believes that a strong, united Western Europe is necessary to attain this goal.

1013

Robinson, Thomas W. PEKING'S REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: THE FAILURES OF SUCCESS. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 64-77.

HL.A4, v. 386

Three facets of China's strategy of revolutionary war are examined: (1) the Mao Tse-tung-Lin Piao theory of "people's war"; (2) the history of Chinese Communist involvement abroad in promoting "national liberation wars"; and (3) some constraints upon this instrument of Chinese policy. The contradiction between theory and practice is explained by real-world restraints upon Chinese desires. The Maoist theory is essentially an analogy between the Chinese pre-1949 revolutionary past and the realities of the present-day world political situation. The analogy is imperfect, however, and many of the problems which China has encountered in fostering revolutionary movements abroad may be traced to this fact. Chinese leaders, prisoners of their limited world outlook, cannot admit this. In fact, there is a low level of actual Chinese involvement in the "Third World"; nowhere have the Chinese become, or are they about to become, a major element in attempts to overthrow local governments by rural-based guerrilla tactics. Three sets of limitations--internal, external, and historical--are important because together they place severe limits on the level and the direction of Chinese involvement. The possibilities for successful revolutionary war lie in the hands of those who elect to pay more attention to local circumstances than to the niceties of the Chinese theory. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1014

Rogers, William P. THE U.S. ROLE IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY; AN ADDRESS. [Washington] Dept. of State [for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969] 9 p. (Department of State publication 8489. East Asian and Pacific series 182) DS33.4.U6R6

Contents.--Asian-Pacific security: Viet-Nam.--Period of change in Asia.--Communist China's power.--Efforts to communicate ignored.--Reaffirming U.S. interests in the Pacific.--Collective security in Asia.--Our Asian policy.

Summarizes U.S. foreign policy objectives in Asia. Rogers contends that peace lies in the interdependence of the peoples of the world.

1015

Rogers, William P. [Interview] CHANGING ROLE OF U.S. U.S. news & world report, v. 68, Jan. 26, 1970: 28-34. illus.

JK1.U65, v. 68

Responds to questions on the Vietnam War, tensions in the Middle East, U.S. relations with the Communist world and Europe, domestic determinants of foreign policy, and State Department reorganization. U.S. policy on all these matters is conditioned by the Nixon administration's decision to shift to "a lowered profile and a reduced presence of the United States, consistent with security considerations."

1016

Rose, Leo E., and Roger Dial. CAN A MINISTATE FIND TRUE HAPPINESS IN A WORLD DOMINATED BY PROTAGONIST POWERS? THE NEPAL CASE. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 89-101. HL.A4, v. 386

Can a ministate located precariously between hostile protagonist powers achieve a substantial degree of independence in the formulation and implementation of its foreign policy on the basis of its own capabilities, or can this only be the consequence of forbearance on the part of its more powerful neighbors? We have explored the tactics by which one such ministate, Nepal, has succeeded in developing an impressive repertory of responses to the intrusion of unwelcome, and often threatening, external influences: balancing external influences and tacking back and forth between its two neighbors--India and China. The objective is both to minimize the restrictions imposed on Nepal's freedom of action and to contribute to that country's internal and external security. Balance was sought through nonalignment in the disputes between its two neighbors during the past decade and through a process of political and economic diversification that was intended to mitigate Nepal's "semisatellite" relationship to India. Neither policy has as yet been a total success, and there are still important limitations on Nepal's capacity to act independently. Nevertheless, the range of freedom allowed to Nepal has been considerably expanded, and the Nepali leaders have demonstrated their skill in defining the limitations and exploiting them to their own advantage. Thus, we argue, any study of contemporary international politics that did not include an analysis of ministate power would be incomplete. (Abstract supplied)

1017

Rosser, Richard F. AN INTRODUCTION TO SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall [1969] 391 p. maps.

DK266.R66

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The bases of Soviet foreign policy: The roots of Soviet foreign policy. The Marxist-Leninist ideology. The impact of the ideology on Soviet foreign policy.--pt. 2. The tactics of Soviet foreign policy: The Bolsheviks acquire a country, 1917-1920. The consolidation of Soviet power, 1921-1933. The Nazi menace, 1934-1941. The great patriotic war, 1941-1945. The cold war, 1946-1953. The interregnum, 1953-1957. Offensive coexistence, 1958-1964. Prudent globalism, 1965-1968.--Conclusion.--Significant dates in Soviet foreign policy.--Other sources for the study of Soviet foreign policy.--Index.

Evaluates the motivations behind Soviet foreign policy, suggesting nine roots of Soviet action, three of which Rosser emphasizes as both affecting and determining Soviet foreign policy. Of the "motivational trilogy"--Soviet national interest, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the power struggle among members of the party elite--the ideological root is discussed in most detail, and Rosser analyzes the evidence for its continuing existence as the prime motivating factor in Soviet foreign policy. The interaction of these three roots is demonstrated by an examination of the major periods in Soviet foreign policy.

1018

Rothermund, Dietmar. INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system. Philadelphia, 1969. (*Its Annals*, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 78-88.

H1.A4, v. 386

Indo-Soviet relations have formed a complex pattern in recent years: changing trends in foreign policy, trade, and aid; the fate of the Communist party of India (CPI); the death of Nehru and the removal of Khrushchev; Kosygin's mediation at Tashkent and Soviet military aid to Pakistan; the Chinese bomb and nonproliferation--these are only a few of the elements in the pattern. The two triangles India-China-Soviet Union and India-Pakistan-Soviet Union are of crucial importance in the game of international diplomacy, in which the Soviet Union has scored several points while India was groping for a new orientation after the period of the old cold war had come to an end and non-alignment had lost much of its meaning. India's political system has shown a remarkable stability, and it has been actively supported by the Soviet Union, although Soviet analysts and Indian Communists find it difficult to justify this support in Marxist terms. The reality of world affairs has often overruled ideological considerations, but they must be taken into account, nevertheless, particularly in Indo-Soviet relations which go beyond the diplomatic sphere and extend to internal affairs, such as the development of the public sector of India's economy and joint production-planning for a diversification of exports and imports. There are compelling reasons for the further co-operation of the two countries in spite of occasional misgivings. (Abstract supplied)

1019

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NONALIGNED WORLD. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970. xv, 353 p.

DR367.A1R8

Bibliography: p. 335-343.

Partial contents.--The uncertain years, 1948-1952.--Between unalignment and nonalignment.--In the vanguard of nonalignment.--Yugoslav diplomacy at the United Nations: the political dimension.--Yugoslavia and international economic cooperation: focus on the U.N.--Influencebuilding in the Third World.--Yugoslavia and the United Arab Republic: a study of the evolution of interdependence.--Tito's acentric communism and Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Third World.--Beyond nonalignment.

Focuses on the origins and developments of Yugoslavia's policy toward the nonaligned world. Rubinstein examines the forces motivating Yugoslav leaders to begin their nonalignment policy, Belgrade's relationships with the United Arab Republic and other nonaligned nations and its attitude toward the Moscow-Peking rift, and nonalignment's changing role in international relations.

1020

Schleicher, Charles P., and Joginder S. Bains. THE ADMINISTRATION OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1969. 130 p. (The Maxwell School series on the administration of foreign policy through the United Nations, 3)

JX1977.2.I47S34

Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--India's role in the United Nations system.--United Nations field operations in India.--The conduct of Indian foreign policy; a general view.--The Ministry of External Affairs.--Other ministries and organs.--India's permanent UN mission and General Assembly delegations.--India's contributions to the United Nations system.--The Indian public and the United Nations.--Summary.

Outlines Indian administrative organization and procedures for developing and administering policy vis-a-vis the United Nations system.--Since U.N.-related tasks are performed largely by the Indian bodies responsible for both domestic and foreign aspects of national problems, the outline is made in the general context of the Indian political system.

1021

Schütze, Walter. [FRANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST] Frankreich zwischen Ost und West. Moderne Welt, v. 10, no. 4, 1969: 412-415.

D839.M58, v. 10

Points to a recent Franco-American rapprochement as dictated by changes in the international situation and France's national interests and domestic situation. Domestic political pressures have caused France to continue nuclear armaments and

start new initiatives toward the East. The prerequisite for East-West détente is, however, a coordination of Western policies toward the East.

1022

Scott, Sir Robert. CHINA, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES; A BRITISH VIEW. Foreign affairs, v. 48, Jan. 1970: 334-343.

D410.F6, v. 48

The American military presence in Vietnam will continue far longer than desired by advocates of immediate and complete withdrawal. The Soviet Union will not exert any pressure on North Vietnam to moderate its objectives because Soviet political leaders see no reason to end a war that is costly to the United States in men, money, and prestige. Communist China will continue to advocate the withdrawal of foreign forces from Vietnam and support the establishment of a friendly government in the south. Although American confrontation with China is on the decline, there are formidable obstacles to Sino-American cooperation. By overcoming these obstacles China could improve its economy and have a greater role in world affairs, and the United States could achieve a more flexible foreign policy. Further, there might be a hope of negotiating a "hands off" agreement on Korea and Vietnam. Indeed, since America is clearly seeking to lessen its commitments on the mainland of Asia, China may relax its anti-Americanism. But there is no quick solution to world tensions, which are likely to continue.

1023

Smith, Gaddis. THE AIMS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. St. Louis, McGraw-Hill [1969] 117 p. (Grass roots guidebook series)

E183.7.S563

Bibliography: p. 59-60.

Contents.--Preface, by Townsend Scudder.--pt. 1. Independence, 1776-1800. Land, 1801-1860. Power, 1861-1914. The World Wars, 1914-1945. Security, 1945-1967.--pt. 2. Foreign policy and the Constitution, 1787. Washington's Farewell Address, September 17, 1796. The French threat on the Mississippi, 1802. The Monroe Doctrine, December 2, 1823. Mission and opportunity in China, 1900. Theodore Roosevelt's foreign policy, 1904. President Wilson's Fourteen Points, 1918. Outlawing war, 1928. The arsenal of democracy, 1940. The Truman doctrine, 1947. The Cuban missile crisis, 1962. Kennedy's strategy for peace, 1963. American policy in Vietnam, 1964. Dissent on Vietnam, 1966.

History of U.S. foreign policy with a selection of historical documents.

1024

Sontag, John P. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. Review of politics, v. 32, Jan. 1970: 78-90. JAL.R4, v. 32

The conference of Communist Parties held in Moscow in June 1969 proved once again that the international Communist movement is very important to the Soviet Union, which has been more successful

in identifying than solving the great problems that face the movement. The usual Soviet response to nationalism, the youth movement, and other troublesome issues is a "greater dose of orthodoxy." The major goals of the Soviet leaders in organizing the Moscow meetings were precisely to stop the erosion of Communist ideology and to strengthen their own Communist legitimacy. In view of this, it is not surprising that during the course of the conference a series of clashes developed over such issues as the proper course to take with social-democrats and the right of each party to make its own policy, or that the meetings became a platform for blatant attacks on Communist China. Given the importance it attaches to unity, the Soviet Union certainly will continue to press for greater cohesion among Communist Parties. However, it will be satisfied with a rather loose institutional structure and limited doctrinal content. It is difficult to see what practical consequences this kind of unity would have. In a time of increasing Communist heterodoxy, the Soviet Union cannot expect much support for its diplomacy from world Communist Party conferences. Nevertheless, the unity of international communism is still a potent symbol in the Soviet Union and one that the Soviet leadership continues to follow.

1025

Stoph, Willi. NORMAL RELATIONS ONLY WAY. Democratic German report, v. 18, Dec. 3, 1969: 177-178. DD261.D3, v. 18

Excerpts from a speech of Nov. 12, 1969.

Points out that the acknowledgment by West German Chancellor Brandt of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a separate state represents progress in the German Federal Republic's policy although Bonn has not yet renounced the discriminatory Hallstein doctrine. Bonn should hold negotiations on an equal basis with the GDR on the establishment of mutual relations in international law.

1026

Ströhm, Carl G. [ENTICEMENT WITH RAPALLO. MOSCOW'S "WISHES" FOR THE NEW GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT] [Mit Rapallo wird gelockt. Moskaus "Wünsche" an die neue Bundesregierung] Christ und Welt, v. 22, Oct. 31, 1969: 7. BR4.C37, v. 22

Considers the isolation of the German Federal Republic from the West and its reduction to Soviet dependency as aims of Moscow. Ströhm warns that Bonn's hopes for West German-Soviet and West German-East German accommodation are illusory.

1027

Thornton, Thomas P. SOUTH ASIA AND THE GREAT POWERS. World affairs, v. 132, Mar. 1970: 345-358. JX1901.W7, v. 132

Considers the ebb and flow of relations of the Southeast Asian states with the major systems as a model of interaction. Thornton concludes that the area's present and future international position will be determined largely by the following

generalizations: Any action by one invokes reactions by the others; subsystem members necessarily become involved in the affairs of the major system; each nation seeks to have its allies support the totality of its international position; and major system competitors can cooperate in coping with events occurring within a subsystem--e.g., the parallel attempt of the Soviet Union and the United States to stop the Indo-Pakistan war, a possible first step toward recognizing each other as acceptable negotiating partners at the major system level.

1028

Thornton, Thomas P. A VIEW FROM WASHINGTON. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 19-30.

H1.A4, v. 386

American attitudes towards the Third World are passing through a critical period. Especially because of the Vietnam experience, Americans are plagued with self-doubts and disillusioned with the results of previous involvement. America cannot, however, turn its back on the Third World; it finds important interests there, as well as a pressing humanitarian challenge. The present trend in U.S. policy involves a rejection of the role of world policeman, tempered by a realization that U.S. power and near-omnipresence place unavoidable responsibilities on it. In establishing a new role for itself, the United States will have to reduce the intensity of its involvement and look more toward multilateral arrangements. Despite the easing of the cold war, there are major problems at stake in dealing with the Soviet Union and communism as an ideology of modernization. In a world in which violence will be widespread but in which American power imposes limitations on U.S. actions, the Americans will have to develop strong nerves. The major challenge comes in the economic field, at a time when American resources are badly strained. Problems involving investment, trade, and the growing needs of the poorer countries make urgent the development of a new and more productive approach to foreign aid. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1029

Tivari, S. N. IS MOSCOW AT THE EQUI-DISTANCE FROM NEW DELHI AND RAWALPINDI? Southeast Asia quarterly, v. 4, July 1969: 13-31.

P&GP RR

Bibliography: p. 27-31.

Contents that the Soviet Union's recent decision to extend military aid to Pakistan marks a major turning point in Soviet-Indian relations. Tivari reviews the evolution of Soviet Indian relations from the days of the Indian National Movement to the present and notes their deterioration since the Tashkent declaration. He concludes that, far from remaining neutral in the Indo-Pakistani dispute, the Soviet Union has now

moved closer to Pakistan to reduce its dependence on both China and the West.

1030

Tung, S. T. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA. West and East, v. 14, Dec. 1969: 2-4. P&GP RR

Address delivered to the Canadian Chinese Cultural Society, Montreal, Canada, Oct. 8, 1969.

Surveys Sino-Soviet relations and concludes that war is unlikely in the foreseeable future. If Canada recognizes the Communist Chinese Government, other nations might follow its example, setting off a chain reaction that could perhaps undermine the viability of the Nationalist government. Recognition might be more appropriate after the death of Mao Tse-tung.

1031

UNA-USA National Policy Panel Toward the Reconciliation of Europe. TOWARD THE RECONCILIATION OF EUROPE: NEW APPROACHES FOR THE U.S., THE UN, AND NATO; A REPORT. [New York, United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1969] 36 p. JX1417.U2

Contents.--Preface.--The new setting: after Czechoslovakia.--Recent assumptions in European policy.--New measures for strengthening the unity of the West.--Multilateral initiatives in the East-West area.--Initiatives for a settlement of the German question.--The United States, the Soviet Union and Europe.--Memoranda of comment, reservation and dissent.

Outlines the basic premises of postwar U.S. policy in Europe, recommends changes to strengthen West European unity and promote better relations with Eastern Europe, and suggests a new approach to the problem of German reunification.

1032

U.S. Dept. of State. Office of Media Services. COMMUNIST CHINA. [Washington, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969] 32 p. illus. (Issues in United States foreign policy, no. 4) DS777.55.U535

Department of State publication 8499. East Asian and Pacific series 173.

Contents.--Introduction.--Profile.--Politics.--Economics.--Agriculture.--Foreign policy.--United States relations with Peking.--Chinese puzzle.--Conclusion.--Maps of China.

Surveys China's political and economic position and its foreign policy, particularly its relations with the United States.

1033

THE UNSPECTACULAR FOREIGN POLICY. China news analysis, no. 791, Feb. 13, 1970: 1-7. DS777.55.C4469, 1970

Analyses Communist China's foreign policy in the 1960's, focusing on the current Sino-Soviet negotiations, China's efforts to establish a new Peking-centered Communist Internationale, and the general political situation in Asia. The possibility of major and armed clashes is considered remote as long as the Sino-Soviet negotiations continue. If China adopted a more moderate and flexible foreign policy, it could play a dominant political role in Asia. It has, however, alienated many of the Asian nations by denouncing their leaders as criminals, and, as long as the present leadership remains in control, a change in policy is not anticipated.

1034

Valkenier, Elisabeth K. **NEW TRENDS IN SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD.** World politics, v. 22, Apr. 1970: 415-432.
D839.W57, v. 22

Notes that Soviet aid and trade policies with the Third World have entered a phase in which considerations of profit are challenging the hitherto dominant political motivations. While neither Soviet economic relations with the developing countries nor the new pattern in these relations is now of decisive importance, a well-coordinated economic penetration may be more lastingly effective in the Third World than political infiltration.

1035

Whetten, Lawrence L. **CHANGING SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS ARAB RADICAL MOVEMENTS; MORE REVISIONS TO COME IN 1970.** New Middle East, no. 18, Mar. 1970: 20-27.
DS63.L.N48, 1970

Reviews Soviet policy toward Communist Parties in Arab countries, the relations of these parties with Arab governments, and the internal conflicts between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions. Whetten notes the variations in Soviet policy and the difficulties of implementing the basic policy of assimilation with the ruling parties.

1036

Whetten, Lawrence L. **THE ROLE OF EAST GERMANY IN WEST GERMAN-SOVIET RELATIONS.** World today, v. 25, Dec. 1969: 507-520.
D410.W63, v. 25

The reasoning behind West Germany's new East German policy, the early results of its implementation, and its long-term consequences for the two Germanys, the Soviet Union, and Europe. The two Germanys may be unable to reach formal agreement on unification or confederation, but the growth of an informal community of interests and a common view on foreign policy might enable them to act in concert and "exercise the authority of a third Power in Continental matters." If so, the Soviet Union will have to find means to accommodate the German interest without permitting it to dominate Europe.

1037

Winters, Philip R. **POLICY AND THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHER.** In United States Naval Institute, **ARMADA-114.** Proceedings, v. 95, Dec. 1969: 57-62. 11-lus.
V1.U6, v. 95

The political geographer should play a major role in foreign policy decisionmaking because he understands the implications of physical change and advanced technology on the political environment and can interpret "the politics of a given nation or group of nations with far more acumen than most." In an era of brinkmanship diplomacy the political geographer can collect pertinent data, integrate them to a global context, and translate the results.

1038

Woodman, Dorothy. **HIMALAYAN FRONTIERS; A POLITICAL REVIEW OF BRITISH, CHINESE, INDIAN, AND RUSSIAN RIVALRIES.** New York [1970, c1969] 423 p. maps.
DS450.C5W6 1970

Contents.--Maps.--Preface.--India and China in Asia.--The frontier that was assumed.--Where three empires meet.--West of the Karakorum Pass: triangular diplomacy.--China and Britain on the frontier: prelude to Simla.--Conference at Simla.--What happened to the McMahon Line?--Independence and challenge (1947-1951).--All reason spent.--Talking and fighting (Sept. 1962-May 1964).--Undecided frontiers: the eternal triangle.--References.--Bibliography.--Appendices.--Index.

Reviews the role of the Himalayan frontier in India's foreign relations. India should initiate an active foreign policy and reopen talks with Pakistan and China to reconsider the present stalemate in which the Himalayas form a military boundary.

1039

Zweig, Ferdinand. **ISRAEL: THE SWORD AND THE HARP, THE MYSTIQUE OF VIOLENCE AND THE MYSTIQUE OF REDEMPTION; CONTROVERSIAL THEMES IN ISRAELI SOCIETY.** Rutherford, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press [1969] 326 p.
DS126.5.Z85 1970

Contents.--pt. 1. Identity and self-image: The Sabra figure. Common features of the ingathering tribes; the minority. Jewish races, Jewish cultures, and the search for Jewishness. The impact of Hebraization and multi-lingualism. The journey in time. Transformation of identity and self-image. The basic myths of Israel. 'Religiosity,' the nationalization of religious culture. Who is a Jew? Specific versus generic anti-Semitism.--pt. 2. Status and stratification: The two Israels. Stratification and status distinctions. The process of urbanization. The lessons of the kibbutz experiment. Histadrut, integral trade unionism. The devolution of Israeli socialism. The process of orientalizing.--pt. 3. Two mystiques: The mystique of violence. The mystique of redemption. The figure of Jesus on the Israeli horizon.--pt. 4. Encounters and dialogues: The Arab-Israeli conflict. The Israeli-British encounter. The Israeli-American dialogue. The Israeli-Russian encounter. The Israeli-German encounter. The Israeli-Afro-Asian co-operation. The discrepancy between Israel and the diaspora.--Conclusion: challenge and response.--Index.

Analyses Israeli society, foreign relations, and Israel's role among nations.

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

MODERN WAR

1040

Anderson, David C. THE AMBIGUITIES OF DEFEAT. Current, no. 114, Jan. 1970: 6-8.

AP2.C9259, 1970

Reprinted from The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 24, 1969.

The three elements of defeat in war are physical, political, and psychological loss. Predictably, in Vietnam, each of these is a tangle of ambiguities. America's physical losses have been serious but not humiliating or crippling. Politically, the major result has been not a loss but a lesson; viz, that there are limits to U.S. power abroad, especially in the developing countries. The psychological results are not complete, but it is very probable that on balance they will be positive. A period of national self-examination is the most likely consequence of defeat, and, if this results in a better, more mature understanding of U.S. responsibilities in the world, peace will be served. The notion of ambiguous defeat is not self-contradictory. National power depends on internal developments as much as external ones, and the United States stands to gain more from the liquidation of an unpopular war than it will lose through permitting Communist conquest of a non-strategic area.

1041

Birkos, Alexander S. A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN MILITARY PERIODICALS. Military affairs, v. 33, Dec. 1969: 393-396.

K181.N55, v. 33

Surveys a military journal of India and those of the major continental European countries and provides a brief description of their principal interests.

1042

Bloomfield, Lincoln P., and Amelia C. Leiss. CONTROLLING SMALL WARS; A STRATEGY FOR THE 1970'S. New York, Knopf, 1969. xiv, 421, xiv p. illus. JX1395.B57

"A study from the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology." Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.—Introduction.—pt. 1. The age of local conflict. An anatomy of conflict. Lessons from recent history.—pt. 2. Learning from experience: a technique. The Soviet-Iranian conflict, 1941-1947. The Bay of Pigs, 1960-1961. The Greek

insurgency, 1944-1949. The Indonesian war of independence, 1945-1949. Conflict in the Middle East, 1956-1967. Lessons for conflict control from the five conflicts.—pt. 3. United States interests. Toward a strategy of conflict control.—Appendixes: The structure of local conflict. The structure of local-conflict control. The fifty-four local conflicts. Model of U.S. policy preferences and activities toward local conflicts outside Europe.—Index.

Proposes a strategy of conflict control to prevent, contain, or terminate local conflicts in which the United States has an interest. Bloomfield and Leiss examine five such conflicts as a basis for constructing their strategy.

1043

Durst, Jay B. LIMITED CONVENTIONAL WAR—CAN IT BE SUCCESSFUL? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Jan. 1970: 46-63. illus.

Z6723.U35, v. 50

The discovery that neither massive retaliation nor limited nuclear war is a rational solution to the strategic problem posed by nuclear weapons led to adoption of the strategy of flexible response. Today that strategy is being tested in Vietnam in a modified version in which the United States has refrained from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons and accepted restraints on the use of its conventional forces. Could this limited conventional war version of the flexible response strategy ever be successful? The answer would appear to be no. The Vietnam War has shown that, if limits are set to escalation and the escalation that does take place is so deliberate that the enemy can foresee it 6 months in advance, the will of the enemy, even a weak enemy, cannot be broken. The ability of the United States "to assist a weak ally in defeating an externally assisted insurgency is limited by the inhibitions, moral, rational, and political, which [it] voluntarily impose[s] upon [its] theoretical power."

1044

Kahn, George McF., and John W. Lewis. THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM. Rev. ed. New York, Dial Press, 1967 (i.e. 1969) xiv, 345 p. maps. (A Dial report) DB557.A63K3 1969

Contents.—Historical background.—France and the Vietnam.—The Geneva Conference.—The emergence of two Vietnams.—The origins of the civil war.—Limited involvement.—Americanization of the war.—Escalation.—The response.—The unstable

south.--China and Vietnam.--The global context.--Limits of power.--1967-1969.--Appendices.--Selected bibliography.--Index.

Brings the story of the United States in Vietnam up through mid-1969. Kahin and Lewis conclude that "the same erroneous premises that provided the rationale for the faulty judgments of those whose decisions led the United States to project its power into Vietnam" still govern American policies.

1045

Leites, Nathan C., and Charles Wolf. **REBELLION AND AUTHORITY: AN ANALYTIC ESSAY ON INSURGENT CONFLICTS**. Chicago, Markham Pub. Co. [c1970] 174 p. (Markham series in public policy analysis) JC328.5.L43

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction.--Current beliefs and theory.--An alternative approach: insurgency as a system.--The rebellion's viewpoint: structures, operations, and proclivities.--The authority's viewpoint: concepts and conduct of counterrebellion.--Inflicting damage.--Intelligence and information.--Rebellion and authority: a summary.--Index.

Analyses specific cases of insurgency in developing countries to elevate theories of insurgency to the level that has been attained in the study of nuclear strategy.

1046

Max, Alphonse. [THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA] Die Partisanenbewegung in Lateinamerika. Politische Welt, v. 12, Dec. 1969: 18-20. D839.P65, v. 12

Contents that Latin America lacks important conditions for a popular guerrilla movement. The movement that has been active there comprises elements from privileged classes. Because of oligarchic exclusiveness its leaders distrust the populace's ability to understand its own interests and often are conditioned by their own neuroses. The movement "has no ideology; it only uses one." Moscow knows that the movement is bound to fail and waits to turn the failure to its own advantage.

1047

Mayer, Arno J. **INTERNAL CAUSES AND PURPOSES OF WAR IN EUROPE, 1870-1956: A RESEARCH ASSIGNMENT**. Journal of modern history, v. 41, Sept. 1969: 291-303. D1.J6, v. 41

War is a "tool of domestic politics" and is caused by politicians who seek to salvage their domestic positions during an internal crisis. The politics of diversionary war and counterrevolution have been closely tied to the European wars from 1870 to 1956. According to Clausewitz, preparation for war and its political purpose are decided "not by abstract states but by governments com-

posed of specific persons and acting under concrete historical conditions." However, governments that are beset by acute crises, which could preclude the loyalty of critical segments of the population during a war, will refrain from external complications.

1048

Stupak, Ronald J., and Donald Roether. **GUERRILLA WARFARE: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS IN THE SUPERPOWER CONTEXT**. Studies on the Soviet Union, v. 8, no. 4, 1969: 1-11. DKL875, v. 8

Argues that guerrilla warfare that is used offensively from a position of strength like that of the Soviet Union can become a strategic weapon comparable to the Strategic Air Command or any other force capable of exerting influence on another nation. However, guerrilla warfare is unique in that it operates below the threshold of nuclear exchange and is less likely to escalate. Whether or not the strategic value of guerrilla warfare makes it "essentially an instrument of protracted conflict is debatable. If it is not, it certainly could become one."

1049

Turner, Frederick C. **PROFESSIONAL HEALING FOR THE SOVIET ARMOUR LEADER**. Cosmopolitan, v. 29, Oct. 1969: 327, 329-334.

UI.C8, v. 29

Surveys Soviet military publications, focusing on armor-related articles. While military history has always been stressed, recent writings have emphasized nuclear and chemical warfare and amphibious, winter, and night combat operations. Turner asserts that Soviet literature demonstrates a conspicuous lack of concern for tactical air support although there are numerous references to airborne and helicopter-borne troop landings in conjunction with armor operations.

1050

Weidemann, Diethelm. [PROBLEMS AND ASPECTS OF THE U.S. AGGRESSION AGAINST THE DRV AND OF THE ORGANIZATION OF A SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE ACTION (1965-1968)] Probleme und Aspekte der USA-Aggression gegen die DRV und der Organisation eines erfolgreichen Abwehrkampfes (1965-1968). Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte, v. 8, no. 6, 1969: 691-708. illus.

D25.Z4, v. 8

Contents that the United States has engaged in the Vietnam War to test the possibility of limited wars "on the boundaries of the Socialist world system," try the cohesiveness of that system, using political concessions from the Soviet Union by threats of escalation, and separate "the anti-imperialist and democratic movement from the Socialist states." The war, which has proved the futility of U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam, has made a fiasco of the American concept of limited wars. The U.S. defeat in Vietnam cannot be at-

tributed solely to local developments but reflects the preponderance of the Socialist world system and the shrinking freedom of action of the imperialist system.

1051

Wienhöfer, Elmar. (THE BUNDESWEHR'S CONCEPT OF WAR AND THE PRESENT POLITICOMILITARY REALITIES) Das Kriegsbild der Bundeswehr im Spiegel heutiger politisch-militärischer Realitäten. Wehrkunde, v. 18, Nov. 1969: 571-573.

U3.W396, v. 18

Examines the Bundeswehr's "Kriegsbild"; i.e., "an abstraction of total reality related to an act of war, which comprises a fully useful coordination of theory and practice." Wienhöfer discusses guerrilla warfare during World War II and in Communist theory and practice to prove that, as a manifestation of modern reality and an alternative to full-scale war, it should be incorporated into Bundeswehr's Kriegsbild.

1052

Zwengel, Otto. (THE THEORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE) Zur Theorie des kleinen Krieges. Revue militaire générale; general military review, no. 8, Oct. 1969: 397-407. U2.R48, 1969

Includes summaries in English and French.

Traces the development of guerrilla war theories from Clausewitz to Giap and Lin Biao and stresses the "moral support of the population and outside logistic aid" as essential for effective guerrilla action. Zwengel considers international law aspects of guerrilla warfare and discusses antiguerilla methods, pointing out that some old rules like using the guerrilla's own weapons against him are still applicable today.

MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1053

AEC SUBMITS FY-1971 BUDGET. Nuclear news, v. 13, Mar. 1970: 20-22. QCT70.N75, v. 13

Analyses the Atomic Energy Commission's budget request for FY 1971. Reductions in funds requested for raw materials acquisition, civilian applications of nuclear explosions, and work costs of other programs are more than offset by increases in funds for special nuclear materials, weapons, and reactor development. The weapons program encompasses the design, development, testing, production, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons; conduct of an atmospheric test readiness program; and participation in the development of nuclear test detection methods. The reactor development program emphasizes the liquid metal fast breeder reactor, and Flowshare stresses the production of

natural gases and copper ores with nuclear explosions. No moneys are requested under Flowshare for excavation experiments.

1054

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. THE SAFEGUARD ARM SYSTEM. Washington [1969] 157 p. (Its Special analysis, 91st Congress, 1st session, no. 9) U6633.A715

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.—Introduction.—History.—Political environment.—Strategic environment.—Doctrinal environment.—First strike.—What risk of escalation?—How effective?—Are costs acceptable?—What price delay?—Summary.—Persons quoted.

History and evaluation of the ARM system with extended quotations from leading participants in the ARM debate.

1055

Anderson, William R. LET'S SEND SAMMIS TO SEA NOW. Reader's digest, v. 96, Feb. 1970: 102-106. AP2.R255, v. 96

The protection afforded by an ARM system consisting of coordinated sea- and land-based ARM's would give the United States a defense-in-depth that would offer increased protection to a vital portion of U.S. retaliatory forces. Sea-based antiballistic missile intercept system (SAMMIS) ships could be deployed in forward positions from which many incoming ICBM's could be intercepted before MIRV "clouds" dispersed, and, since interception would occur above the atmosphere and over water, North America would be shielded from the direct effects of nuclear blast and radioactive fallout. SAMMIS could also defend against submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It would increase the President's decision time in a nuclear crisis and might obstruct the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Friendly powers could avoid costly nuclear weapons programs by sharing the cost of SAMMIS ships for their own defense. SAMMIS is less vulnerable and more costly to destroy than land-based systems and has an "attractive" price. Since there has never been a reasonable argument against SAMMIS, Defense Department opposition is a "grave and costly mistake."

1056

Arden, Harvey. NOW VIETNAM TESTED U.S. ARMY FLASHING. American Legion magazine, v. 86, Feb. 1970: 6-13. illus. D570.A1A32, v. 86

Enumerates the devices developed under the direction of the U.S. Army Combat Development Command and similar organizations for use in the Vietnam War. Arden contends that U.S. military and technological ingenuity has been more than a match for guerrilla tactics and has proven the futility of the Communist strategy of "wars of liberation."

1057

Bereznev, P. **SPEED AND BATTLE.** Soviet military review, Jan. 1970: 20-23. illus.
U1.87, 1970

Emphasizes the importance of increased troop mobility, speed of effect of weapons and movement of subunits, speed in erecting and overcoming obstacles and obstructions, and speed of troop control in modern warfare.

1058

Chafee, John H. **THE NAVY MOVES AHEAD.** Ordnance, v. 54, Sept./Oct. 1969: 155-158. illus.
U1.067, v. 54

Praises the Navy's achievements over the past 50 years, including the first Atlantic aircrossing and gyroscopically stabilized bomb sight, the development of dive-bombing techniques, and the use of atomic propulsion. Chafee discusses the influence of aerospace technology, the deployment of a ballistic missile fleet, the multishot portable flame weapon system, and the role of communications and command and control.

1059

CHINA SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHES ITS FIRST MAN-MADE EARTH SATELLITE. Peking review, v. 13, Apr. 30, 1970: 4-5.
DS701.P42, v. 13
Translated from a Hsin hua t'ung hsin shi (New China News Agency) release, Peking, April 25, 1970.
DS775.55.H656

Describes the satellite, which "marks a good beginning in the development of China's space technology."

1060

CHINA VICTORIOUSLY CONDUCTS NEW HYDROGEN BOMB EXPLOSION, SUCCESSFULLY CONDUCTS FIRST UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TEST. Survey of China mainland press, no. 4514, Oct. 10, 1969: 9.
DS777.55.U52, 1969
Hsin hua t'ung hsin shi (New China News Agency) release, English, Peking, Oct. 4, 1969.
DS777.55.H656, 1969

Reports on the two most recent Chinese nuclear tests. The development of nuclear weapons is for defensive purposes only and is aimed at breaking the nuclear monopoly maintained by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Chinese Government advocates the "complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons" and declares that it will never be the first to use them.

1061

De Volpi, Alexander. **MINY--GORGON MEDUSA OF THE NUCLEAR AGE.** Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 35-38, 46.
TK9145.A84, v. 26

Discusses the design technology, performance, and strategic implications of the multiple inde-

pendently targetable reentry vehicle. De Volpi predicts that deployment of this weapon will increase the danger of first-strike concerns and accidental nuclear war, accelerate the arms race, and decrease the security of the superpowers.

1062

Giese, Fritz E. **[IS THE "GUNBOAT POLICY" STILL VALID?] Hat die "Kanonenboot-Politik" heute noch Bedeutung?** Revue militaire générale; general military review, Feb. 1970: 187-199.
U2.H48, 1970
Includes summaries in French and English.

Contents that the prerequisites for a policy of force by a naval power against a small coastal country are missing today because of the role of aircraft in military defense and the intervention of international organizations. Peking's accusation that the Soviet Union conducts a "gunboat policy" is unfounded since the Soviet Navy does not intervene in the countries whose ports it visits. Giese also discusses the modern equipment of the Soviet Navy.

1063

Gimlin, Hoyt. **CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL WEAPONRY.** Editorial research reports, v. 1, June 18, 1969: 452-470.
H35.K35, v. 1
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Reviews the events that have recently brought chemical and biological warfare (CBW) to public attention in the United States; examines the use or alleged use of CBW agents in World Wars I and II, Korea, and Vietnam; and discusses congressional interest in banning CBW weapons.

1064

IN PURSUIT OF THE LMFBR. Nuclear news, v. 13, Mar. 1970: 49-68. illus.
QC770.H75, v. 13

Contents.--Top-priority program: the fast breeder reactor, by Milton Shaw.--SHEFOR construction and operation: prelude to LMFBR development, by L. F. Fidrych and J. O. Arterburn.--Fuels and materials irradiation program in support of the FFTF, by W. E. Roake and J. C. Tobin.--SRR-2 as a fast reactor irradiation facility, by Frederick S. Kira.

Various aspects of the program to develop a liquid metal fast breeder reactor--the highest priority U.S. program in the field of nuclear energy and one pregnant with important national and international consequences.

1065

KEEPING PLOWHARE ALIVE. Nature (London) v. 225, Mar. 14, 1970: 992-993.
Q1.H7, v. 225

Comments on the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's FY 1971 budget requests for Project Plowshare and

the program to construct thermonuclear research machines. Flowshare budget cuts could have serious long-term consequences, leading, for example, to a loss of trained personnel, but no one has yet articulated a sound economic case for the project.

1066

Kennedy, William V. **FUTURE OF THE FIGHTER.** Ordinance, v. 54, Jan./Feb. 1970: 402-406.
UFI.067, v. 54

Production of a new long-range fighter-bomber and an airborne-control-of-interception system has been partially blocked by the belief that the strategic threat is shifting from manned bombers to ballistic missiles. While this debate persists, the Soviet Union has achieved a significant long-range bomber capability. The continuing need for a long-range bomber force is based on the unknown performance of ballistic missiles in war, the effects of electromagnetic pulse and massive electronic countermeasures, and the variables introduced by antiballistic missiles. It may therefore be necessary for the United States to deploy the F-12 or a more advanced interceptor. While the armed attack helicopter may supplant the fixed-wing close-support aircraft, other aircraft like the air-superiority fighter, fighter-bomber, advanced manned strategic aircraft, and advanced long-range interceptor will be necessary as long as missiles cannot perform the aircraft's varied missions. The future of the fighter in naval aviation will depend on the future of the aircraft carrier.

1067

Levin, Stuart M. **F-15: THE TERTHING OF A DOGFIGHTER.** Space/aeronautics, v. 52, Dec. 1969: 36-47. illus.
TL501.A8187, v. 52

Discusses the conceptual debate within the Defense Department and among prime contractors over the mission, airframe-propulsion configuration, and avionics and weapons design of the F-15 system.

1068

London, Michael P. **SAFEGUARD: IS THERE A CHOICE?** Space/aeronautics, v. 52, Nov. 1969: 48-55. illus.
TL501.A8187, v. 52

In a section entitled "Strategic Defense."

A terminal-intercept system could best overcome the cost, command and control, and countermeasures problems that confront an ABM. A boost system is vulnerable to countermeasures early in the boost phase, is very expensive, and eliminates the freedom from the command and control loop. A mid-course system can be penetrated even in a relatively unsophisticated attack. An effective hard-point system should consist of a slower and smaller interceptor that could discriminate warheads from decoys and keep intercept distances at a minimum and smaller and cheaper missile site radars that could be made mobile within the missile field. Because it is possible to build improved

components for a terminal system, the Safeguard will be very short lived. Other current or potential systems like superhard silos, a sea-based or mobile ICBM, multiple independent reentry vehicles, advanced manned strategic aircraft, short-range attack missiles, or supersonic cruise armed decoys could protect America's assured-destruction capability.

1069

Lowenbar, Herman. **ABM RADARS: MYTH VS REALITY.** Space/aeronautics, v. 52, Nov. 1969: 56-64. illus.
TL501.A8187, v. 52

In a section entitled "Strategic Defense."

Contents that Safeguard's radars are inadequate against relatively simple countermeasures, suggests alternatives, and concludes that the latter concept of onboard radars is so different from the Safeguard system that major portions of the system would have to be changed to restructure the ABM around a true, Spartan area-intercept capability.

1070

Marriott, John. **CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE.** International defense review, no. 2, 1969: 170-174. illus.
PQGP R8

Some advantages of chemical and biological warfare (CBW); characteristics and capabilities of various chemical agents and disease organisms; dissemination and protection strategies. Marriott predicts that chemical and biological agents will be used in future conflicts and argues that nations that lack CBW capability will be at a grave disadvantage.

1071

Marriott, John. **NAVAL MISSILES.** International defense review, no. 3, 1969: 243-248. illus.
PQGP R8

Surveys the status, characteristics, and capabilities of five types of Western naval missile systems. While naval missiles have been accepted as the main armament of modern warships, the gun is still an efficient weapon for shore bombardment and will not be replaced completely by missiles for another 20 years.

1072

Mason, John F. **MISSILE RANGE SHARPENS REENTRY TECHNIQUES.** Electronic design, v. 18, Apr. 12, 1970: 30-32. illus.
TK7800.SA37, v. 18

Describes the design and capabilities of various radar systems that monitor and analyze payload behavior and techniques.

1073

Malika, Samuel. **A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE MISSILE-ALLOCATION PROBLEM.** Operations research, v. 18, Mar./Apr. 1970: 334-373.

Q175.763, v. 18

Annotated references: p. 357-373.

Organized review of the unclassified literature on the missile-allocation problem. The problem considered is: given an existing weapon force and a set of targets, what is the optimal allocation of weapons to targets? References are organized by type, characterized by submodel, discussed, and annotated. It is proposed that this review methodology be applied to other appropriate areas. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1074

Moorer, Thomas H. [THE CVN] Navy, v. 13, Feb. 1970: 45-46, 48; Mar. 31-33. illus.

VA49, N28, v. 13

Memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Secretary of the Navy, John H. Chafee.

Parts 1-3 of this article were annotated as item no. 625 in v. 6, no. 2, of this bibliography.

The U.S. Navy's case for nuclear- and conventional-powered aircraft carriers.

1075

Hsu, Sien-chong. RED CHINA'S NUCLEAR MIGHT. Ordnance, v. 54, Jan./Feb. 1970: 395-401.

UFI.067, v. 54

Traces the development of Communist China's nuclear weapons program from 1951 to 1967. Although achievements in nuclear materials production and improvements in the weight-yield ratio of weapons have been particularly impressive from a technical and scientific point of view, the cultural revolution has hampered the nuclear program.

1076

[NUCLEAR NAVY] Navy, v. 13, Feb. 1970: 14-51. illus.

VA49, N28, v. 13

Contents.--Past-present-future of nuclear navy, by Elton C. Fay.--Polaris-Poseidon-ULAMS: the strategic answer, by John C. Morris.--Congress sparks nuclear surface ship construction, by Sen. Henry M. Jackson.--Nuclear sub-tankers: the answer to carrying Alaska oil? by Clay D. Blair, Jr.--NAUTILUS and HARMAL: a unique personal view, by Rear Admiral E. P. Wilkinson.--Administration backs away from A-merchants, by Admiral John Will.--Nuclear subs get top Russian priority, by Norman Polmar.--Navy spurs commercial nuclear power advances, by Rep. Carl Albert.--Admiral Moorer on the CVN gap (by Thomas H. Moorer)--Profile of Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, by Charles W. Cordery.

Articles on various aspects of the use of nuclear energy for ship propulsion.

1077

FLOWSHARE. Nuclear news, v. 13, Jan. 1970: 42-44. illus.

U775.N75, v. 13

Fifth article in a section entitled "Nuclear Industry 69."

Review of Project Flowshare activities in 1969. The results of tests in the excavation and natural gas production programs, legislative action

relative to commercial uses of nuclear explosives in the United States and abroad, the Interior Department's battle to win a role in the decision-making on questions concerning commercial uses of nuclear explosives, and the growth of congressional opposition to Flowshare are briefly discussed.

1078

POWER REACTORS 1970--INDEX. Nuclear engineering, v. 15, Feb. 1970: 109-134.

TK9001.N75, v. 15

General information, technical data, and progress schedules for all the world's nuclear power reactors--planned, under construction, and operational.

1079

Prina, L. Edgar. AEGIS--NAVY STRIVES TO MEET SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE THREAT. Navy, v. 13, Mar. 1970: 16-20. illus.

VA49, N28, v. 13

Describes the U.S. Navy's program to develop a fleet defense against the Soviet Union's Styx and submarine- and bomber-launched cruise missiles.

1080

Ryan, D. H. P. ASW HELICOPTERS IN DESTROYERS. International defense review, no. 3, 1969: 230-241. illus.

P&GP BR

Describes the development of Canada's destroyer-antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopter program, focusing on aircraft and ship design and trial flight operations. The ASW helicopter weapon system can detect, classify, and attack under all weather conditions the most modern submarines planned for the future.

1081

Schröder, Harald, Ingemar K. Olsson, and Rolf Ljungkvist. VIGGEN. Astronautics & aeronautics, v. 7, Dec. 1969: 26-34. illus.

TL501.A688A25, v. 7

Describes the evolution of Sweden's aircraft industry, the general characteristics of the Saab 37 Viggen, and the organization and management methods applied to the Viggen project, which resulted in development cost stability.

1082

Seener und Eiterlin, Ferdinand M. von. [THE AMERICAN ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM] Das amerikanische Raketenabwehrsystem. Wehrkunde, v. 18, Nov. 1969: 576-579.

U1.WJ96, v. 18

Outlines changes in American antimissile defense systems and points out costly fallacies that led to be dropped from the Nation's defense planning, e.g., that offensive strategic weapons suffice to deter enemy attack and that deployment of those weapons in immobile sites would ensure the Nation's second-strike capability.

1083

Terzibaschitsch, Stefan. [NAVAL ARMAMENTS AS REFLECTED IN NEW NAVY MANUALS] Maritime Rüstung im Spiegel neuer Flottenhandbücher. Marine Rundschau, v. 67, Jan. 1970: 36-42. illus. V3.M3, v. 67

Notes the 1969 changes in the naval armaments of 27 nations, with special attention to Great Britain, France, and Italy.

1084

Zoppo, Ciro. NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONS, AND THE THIRD WORLD. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p 113-125. H1.A4, v. 386

The decade ahead is likely to witness a diminished capacity by the protagonist powers to control the universalization of that nuclear technology most suited to eventual military purposes. The fast-breeder reactor and centrifuge-enrichment, two nuclear developments on the threshold of commercial feasibility, are the most foreboding. They would provide, as by-products of the generation of electricity, two fissionable materials used in making nuclear weapons: plutonium and enriched uranium. This technology will be developed by industrial countries, like Germany and Japan, but it could be exported to countries in the Third World, where it is fervently believed to be the key to economic development. The prospects that the Soviet Union and the United States will effectively curb the spread of this technology seem poor because mutually reinforcing economic, status, and security incentives will undermine the diplomatic leverage of the superpowers and lead to relaxed safeguards. Thus, even a Nonproliferation Treaty ratified by most threshold and Third World countries would not prevent the eventual formation of a base for nuclear technology amounting to a real military option in many developing countries. (Abstract supplied)

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

1085

Aber, John W., and Paul W. Garber. THE NAVY AND THE MERCHANT MARINE: A CRITICAL COALITION. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 96, Mar. 1970: 40-44. illus. V1.U8, v. 96

Examines the inadequacies of existing U.S. organizations and doctrines to control and protect merchant shipping in view of recent technological changes.

1086

AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE IN THE 70'S. Edited by Abdul A. Said. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall [1970] 179 p. (A Spectrum book) E840.A64

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Commentary: changing requirements of U.S. security, by Abdul A. Said.--Security and American diplomacy, by Whittle Johnston.--Security and threatmanship, by Samuel L. Sharp.--Western Europe, by Hans J. Morgenthau.--The Balkans, by Theodore A. Coulombis.--Latin America, by John N. Plank.--Sub-Saharan Africa, by Charles Burton Marshall.--The Middle East, by Abdul A. Said.--South and Southeast Asia, by Richard Butwell.--The Far East, by Takehiko Yoshihashi.--U.S. security through multilateralism, by Urban Whitaker.--U.S. security and the community of nations, by Lawrence W. Wadsworth.--U.S. security and regionalism, by James R. Jose.--Military technology in the 1970s, by Walter C. Clemens, Jr.--Index.

Examines U.S. foreign policy, explores the issues of the changing requirements of American security, and recommends new security roles for the United States in the 1970's.

1087

ARMED FORCES REORGANISATION. Asian almanac, v. 7, Dec. 20, 1969: 3701-3702. D81.A4752, v. 7

Surveys the recent reorganization of the Indonesian Armed Forces Command, which includes a plan to retire 50,000 army personnel by 1973. A militia will be formed to compensate for these reductions. The new tasks of the armed forces will be sociopolitical and military. Although strategic estimates indicate that Indonesia will not be confronted with an external military threat during the next 5 years, Communist subversion will continue to be a major problem.

1088

Barnett, A. Doak. A NUCLEAR CHINA AND U.S. ARMS POLICY. Foreign affairs, v. 48, Apr. 1970: 427-442. D410.F6, v. 46

While it would be impossible for China to achieve a first-strike capability or gain parity with either of the superpowers in the foreseeable future, it may acquire a limited defensive second-strike capability in time. The Chinese can be expected to be constrained by the realities of nuclear deterrence. Once China attains a minimal credible deterrent, a new leadership might be more inclined to reassess its posture on strategic problems and arms control, concluding that it would be more advantageous to reduce the nuclear weapons gap through negotiated strategic arms limitations than by competing in a costly and futile arms race. The United States and the Soviet Union should therefore agree in the strategic arms limitation talks not to deploy antiballistic missiles or take other measures designed to prevent China from acquiring even a limited second-strike capability. Instead, as soon as it is justifiable they could indicate to China the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. U.S. and Soviet ABM deployments in an attempt to maintain total damage-denial capability against China would delay

China's eventual acquisition of a second-strike capability, ensure its continued opposition to U.S.-Soviet sponsored arms control proposals, and inhibit Chinese willingness to participate in arms control negotiations. In addition, ABM's would escalate the Soviet-American arms race, adversely affect Sino-American relations, and convince the Chinese that Moscow and Washington are actively collaborating to perpetuate their total strategic superiority vis-a-vis Peking. The United States should make it clear that it will not support the Soviet Union's anti-Chinese policies and will maintain an evenhanded policy toward both powers.

1089

Barrett, Raymond J. GEOGRAPHY AND SOVIET STRATEGIC THINKING. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Jan. 1970: 17-25. illus.

Z6723.U35, v. 50

It is a serious mistake to assume that Soviet strategic thought is the mirror image of U.S. strategic thought. Geographic vulnerability, the major fact of Soviet geography, presents Soviet strategists with a range of problems not faced by their U.S. counterparts. This vulnerability explains why Soviet decisionmakers are so defense minded, why they persist in maintaining outsized conventional forces, and why they follow the policy they do with regard to the Warsaw Pact. This same factor is a major source of the friction with Communist China, which in turn provides the *raison d'être* of ABM deployment. Because of its vulnerability, the Soviet Union will be chary of agreeing to freeze ABM deployment or limit its conventional forces or of permitting changes to the status quo in central and Eastern Europe, and for the same reason there will be no rapprochement with Communist China. China is bound to play a greater role in Soviet strategic thought and to have a decisive impact on the Soviet attitude toward disarmament, détente, and economic development. Moscow will continue to be cautious in its relations with the United States, but, if its Vietnam policy and naval strategy are any indication, it may be trying to force the United States into a position of vulnerability similar to its own. As the pressures along the Soviet frontiers increase and Soviet sensitivities grow, the United States will have to develop "policies that will encourage gradual changes while not precipitating explosive reactions stemming from Soviet anxieties."

1090

Baudissin, Wolf, Graf von. [LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF MILITARY ALLIANCE SYSTEMS; SECURITY-POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN THE COMING DECADE] Grenzen und Möglichkeiten militärischer Bündnissysteme; sicherheitspolitische Perspektiven im kommenden Jahrzehnt. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Jan. 10, 1970: 1-10. D839.E86, v. 25

Since deterrence, arms control, and the achievement of peace are likely to loom large in the fu-

ture strategic picture, they are used here as criteria of the limits and possibilities of the alliance systems. "Deterrence is a continuous process." Each failure adds to the importance of deterring the next bigger disaster. Since deterrence aims primarily at peace, its rules resemble those of "crisis management" rather than war. It requires, however, a flexible "set of military instruments," too costly for nation-states and too difficult for classical alliances to acquire. Only in modern alliance systems can a multinational division of labor reduce the costs adequately and secure a high strategic mobility of forces. A united but politically nonintegrated Western Europe could never achieve NATO's deterrent power. Arms control is an unusually complicated process that can serve many purposes like reduction of the chance, intensity, or escalation of war. In the future the military alliances will deal with arms control on a superpower level as in the strategic arms limitation talks and on a regular multilateral level as in a European security conference. Success will depend on factors like a realization by the two sides that there is a law of diminishing returns in arms races and that the interests of industrial states increasingly converge. By their contribution to the balance of power, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have cemented the status quo, but they have nevertheless shown flexibility in their objectives, structures, and strategies. A European peace order might be achieved by a rapprochement and osmosis of the two alliances. Since the "political scenery is no longer strictly bipolar," the military alliances offer their members greater security than would neutrality despite the risks involved in membership. Europe's future security will depend on these alliances, while other problems will be solved through supranational and international co-operation.

1091

Baudissin, Wolf, Graf von. THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Dec. 1969/Jan. 1970: 26-32. UA646.F5, v. 14

Thoughts on modern strategy, the doctrine of flexible response, and future strategic problems.

1092

Bauer, Helmut. [HOME DEFENSE OF EUROPEAN NATIONS; A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION: THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC--FRANCE] Die Landesverteidigung europäischer Nationen; eine vergleichende Auswertung: Bundesrepublik Deutschland--Frankreich. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit, v. 19, Oct. 1969: 557-576. U3.W485, v. 19

Examines several aspects of the French and West German defense postures, including geography, legal structure, organization, logistics, economics, civil defense, leadership, planning, and morale. Bauer concludes that in most of these fields France is superior to the German Federal Republic and suggests measures to improve West Germany's defense posture.

1093

Bechtoldt, Heinrich. [CHINA'S STRATEGY OF REVOLUTION; WITH THE THIRD WORLD AGAINST RUSSIA AND AMERICA] Chinas Revolutionsstrategie. Mit der Dritten Welt gegen Russland und Amerika. [Vom Autor erw. u. aktualisierte Ausg.] [München] Deutscher Taschenbuch Verl. [1969] 371 p. (DTV, 615) DS740.5.R8B4 1969

Originally issued under the title: Die Allianz mit der Armut. Chinas Revolutionsstrategie gegen Russland und Amerika.

DS740.5.R8B4

Enlarged and updated by the author.

Contents.--Foreword to the pocket edition.--The revolutionary dynamics of Maoism.--Russian imperialism in China.--Ideological escalation against Moscow.--The Fifth International as a counter-front.--Call to the Third World for a revolution.--Model war for the world revolution.--Extremely high hope and a fall into the abyss.--Unequal treaties and the intermediate zones.--Nuclear weapons for the protection of people's war.--Introversion as a revolutionary reserve.--Annotations and references.--Selected bibliography.--Index of names and subjects.

Examines the origins, methods, and goals of Communist China's strategy of world revolution and discusses the Sino-Soviet dispute and Mao Tse-tung's theory of intermediate zones, according to which Canada, Australia, Europe, Latin America, Africa, and most of Asia will develop closer relations with China than with the United States or the Soviet Union. Bechtoldt examines China's nuclear armaments and its negative attitude toward arms control agreements. Although Peking formally rejects the notion that nuclear proliferation automatically increases the danger of nuclear war, it nevertheless realizes that proliferation abroad is not in China's best interest. Once China acquires full-fledged nuclear status, its security policy may change.

1094

Beer, Francis A. INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN NATO; PROCESSES OF ALLIANCE COHESION AND PROSPECTS FOR ATLANTIC COMMUNITY. [Columbus] Ohio, State University Press [c1969] 330 p. (A Publication of the Merston Center for Education in National Security) UA646.3.B39

Contents.--Introduction.--Political consultation in NATO.--NATO military forces: integration.--NATO military forces: leadership, functionalism, and spill-over.--NATO armaments.--NATO infrastructure.--NATO science.--NATO: past and future.--Appendixes.--Notes.--Index.

Contents that NATO is not integrated. Although the organization's structures and tasks have changed and become increasingly differentiated, binding institutional procedures and alliance authority remain mostly ineffective. Political leaders have been unwilling to support sizable joint activities except when they were in the national interest of their own countries.

1095

[BONN PREPARES A TOXIC WAR] Bonn bereitet Giftkrieg vor. [Hrsg. vom Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR] Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1969. 109 p. DD259.2.B65

Partial contents.--Introduction.--From a declaration by Ehrenfried Petras, former head of the Microbiological Laboratory at the West German Institute for Aerobiology in Grafschaft/Sauerland, to an international press conference held on December 6, 1968.--From a speech by the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Secretary of State Günther Kohrt, to an international press conference held on December 6, 1968. Memorandum by Friedrich Jung (Humboldt University, Berlin), Werner Scheler (Ernst-Moritz-Arndt University, Greifswald), and Horst Ankermann (Friedrich-Schiller University, Jena) on the creation of prerequisites in West Germany for biological and chemical warfare. An appeal to scientists, engineers, and technicians in the West German Federal Republic.--West Germany, the home of crime.--Science and technology in the service of crime.--Index of names.

Asserts that West Germany is developing toxic substances and biological weapons and lists pertinent laboratories, institutes, and firms.

1096

Braune, Hans J. THE GERMAN AIR FORCE. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 9, winter 1969: 269-275. illus. UG635.G7A1252, v. 9

Traces the development of the German Air Force since the fifties and projects it to the midseventies. Braune discusses the force's mission, strength, equipment, organization, personnel, training, and integration in NATO's air defense system. The change in NATO's strategy from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" had little effect on the force's basic mission, which includes air defense of areas assigned by NATO, direct support of the battlefield, and participation in NATO's nuclear counterstrike.

1097

Burke, Arleigh A. ROLE OF NAVAL FORCES. Naval War College review, v. 22, Mar. 1970: 5-11. P&GP RR

Address delivered to the Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College.

In view of the Soviet Union's new interest in seapower and the growing reluctance of the United States to commit ground forces to overseas combat, U.S. global strategy will gradually shift from a dependence upon troop commitments and fixed land bases to reliance on naval power to exercise diplomacy, protect vital national interests, and maintain existing treaty commitments. The Russians will confront the Americans with a policy of more competitive intervention in international political and military affairs and improved military

capabilities. The Soviet Navy, which was formerly tied to the flanks of the army, now operates sizable forces in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. The Russians are improving their merchant marine, fishing, and oceanographic research capabilities on a large scale, are building submarines at a faster rate than all other nations combined, and soon will have more ballistic missiles at sea than the United States. They also are adopting a maritime strategy that will use naval forces for combat and in conjunction with the merchant marine for global political and economic influence and will be supported by a large and versatile shipbuilding program. Although national navies might be combined through alliance systems or integrated into a U.N. naval command, and multinational naval forces based on mutual regional interests are feasible and desirable, such efforts must take second priority to specific national interests.

1098

Cabrita Matias, A. THE ATLANTIC AS AN OBJECTIVE OF SOVIET GEOSTRATEGY. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 14, Dec. 1969/Jan. 1970: 42-44.
UA646.F5, v. 14

Analyzes the Soviet Union's motives for expanding its naval forces. Cabrita Matias warns that, if the Soviet Union, which now enjoys superiority in air power and ground forces, gains the advantage in nuclear weapons and seapower, it will be strongly tempted to provoke a showdown with the West to secure its European or Atlantic frontier before Communist China becomes a serious threat.

1099

Caucig, Franz. [THE AIMS OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. DEFENSE POSSIBILITIES ABOVE ALL] Die Ziele der türkischen Regierung. Verteidigungsmöglichkeiten an erster Stelle. Politische Welt, v. 12, Dec. 1969: 4-6.

D839.P65, v. 12

Considers Turkey's defense problem after the United States closes its military bases. To maintain an adequate defense capability even with NATO support, Turkey will have to develop its own defense industry.

1100

Chou, En-lai. SPEECH BY PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI AT PYONGYANG MASS RALLY. Peking review, v. 13, Apr. 10, 1970: 18-21. DS701.P42, v. 13
Delivered on Apr. 7, 1970.

Expresses concern over Japan's rapidly expanding defense programs and the position of Taiwan and South Korea in its evolving Asian security system.

1101

Coffey, Joseph I. THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE. Revue militaire générale; gen-

eral military review, no. 10, Dec. 1969: 628-639; no. 1, Jan. 1970: 47-65.

U2.R48, 1969/70

Includes summaries in French and German.

Assesses the implications of U.S. policy toward Western Europe for future defense policies and relations with NATO. A policy that emphasizes nuclear weapons rather than conventional forces could counter the exaggerated Soviet threat to Western Europe. The flexible response strategy is not relevant to Europeans because they are concerned with deterring aggression, not defending against attack. Coffey outlines the policies that could best promote a sense of security among the NATO allies, including a realistic limitation to the level of NATO's conventional operations. Neither arms limitation measures nor a move toward a détente "are likely to be acceptable as long as the NATO allies are at odds with the United States over the strategic concepts and the force postures required for their common defense."

1102

Cox, Frederick J. THE RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN EGYPT. Naval War College review, v. 22, Feb. 1970: 44-53. map. P&GP RR
Bibliographical references included in "Footnotes": p. 51-53.

Surveys Soviet policy in the Near East, emphasizing current economic and military aid programs in Egypt and concluding that the Russians control the Egyptian Armed Forces. The Soviet presence in the Near East alters the global balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, increases the possibility of a confrontation between the superpowers, allows the Russians to outflank NATO, and threatens American naval hegemony in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union's increasing influence in the Arab world stems directly from its strategic naval capability in the Mediterranean.

1103

Datta, N. P. THE VACUUM AND ALL THAT. In United Service Institution of India, New Delhi. Journal, v. 99, Apr./June 1969: 105-112.
U1.U5, v. 99

Western and Russian interests in the Indian Ocean area have become marginal. The inevitable Chinese effort to fill this vacuum will endanger Indian interests. The Indian Achilles' heel is not the northern borders but Burma, for whose integrity neither the United States nor Russia feels sufficiently concerned to intervene in a Chinese-inspired internal revolt. A Sino-Indian military balance making possible a state of coexistence would not imperil the smaller states, whose interests coincide with India's, nor anger the superpowers, who would welcome the appearance of a second Asian power. With the growth of the Indian economy, the increased military budget allocations necessary need not exceed the present percentage of the gross national product.

1104

Denis, Michel. [CHAUVINEAU AND THE CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENCE] Chauvineau ou la crédibilité de la dissuasion. *Revue militaire générale*; general military review, Feb. 1970: 200-212.

U2.R48, 1970

Includes summaries in English and German.

Discusses Narcisse Chauvineau's military concepts, which remain relevant to the problem of ensuring coverage for NATO countries against superior Warsaw Pact forces, and argues that the most credible deterrent is nuclear mines.

1105

Fulbright, James William. VIETNAM: THE CRUCIAL ISSUE. *Progressive*, v. 34, Feb. 1970: 16-18. AP2.P8655, v. 34

President Nixon maintains that Vietnam is an exemplary place for the United States to demonstrate that the Communist doctrine of expansion by proxy cannot succeed, while virtually every non-Government specialist on Southeast Asia regards the war as a civil conflict in which communism has always been secondary to the struggle for national independence. From the point of view of U.S. strategic interests, it is of no consequence whether Vietnam is Communist or not, united or divided. To pursue "victory" in a war that serves no worthy political purpose, as both Presidents Nixon and Johnson have done, is immoral and destructive of the national interests. Nixon's strategy of "Vietnamization" is based on the illusion that the Thieu-Ky government is viable, that it has the support of the South Vietnamese people. The only workable solution to the war is to establish a coalition government through negotiations with the National Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese. This could be achieved if it were not for the Nixon administration's unwillingness to sacrifice the Thieu-Ky government even when it makes a negotiated settlement impossible.

1106

Gache, Paul. [RUSSIA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN] La Russie et la Méditerranée. *Revue militaire générale*; general military review, no. 9, Nov. 1969: 505-522. U2.R48, 1969

Includes summaries in English and German.

Assesses the Soviet effort to convert the Mediterranean into a Soviet sea. Gache concludes that the Russians could achieve their goal by emerging as the "protectors" of Israel after a deterioration of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Soviet Union may then obtain U.S. withdrawal from the Mediterranean because "a few more Israeli blunders or excesses may provoke an attitude of neutrality on the part of the Western powers almost without their realizing it."

1107

Gallar, Joanne L. SEVEN WARNING SIGNALS: A REVIEW OF SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE. *Bulletin of the atomic*

scientists, v. 25, Dec. 1969: 18-22.

TK9145.A84, v. 25

Reprinted from the *Oak Ridge National Laboratory Review*.

Civil defense in the Soviet Union is a large-scale, well-coordinated program that includes compulsory training, realistic exercises, detailed planning, and protection measures. Everyone is exposed to civil defense and "instructed on how to respond to surprise attack and to the preattack government order to evacuate their cities." The people are taught in realistic exercises to fight fires, administer first aid, rescue the injured, and construct emergency passageways in destroyed shelters. Although the rural program has lagged behind its urban counterpart, the discrepancy has been reduced. Dispersion of industry and duplication of production are encouraged to ensure the survivability of industrial installations. In rural areas, the civil defense program is designed to ensure agricultural production in wartime, furnish manpower for rescue operations, and protect livestock and water supplies.

1108

Gallois, Pierre M. [FROM NATURAL DETERRENCE TO ARTIFICIAL INSECURITY] De la dissuasion naturelle à l'insécurité artificielle. *Politique étrangère*, no. 5/6, 1969: 547-579.

JX3.P6, 1969

The nuclear arms race has deceived the superpowers. They have accumulated an excessive destructive potential at the price of a tremendous technological effort, only to succeed in nullifying their mutual progress. According to the author, the Americans, by invoking the "missile gap" since 1960 to launch their strategic armaments program, are at the origin of this escalation. Today, technological progress again menaces the painfully reached "equilibrium of prudence." When, for example, a multiple independently guided warhead will have been constructed, a possible aggressor could be tempted to risk a first strike, but could one be sure that an accord prohibiting the construction of such missiles would be observed by the superpowers? A strategic arms limitation agreement difficult to achieve--a global agreement--would appear all the more problematic because the superpowers will renounce neither the privilege that their strategic superiority confers upon them vis-a-vis the middle powers nor the scientific and industrial advances that such an armament effort requires. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

1109

Gambiez, Fernand C. [THE FATAL SKIN] La peau de chagrin. *Revue de défense nationale*, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 5-16. D410.R45, v. 26

Warns that "the fatal skin of deterrence is shrinking dangerously" and that deterrence theory will no longer be valid. The multiple independent reentry vehicle and the SS-9, the proliferation of

nuclear technology, and the Chinese psychology and logic of deterrence threaten the balance of terror.

1110

Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies. SOVIET SEA POWER. Washington, 1969. 134 p. illus. (Its Special report series, no. 10) VA573.046

Contents.--Preface.--Members of the panel and contributors.--pt. 1. Policy findings and implications for U.S. policy.--pt. 2. The background paper: Introduction. Historical trends. Soviet maritime strategy, roles and missions. Present status and plans for Soviet naval forces. Soviet naval aid to other countries. Soviet merchant fleet. Soviet fishing fleet and intelligence activities. Soviet oceanography.--pt. 3. Panelists' and contributors' comments: Panelists' comments. Contributors' comments.--Charts.

Assesses the growth of Soviet maritime power and its implications for the United States. The panelists warn that failure to improve the U.S. Navy and merchant marine will lead to a diminished global role for the United States.

1111

Goodstadt, L. F. LET SLIP THE DOGS OF WAR. Far Eastern economic review, v. 66, Dec. 4, 1969: 485-486. illus. HC411.F18, v. 66

Describes war preparations in China, focusing on civil defense measures. While the Chinese seem to be convinced that a Soviet strike is imminent, the possibility exists that the invasion scare is being used as a propaganda ploy to generate internal unity. Although Mao Tse-tung's "spiritual atom bomb" might discourage a Soviet invasion of China, it is not an effective deterrent against a Soviet strategic missile and air attack.

1112

Gostony, Peter. [LEADERSHIP IN THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S ARMY] Menschenführung in der ungarischen Volksarmee. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit, v. 19, Dec. 1969: 676-691. U3.W485, v. 19

Considers the postwar history of political leadership and indoctrination within Hungary's Armed Forces, the relationship between political and commanding officers, reorganization and purges in the army after the 1956 Hungarian revolt, and the present morale and political reliability of the troops. Gostony concludes that the strong individualism and patriotism of the Hungarian soldier hamper Communist indoctrination efforts.

1113

Hakovirta, Harto. THE FINNISH SECURITY PROBLEM. Cooperation and conflict, no. 4, 1969: 247-266. P&GP RR

Proposes "a rough analytical model of the problems of decision making in Finnish security policy, comprising only the most significant structural elements and relations of action and interaction."

1114

Höpker, Wolfgang. [HOW RED IS THE MEDITERRANEAN?] Wie rot ist das Mittelmeer? Politische Welt, v. 12, Dec. 1969: 27-30. D839.P65, v. 12

Sees in the reduction of the Soviet Mediterranean force a sign that Moscow is discouraging an intensification of Arab militancy. The Soviet submarine fleet now causes the greatest concern to the NATO Mediterranean Command. The Soviet military posture in the area, although inferior to that of the West, may improve by the acquisition of airfields in coastal Arab countries. Höpker discusses plans for improving NATO's Mediterranean defenses and the roles of Turkey, Greece, and Italy.

1115

Jen, Wu-chun. HOLD ALOFT THE GREAT RED BANNER OF CHAIRMAN MAO'S THINKING ON PEOPLE'S WAR AND STRENGTHEN THE BUILDING OF THE MILITIA. Peking review, v. 13, Feb. 6, 1970: 7-9. D8701.P42, v. 13

Focuses on the opposition of former Chinese political and military leaders to the guerrilla strategy favored by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Biao, and its overemphasis on a massive, untrained militia. Since the militia will continue to play an important role in modern warfare the author prescribes increased political and military training.

1116

Kahn, Herman. ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR. 2d ed., with index and a new pref. written by the author especially for the paperback ed. New York, Free Press [1969, c1969] xxvi, 668 p. illus. (Free Press paperback) UF767.K25 1969

Partial contents.--Lecture 1. The nature and feasibility of thermonuclear war: Alternative national strategies. Will the survivors envy the dead? Neither oblivion nor surrender.--Lecture 2. The formulation and testing of objectives and plans: Conflicting objectives. Stresses and strains. Additional remarks on the military problems.--Lecture 3. World War I through world war VIII: The role of analysis. The real past. The hypothetical past. Present and future. Recapitulation. The problem must be taken seriously.--Appendices: Introduction. Improve policy formulation. Proposal for a war damage equalization

corporation. The special importance of installations. A proposed civil defense program. Some questions and answers. Index.

Estimates the effects of thermonuclear war on the United States. The solution to strategic problems between the superpowers lies partly in coexistence or collaboration, which the United States can achieve by being strong enough to prevent nuclear blackmail and aggressive tactics and make Soviet leaders believe that agreements would be worthwhile. Although the United States could match the Soviet Union in arms production and development for several decades, an uncontrolled arms race would create unacceptably high risks of irresponsible behavior.

1117

Kim, Youn-soo. [THE NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY (INMIN-KUN): THE PAST AND THE PRESENT] Die nord-koreanische Volksarmee (Inmin-Kun): Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit, v. 19, Nov. 1969: 614-619.

U3.W485, v. 19

Traces the development of the North Korean Armed Forces since 1948, with special emphasis on the Korean War and recent years. Kim notes that the army's dependency on Soviet military aid hinders North Korea's leaders from turning their country into a model of independence and self-reliance for other Afro-Asian countries.

1118

Knorr, Klaus E. NATO: PAST, PRESENT, PROSPECT. [New York] Foreign Policy Association [1969] 63 p. illus. (Headline series, no. 198) UA646.3.K52

Bibliography: p. 62-63.

Contents.--The foundation of NATO.--History and evolution.--Is NATO indispensable?--Ways and means.--Future role for the United States.--Talking it over.

History and evaluation of NATO. Knorr examines some of the basic problems of NATO and recommends a U.S. NATO policy based on active cooperation but with no attempt to force U.S. leadership on reluctant allies.

1119

Kolodziej, Edward A. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: INNOVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS. Public administration review, v. 29, Nov./Dec. 1969: 573-585. JK1.P85, v. 29

Compares the organization and operation of the National Security Council (NSC) under the present and previous administrations. Kolodziej finds the present NSC more formally structured than under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson but less so than under Eisenhower. Special attention is given to

the evolving relationships of the Departments of State and Defense to the NSC.

1120

Lal, Nand. ARMS CONTROL: AN APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT. Indian journal of political science, v. 30, July/Sept. 1969: 277-290.

JA26.15, v. 30

In the present atmosphere of international hostility, nations will not renounce arms and depend on an unreliable system of collective security but will value security through armaments over uncertain security through disarmament. National sovereignty acts as an obstacle to disarmament because it is often the basis for rejecting an inspection system, which is an essential corollary of all disarmament agreements. Further, despite the usefulness of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, OGD is not compatible with the U.N. Charter. The decline of aggression in the classical sense and the growth of civil wars and revolutions as the major techniques in interstate conflicts deprive disarmament "of much practical utility as far as the mitigation of these new types of intra-frontier wars and conflicts is concerned." Since OGD is neither attainable nor desirable, arms control is available in light of threats to the delicate balance of terror and could consist of legally binding bilateral or multilateral treaties, denuclearization of certain regions, partial restrictions on nuclear testing, establishment of communications between adversaries, an embargo on arms shipments, restrictions on the production of fissile materials or a nation's military operations, development of a universal law of mankind, or strengthening of the United Nations to enforce disarmament agreements. Although the arms control record is not very encouraging, its contribution "to the avoidance of wars by misunderstanding and to the mitigation of the cold war . . . can not be ignored."

1121

Love, George E. TWENTIETH-CENTURY DETERRENTS AND DETERRENCE. Virginia quarterly review, v. 46, winter 1970: 27-45.

AP2.V76, v. 46

The United States should reexamine its nuclear strategy to determine whether international realities and technological advances have made it obsolete. The mobile- and fixed-based deterrent systems of the sixties promoted an arms race that will bring forth a "New Age" of strategic systems for which neither the average man nor the decisionmaker will be prepared. The solution is a mobile, sea-based ICBM system armed with over 5,000 warheads and targeted against the Soviet Union's and China's urban complexes. Further, the United States should encourage a united Europe and the Soviet Union to deploy similar sea-based systems and discourage nations from constructing first-strike weapons systems.

1122

Luchsinger, Fred. NO SUBSTITUTE FOR SECURITY [editorial] Swiss review of world affairs, v. 19, Mar. 1970: 2-3. D839.99, v. 19

Speculation on American troop withdrawals from Europe "is blatantly premature, since the matter has by no means been decided." Despite hints of a reduction in President Nixon's State of the Union message and Senator Mike Mansfield's call for "substantial reductions," Washington officials emphasize the maintenance of troops in Europe. A large-scale reduction could influence West European countries to cut back their commitments, but no European country could meet the challenge. The uncertainty over troop reductions could damage East-West negotiations on mutual troop reductions and undermine current efforts at détente.

1123

McGovern, George S. AND NOW THAT THE AMERICAN DREAM IS SAFELY IN THE HANDS OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENT, WE WAKE TO A NEW DECADE. Esquire, v. 73, Dec. 1969: 189, 324-326, 328-329. AP2.E845, v. 73

The military-industrial complex consumes a disproportionate share of the Nation's human and natural resources. Because Congress lacks the capability to scrutinize every individual weapons system proposed by the military, it must focus its criticism on the military-industrial complex itself, not on specific proposals. The enormous growth of the military establishment has diminished rather than increased the Nation's security by diverting resources from pressing social needs. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to berate military leaders for the present situation since for the most part they have only implemented the policy directives of their civilian superiors. The initiative for change must therefore originate with the executive and legislative branches, both of which should review the Nation's military capabilities and commitments and look for ways to divert present defense expenditures to useful social purposes. The existing method of reviewing military requests is inadequate because it tends to consider questions of military efficiency alone when in fact weapons systems like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles have much broader policy implications.

1124

Nechtersheimer, Alfred. [CIVILIAN DEFENSE--A UTOPIA OR AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S ARMED FORCES?] Soziale Verteidigung--Utopie oder Alternative zur Bundeswehr? Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit, v. 19, Oct. 1969: 541-551. U3.W485, v. 19

According to the advocates of "civilian defense," it would rely on nonviolent action as do some interstate protest movements. Its techniques may vary, but its ultimate ratio always remains nonvio-

lent. Presumably this should force the attacked regimes to moderate their countermeasures to avoid dangerous reactions. Under such circumstances a nonviolent revolt should be as effective as an armed one. Successful nonviolent struggles have been too disparate to permit the formation of a general theory. The doctrine of civilian defense tries to project a domestic struggle mechanism into the area of interstate relations, whose forces and institutions make such a transposition irrelevant. Theoreticians differ in their points of departure on civilian defense as an instrument. Some call for the democratization of the nation. Gene Sharp proposes the replacement of the military defense organization by civil and social defense "within the framework of existing intranational and international relationships." Civilian defense eliminates the dangers of militarism and the arms race; it is necessarily defensive in nature and may be a new road to world peace. Civilian defense could be an equivalent of West German military defense if it were integrated into the Western defense system and became a power factor in West German foreign policy equal to armaments. However, reliance on civilian defense would fail to deter an attack. It would restrain the nation's foreign policy and upset the existing balance of power, which is essential for present security and progress in disarmament. Such defense could develop into the most total form of war, guerrilla war. Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile for West Germany to consider civilian defense a subsidiary defense means although civilian defense lacks the necessary qualities to equal military defense or eliminate the danger of war from the world.

1125

Moebius, Erich. [THE GUERRILLA IN EUROPE?] Guerilla in Europa? Wehrkunde, v. 18, Nov. 1969: 573-575. U3.W396, v. 18

Suggests that guerrilla warfare against enemy occupation of the German Federal Republic be ignored in West German defense planning because most prerequisites for a successful resistance of that type are missing in densely populated and industrialized Western Europe and the potential enemy is superbly experienced in suppressing underground activities. "Civilian defense," a form of passive resistance, although commendable, would have no decisive influence on the aggressor. Moebius stresses the value of NATO for West German defense and urges the Government to plan defense measures against possible enemy guerrilla activities.

1126

Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. [WHAT'S NEW AT NATO?] A l'OTAN, quoi de nouveau? Revue militaire suisse, v. 115, Mar. 1970: 101-104. U2.R5, v. 115

Reports on NATO's current activities and problems. General Goodpaster's recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of NATO's forces, the results of a meeting of the Nuclear Planning

Group, and the problem of troop reductions are discussed.

1127

Moorer, Thomas H. [interview] RISE OF SOVIET SEA POWER. Ordnance, v. 54, Jan./Feb. 1970: 394-398. illus. UPL067, v. 54

Discusses the modernization and expansion of the Soviet Navy and merchant marine, increasing maritime activities in the Mediterranean and Pacific and Indian Oceans, and relative naval strengths in the Mediterranean. If necessary, the United States is prepared to operate in the Indian Ocean. Although the Russians have shifted from a defensive to an offensive naval strategy of global proportions, the Soviet Navy is still relatively weak in terms of underway logistical support, antisubmarine warfare, and naval airpower.

1128

Morice, Gérard. [IS DETERRENCE STILL POSSIBLE?] La dissuasion est-elle encore possible? Science et vie, v. 117, Mar. 1970: 107-113.

T2.S3, v. 117

Includes statements by André Beaufre and Fernand Gambiez.

Debates whether deterrence can be maintained in light of nuclear proliferation and innovations in weaponry. Beaufre asserts that total war is "dead" because it would be too exorbitant and catastrophic, while Gambiez contends that China's growing nuclear power and the multiple independent reentry vehicle are threatening the balance of terror.

1129

Morris, C. E. THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Army quarterly, v. 99, Oct. 1969: 9-13. U1.A85, v. 99

The future of Western Europe's defense lies in an overwhelming U.S. military commitment and independence for European members to guarantee their own integrity while ensuring deterrent credibility. The solution to these requirements rests on devising "a system in which fifteen nations can merge their national sovereign interests to the extent necessary" to fight another war in Europe and to enable members to pursue their interests outside the NATO area without escalating them into general war. NATO must have the ability to handle anything short of an all-out invasion and be "capable of putting up a dogged resistance and inflicting terrible punishment on the invader." Although the present trend of reducing NATO's force level will continue because of rising costs, the introduction of jet transports helps alleviate the problem. The flexible response strategy requires well equipped, well trained, and highly mobile conventional forces. A reduction of forces would suggest that the recourse to nuclear weapons could occur much sooner. A great deal depends on the combat efficiency of NATO's forces, which might

have to engage in a conventional battle for days, or even weeks. NATO's policies and goals must reflect the political changes in the 1970's that are already manifest in U.S. policies toward the alliance as a result of America's commitment in Southeast Asia and in Germany's attitude toward the alliance as a result of its policy toward Eastern Europe. NATO's future is bleak because of the pressures on member governments to reduce their commitments to the alliance. The basic problem will be to maintain a credible deterrent while contending with the vicissitudes of European politics, which could change the membership and structure of the organization.

1130

MOSCOW'S MILITARY MACHINE: THE BEST OF EVERYTHING. Time, v. 95, May 4, 1970: 36-40, 45-47. illus. AP2.T37, v. 95

Surveys Soviet military capabilities and organization, changes in postwar strategy, and the Soviet view of the strategic arms limitation talks.

1131

Munthe-Kaas, Harald. RUSSIANS' DOWN BELOW. Far Eastern economic review, v. 67, Jan. 29, 1970: 19-20, 25-26. illus.

HC411.F18, v. 67

The Soviet Union's diplomatic and trade offensive in Asia is viewed apprehensively by the nations in the region although with less hostility now than a few years ago. While the Soviet Union stresses the nonmilitary character of its proposed Asian collective security pact, it has increased the strength of its armed forces on the Sino-Soviet border and redeployed an increasing number of warships and oceanographic research vessels into the Indian Ocean, to the alarm of the Indians and Australians. The Russians have been reportedly pressuring the Indians for naval bases and may seek such installations in surrounding countries. The Soviet Union is primarily concerned about the next generation of U.S. nuclear submarines, which will be able to strike targets in the U.S.S.R. from protected positions on the Indian Ocean. The Russians might deploy amphibious assault forces in the Indian Ocean to improve their capability to intervene on the ground. Soviet naval power may also be used to protect newly acquired oil interests on the Persian Gulf.

1132

Murphy, Frank M. SEA-POWER AND THE SATELLITES. In United States Naval Institute, ANNAPOLIS. Proceedings, v. 95, Nov. 1969: 74-83. illus. V1.U8, v. 95

Stresses U.S. naval power as an instrument to influence the satellite countries and keep their hopes of freedom alive. A regional organization would reduce the instability of East central Europe, a source of friction between the superpow-

ers, by settling problems like the division of Germany. A united Eastern Europe should not mean disengagement for the United States, for U.S. security is closely related to Europe's.

1133

[NATO'S DEFENSE POSTURE] International defense review, no. 4, 1969: 331-346, 357-372, 376-382. illus. P&GP NR

Contents.--The structure and strength of NATO.--NADGE: front line of NATO's air defenses.--Military combat systems for Europe.--The United Kingdom warning and monitoring organization, by John Marriott.--The missile systems of the Italian Navy, by Aldo Baldini.--HMS Blake: Britain's first helicopter carrier.--Weapons systems for warships, by J. S. Fricker.--The Royal Marines special boat service.--Weapons, vehicles, equipment.--Optical and IR equipment of the AMX 30.--Coherent pulse doppler radars for the French Army.--The Swiss Air Force on target.

Status of NATO defense capabilities in 1969.

1134

Makamura, Koji. STRATEGIC SPLIT. Far Eastern economic review, v. 67, Mar. 19, 1970: 6-7. NC41.718, v. 67

Summarizes the debate between the Japanese Defense Agency and the National Defense Council over the status and structure of Japanese defense forces in the 1970's. "The controversy may substantially affect American strategic thinking and deployment in the Pacific."

1135

NAVAL REVIEW, 1969. Edited by Frank Uhlig. Annapolis, United States Naval Institute [1969] 478 p. illus. V10.M615, 1969

Contents.--pt. 1. A strategic analysis of the Baltic Sea and the Danish Straits, by Edward Wegener. A strategic analysis of the Mediterranean, by Stephen W. Rockhill. The riverine force in action, 1966-1967, by W. C. Walls. Naval logistic support, Qui Nhon to Phu Quoc, by Herbert T. King. Marine Corps operations in Vietnam, 1967, by Edwin H. Simmons. The Indonesian confrontation, by J. M. Moulton. The U.S. tanker industry, by Ben Metten. Developments and problems in carrier-based attack aircraft, by C. O. Molquist. Studies for the new icebreakers, by Keith B. Schumacher. The ocean sciences and the Navy, by O. D. Waters, Jr. Man's future beneath the sea, by George F. Bond.--pt. 2. Naval and maritime events, 1 July 1967-30 June 1968, by Harold S. Torrance. The sea, 1966-1967, by John D. Hayes.--pt. 3. U.S. naval operations against North Vietnam, August 1964-November 1968. 1967 Seventh Fleet summary. The Soviet merchant marine, by the U.S. Maritime Administration. U.S. defense program, 1969-1973, by the Secretary of Defense (Robert S. McNamara).

Problems of naval strategy; U.S. and allied naval operations in the Vietnam War, the Indonesian-

Malaysia confrontation, and elsewhere; oceanography and undersea technology; the U.S. and Soviet merchant marine; the FY 1969-73 U.S. defense program; and other recent naval events and issues.

1136

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING HELD AT BRUSSELS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 61, Dec. 29, 1969: 627-630. JX232.A33, v. 61

Final communique and declaration of the North Atlantic Council's regular ministerial meeting, held at Brussels, Belgium, December 4-5, 1969. The documents briefly recapitulate the proceedings of the Ministers and the positions taken on major issues facing the alliance; viz, military strategy, East-West relations, arms control and disarmament, and economic, technical, and cultural cooperation.

1137

Mouli, Elise. HOW DO NORWEGIANS TAKE TO CIVIL DEFENCE. International civil defence, v. 16, Dec. 1969: 3-4. UA926.I488, v. 16
Excerpts from an article that appeared in NATO Letter. D845.2.A44

Describes Norway's compulsory civil defense program, focusing on "People and Defence," a special group that informs professional, cultural, and civic associations of developments in civil defense.

1138

Oosten, Fernand. [THE LIMITS OF VIETNAMIZATION] Die Grenzen der Vietnamisierung. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, Jan. 1970: 29-34. D839.A885, v. 21

Points out the shortcomings of Vietnamization and considers economic, military, and political factors in South Vietnam that impede its realization. The solution to these problems is not in sight.

1139

Palachar, R. D. MINIMUM DETERRENT AND THE ASIAN BALANCE. In United Service Institution of India, New Delhi. Journal, v. 99, Apr./June 1969: 113-123. U1.U5, v. 99

The Chinese possession of battlefield nuclear weapons tilts the Asian military balance against India. Low-yield nuclear weapons can achieve decisive local victories against conventionally armed forces. If India had tactical nuclear weapons, the possibility of a destructive stalemate might deter Chinese aggression. Pakistan's reaction to a nuclear India should not be considered decisive. Political tensions between the two or between India and China will not be reduced if India remains nonnuclear and hence weaker than

China. Indian diplomacy should be channeled toward convincing Pakistan of the Chinese threat to both nations. India now needs the minimum nuclear deterrent against attack by Pakistan and China.

1140

[PANKOW'S IMPORTANCE FOR MOSCOW] Pankow's Bedeutung für Moskau. Politische Welt, v. 12, Dec. 1969: 30-31. D839.P65, v. 12

Outlines East Germany's role in Soviet strategy and points to the importance of East German industry for Soviet armaments. The "Soviet zone" of Germany is a potential base for a Soviet attack on Western Europe and would provide the Warsaw Treaty Organization with "first echelon" troops in case of war.

1141

Pisinger, Donald D. MAINLAND CHINA AS A POTENTIAL SEAPOWER. Naval War College review, v. 22, Apr. 1970: 45-53. PACP 88
Bibliographical references included in "Footnotes": p. 52-53.

Reviews Chinese naval history and assesses current capabilities and strategy. Pisinger concludes that, while in the near future China's naval power may decline relative to Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States, China could be a first-rate naval power by the middle of the 21st century.

1142

Powell, Craig. STRATEGIC FORCES: SECOND-GUESSING TOMORROW. Armed Forces management, v. 16, Apr. 1970: 26-29. illus. UB153.A65, v. 16

Compares Soviet and American strategic capabilities, focusing on the Chinese threat and future weapons technology. The Soviet Union can put the United States "behind the [nuclear] power curve" in the next 5 years unless America "makes the right moves at the right times."

1143

Powers, Richard J. CONTAINMENT: FROM GREEK TO VIETNAM--AND BACK? Western political quarterly, v. 22, Dec. 1969: 846-861. JAL.W4, v. 22

Attempts "a reassessment of the hopes and alleged success of the practice of containment." Powers argues that the containment policy has brought about a militarization of foreign policy, an imbalance between interests and capabilities, and a status quo, antirevolutionary commitment that confuses national with international conflict and national with ideological goals. He warns that the United States is certain to suffer fur-

ther serious setbacks abroad unless it changes its policy and speculates on the possible benefits of a new orientation in world affairs.

1144

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. China news analysis, no. 790, Feb. 6, 1970: 1-7. D8777.55.C4469, 1970

Describes the reestablishment of the civilian apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of the party organization in the army. Apart from the Central Committee, the civilian party has ceased to exist; consequently, the military party committees function as the government at all levels through the revolutionary committees. Although new civilian party leaders will be recruited from the armed forces, "military rule" will not be permanent. While civil-military relations appear unbalanced and ambiguous, official party sources insist that the civilian party is the supreme source of authority.

1145

Riggert, Ernst. [WAR IN AN OCCUPIED COUNTRY. SWEDISH IDEAS] Krieg in besetzten Lande. Schwedische Vorstellungen. Wehrkunde, v. 18, Nov. 1969: 576-577. U3.W396, v. 18

Reports on public discussion in Sweden about the suitability of a guerrilla defense against enemy occupation. Riggert outlines the Home Defense Force preparations for such a defense and sums up proposals for expansion of the program to regular forces and organizations. As an important accessory to a regular defense, a guerrilla defense would increase the nation's security.

1146

Noy, Suresh R. de. A RATION REAUME. Far Eastern economic review, v. 66, Dec. 18, 1969: 600-602. illus. BC411.F15, v. 66

Neither constitutional constraints nor subsidizing pacifism have impeded Japan's burgeoning defense programs. While some nations are alarmed by the reemergence of Japanese military power, rearmament is viewed increasingly as an economic necessity and fundamental state duty in Japan. During the third 5-year defense plan, scheduled to end in 1971, the nation will achieve a vastly improved offensive and defensive military force, placing a total of 325,000 men in the armed forces. By the end of its fourth 5-year defense plan in 1976 Japan will be a leading military power and will be assuming a more important role in the Asian collective security system. Although annual defense expenditures are expected to double by 1972, military spending will not exceed 1 percent of the gross national product until the mid-1970's. While Japan's defense industries now produce most of the weapons and equipment currently in use, Japan's defense agency is planning to expand air

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and naval industries on a large scale to meet rising defense needs.

1147

SPJ'S POLICY ON NATIONAL SECURITY. Japan Socialist review, no. 191, Nov. 15, 1969: 11-22.
HX9.J3, 1969

Criticizes Japanese defense and foreign policies, concluding that the prospects for world peace are improving and that wars are not inevitable. Since history demonstrates that the balance-of-forces concept leads to an arms race and war, Japan should pursue a foreign policy based on the "five principles of peace," positive and unarmed neutrality, and military nonalignment.

1148

Savornin Lohman, Jonkhoeur W. H. de. [SOME ASPECTS OF THE NETHERLANDS DEFENSE] Quelques aspects de la défense néerlandaise. Revue militaire générale; general military review, no. 10, Dec. 1969: 611-627.
U2.N48, 1969

Includes summaries in English and German.

Assesses the Dutch Armed Forces' strength and contribution to NATO. Cooperation among alliance members and a better distribution of assignments for weapons production and personnel training are stressed.

1149

Schmidt, Helmut. [DEFENSE AND DÉTENTE. THERE IS NO SECURITY FOR EUROPE WITHOUT NATO] Verteidigung und Entspannung. Ohne die NATO gibt es keine Sicherheit für Europa. Soldat und Technik, v. 13, Jan. 1970: 3-7. illus.
U3.S58, v. 13

Statement made on Dec. 9, 1969, in Paris, at the meeting of the West European Union.

Considers the importance of NATO and West European-American ties for West European security and East-West détente, inter-Allied decisionmaking in the use of nuclear weapons, the possibility of East-West agreement on troop reduction in Europe as a principle of the European balance of power, and "cooperative bipolarity" as an alternative to the present situation.

1150

Schneider, Fernand T. [NATO WEAKNESSES AND GERMAN SOLUTIONS] Faiblesses atlantiques et solutions allemandes. Revue militaire générale; general military review, Mar. 1970: 351-364.
U2.N48, 1970

Includes summaries in English and German.

Contends that the 12 West German divisions form the most substantial part of the NATO defense system. Since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia,

the West Germans have become aware that they would have to bear the brunt of an attack on Western Europe.

1151

Schütze, Walter. [THE IDEA OF THE "EUROPEAN CAUCUS"; POSSIBILITIES OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION WITHIN NATO] Die Idee des "European Caucus"; Möglichkeiten europäischer Zusammenarbeit in der NATO. Europa-Archiv, v. 24, Dec. 25, 1969: 853-862.
D839.F86, v. 24

Contends that no strategic reason exists for a West European defense community since the security of Western Europe depends primarily on global deterrence of a Soviet military attack. Therefore, any planning of West European defense must involve American assistance. Only the unlikely situation in which the Soviet Union disarms its European territory could warrant a joint West and East European arms control and disarmament arrangement. In order not to be degraded into a market for American military hardware, Western Europe could cooperate in a "caucus" on arms production and procurement. This indefinite organization would avoid legal formalism and economically self-defeating protectionism against America. Schütze considers political, military, technical, and financial prerequisites of West European defense cooperation and outlines its specific forms.

1152

Schwab, George. SWITZERLAND'S TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY. Orbis, v. 13, Fall 1969: 900-914.
D839.D68, v. 13

Although Switzerland is neutral, it has the right to defend itself with conventional or nuclear weapons. The nuclear armament question has been brought before the Swiss electorate through two constitutional initiatives. Several years before these initiatives, the Government, realizing Switzerland could not acquire atomic weapons, formed a commission to study ways of making the army a more effective combat force. The commission concluded that the army's firepower could be best augmented by tactical nuclear weapons, but at the time Switzerland was incapable of producing nuclear bombs. However, "various developments in the early 1960's made it clear that Switzerland could eventually produce her own nuclear weapons." The reorganization of the Swiss Army, which was to have been an intermediate step before the armed forces could be equipped with nuclear weapons, became the Government's basic policy. This coincided with an easing of tensions in Europe, marked by the partial test ban treaty. The Government hoped that an effective nonproliferation treaty (NPT) would eliminate the threat of nuclear war. The dismantling of these hopes by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia will almost certainly reopen the Swiss nuclear debate. Even before the invasion Switzerland had strong reservations against the NPT, and, although more than 50 countries had signed it by the time of the invasion, Switzerland

had not. By giving up nuclear weapons, Switzerland has helped stem the tide of proliferation. The Government will continue its neutral policy--with or without nuclear weapons--hoping to avoid any conflict that could put it under the NATO umbrella and cause it to lose its neutrality. However, if this is unsuccessful, "Switzerland's safety valve for the foreseeable future remains NATO."

1153

Schweinitz, Kurt, Graf von. [ITALY'S STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN] Die strategische Lage Italiens im Mittelmeerraum. Wehrkunde, v. 18, Nov. 1969: 568-570.

U3.W396, v. 18

Contents that the Soviet Union, by its newly increased activity and naval presence in the Mediterranean, aims to change the strategic balance of power and transform the area into a Soviet flank against NATO. Moscow exploits the fact that the Near East, Cyprus, northern Africa, and most Balkan states are not within NATO's defense area. Italy, "almost isolated geographically from its allies," would be excessively vulnerable to enemy attack except for its dominating geographical strategic situation in the Mediterranean Sea. Schweinitz outlines the strength of Italy's forces, its defense concept, and the prospects for NATO defense.

1154

Sharp, F. R. THE THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization. EMO national digest, v. 9, Dec. 1969/Jan. 1970: 2-4.

UA926.C295, v. 9

Extract from a paper presented to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, May 1969.

Evaluates the Soviet bomber, missile, and space threat to North America. "The emphasis has shifted from a solely bomber threat in 1958 to a massive missile and a limited but still significant bomber threat in 1969."

1155

Shim, Jae-hoon. KIM ON THE HIGHBOARD. Far Eastern economic review, v. 67, Feb. 19, 1970: 11. illus. HC411.F18, v. 67

Describes the improved capabilities of the North Korean Armed Forces, focusing on recent significant increases in personnel strengths, weapons, and equipment; the modernization of the South Korean Armed Forces; U.S. military aid; the prospects for U.S. troop withdrawals; and "Koreanization" programs. According to the former director of South Korea's CIA, "this buildup is creating an imbalance of power in favor of North Korea that could lead to another full-scale war."

1156

Sokol, Hans. [NATO, QUO VADIS?] NATO, quo vadis? Revue militaire générale; general military review, Feb. 1970: 251-264.

U2.R48, 1970

Includes summaries in French and English.

Compares the performances and military postures of NATO and the Soviet Union and considers NATO's history and strategies. Sokol criticizes the alliance's purely defensive posture and suggests reorganization and improved coordination of its conventional and nuclear forces. The strategic arms limitation talks in Helsinki, the Geneva arms control and disarmament conference, and the coming into force of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty may cause an upgrading of NATO's conventional forces. NATO should also consider possible expansion into the South Atlantic.

1157

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICA. International defense review, no. 3, 1969: 233-237. illus. P&GP RR

Analyzes South Africa's strategic value to NATO, focusing on that country's relative military weakness, the rising Soviet threat in the area, and the increasing importance of the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope. Since South Africa's Armed Forces are incapable of securing this vital line of communication and trade, the arms embargo should be lifted, NATO and South Africa should work out a defense agreement, joint military exercises should be conducted, and NATO should station a naval force in South African waters.

1158

[TOWARD A BALANCED DETERRENT] Pour une dissuasion équilibrée [by] **** [pseud.] Économie, v. 26, Mar. 14, 1970: 16-18.

HC17.E42, v. 26

Urges that France halt defense development, reorganize its military structures, and adapt its strategy to present conditions. The author advocates the strengthening of internal defenses because they are the basis of deterrence.

1159

Van der Kroef, Justus M. AUSTRALIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE LIMITS OF STRATEGIC COMMITMENT. Southeast Asia quarterly, v. 4, Oct. 1969: 1-19.

P&GP RR

Bibliography: p. 17-19.

Examines Australia's defense relationship with Southeast Asia in the light of recent statements and remarks by Prime Minister Gorton, notably at the Five Power Defense Conference held in Canberra in June 1969. Van der Kroef notes Gorton's deliberate restriction of Australia's commitments to the peninsula of Malaya instead of Malaysia proper but stresses Australia's substantial military aid

250 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

to Vietnam and its continuing interest, in conjunction with the United States, in maintaining its forward defense perimeter in Malaysia-Singapore.

1160

Veilly, N. [AN OPINION ABOUT THE WARSAW PACT] Une opinion sur le pacte de Varsovie. *Revue militaire générale*; general military review, no. 1., Jan. 1970: 66-83. U2.R48, 1970

Summary of a study written by Andrzej Korbonaki, University of California.

Includes summaries in English and German.

Describes the difficulty of establishing a lasting alliance and the sensitive problem of adapting organizations like NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization to changing requirements.

1161

Vukadinović, R. van. THE ROLE AND STRENGTH OF THE CHINESE ARMY. *Review of international affairs*, v. 20, Dec. 5, 1969: 29-31.

D839.R4, v. 20

Even before the armed forces took over the apparatus of state power, their special place in the overall dynamics of Chinese sociopolitical development was clear. An unbroken qualitative and quantitative advance throughout the chaos of political events is demonstrated by the crippling of the Chinese defense budget over the past 8 years. However, lagging armaments mean that the army can probably equip only 400,000 men for field operations, and the air force lacks fuel and spare parts for its 2500 planes supported by 120,000 troops. It seems almost certain that China possesses several dozen atom bombs ranging from 2 to 200 kilotons and a few hydrogen bombs with a very limited delivery capability. Recent work on missiles has been intensive, but "the estimate that Chinese missile forces would be able to pose a threat to other continents only by the end of this century probably provides an approximate picture."

1162

WE CONDEMN ARGUMENTS FOR "INDEPENDENT DEFENSE."

Japan Socialist review, no. 192/193, Dec. 1/15, 1969: 7-13. HX9.J3, 1969

Argues that the Japanese Defense Agency's plans for expanding conventional and nuclear forces are irrational in terms of the threat perceived. Rearmament will undermine the political and economic systems and lead inevitably to imperialist expansion and Japan's isolation in Asia. Japan should adopt a policy based on unarmed neutrality, military nonalignment, and the "five principles of peace."

1163

WEAPONS SYSTEM DECISIONS; POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CONTINENTAL DEFENSE. Edited by Davis B. Bobrow. New York, Praeger [1969]

282 p. illus. (Praeger special studies in U.S. economic and social development)

UA23.W369

Contents.—pt. 1. Introduction: Improving the bases for decision, by Davis B. Bobrow.—pt. 2. General perspectives: Defense decision-making; cost-effectiveness models and rationality, by Philburn Ratoosh. Axioms and hypotheses concerning active and passive defense systems and the types of response they seem likely to evoke, by Robert C. North.—pt. 3. Analogous universes: A possible cross-historical survey of active and passive defense, by George H. Quester. Models and missiles; simulation research and ABM defense, by John R. Raser.—pt. 4. Major current actors: Chinese Communist response to alternative U.S. continental defense postures, by Davis B. Bobrow. The genuineness of Soviet elite fear of U.S. aggression, by Ralph K. White. Estimation of Soviet responses to alternative U.S. defense postures, by Bryant M. Wedge. A cost-benefit analysis of French elite attitudinal response to U.S. active and passive defense systems, by Morton Gordon. Prediction of U.S. public response to a damage-limiting program, by Eugene L. Hartley.—About the contributors.

Results of a 1965 study of the usefulness of the behavioral sciences in national security decisionmaking. Continental defense was chosen as an illustrative case.

1164

Westmoreland, William C. THE ARMED FORCES; A REPRESENTATIVE SEGMENT OF AMERICAN SOCIETY. *Vital speeches of the day*, v. 36, Mar. 1, 1970: 299-301. FN6121.V52, v. 36

Speech delivered at a convocation, Lincoln Academy of Illinois, Springfield, Ill., Jan. 31, 1970.

Warns against the erosion of mutual trust between the American people and their Armed Forces, castigates those forces that tend to diminish this trust, and concludes that the Army "has served [the] Nation with unfaltering dedication."

1165

Wheeler, Earle G. OUR MILITARY STRATEGY. *Ordnance*, v. 54, Sept./Oct. 1969: 147-150.

UFL067, v. 54

Traces the evolution of U.S. "national military strategy," summarizes the principal components of the containment policy, and forecasts future military security needs. Although Vietnam may cause some reassessment, basic policy is to maintain a balance of power in Europe and the Pacific and to contain Communist aggression.

1166

White, S. N. THE THREAT TO CANADA. In *Canada. Emergency Measures Organization*. EMO national digest, v. 9, Dec. 1969/Jan. 1970: 5-12. illus.

UA926.C295, v. 9

Estimates the consequences and effects of an enemy nuclear attack, discusses the time factors involved, and concludes that adequate protection will be necessary for the very high proportion of survivors.

1167

Zorthian, Barry. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? Foreign service journal, v. 47, Feb. 1970: 46-47. JX1.A53, v. 47

The basic requirement of counterinsurgency is acceptance of the truism that insurgency is primarily a political phenomenon and only secondarily military. Consequently, a governmental organization designed specifically for counterinsurgency rather than conventional war and characterized by a coordinated single channel of politicomilitary authority is the first necessity. The host government must be interested in responding to the legitimate needs of its people and the assisting Americans skillful in encouraging reform. The last requirement is the effective communication of the nature, goals, and progress of the counterinsurgency effort to the public of the United States, the host country, and the world. To implement these principles, the United States needs an independent center with interagency authority to provide total integration of the civilian-military effort in the field and in Washington. These essentials are not applicable when an insurgency has been transformed into a battlefield war.

CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

Biological

1168

Cameron, James. 23 NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS LATER. New York times magazine, Mar. 1, 1970: 24-25, 44, 46, 48-50. illus. AP2.N6575, 1970

Reports on a return visit to the Bikini Atoll, site of 23 U.S. nuclear weapons tests. Cameron's visit was made in conjunction with a U.S. program to prepare the islands for the return of their original inhabitants, who were evacuated in 1946 before the tests.

1169

Cookson, Sybil. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CBW. Pax et libertas, v. 35, Jan./Mar. 1970: 2-3. P&GP RR

Report on the International Conference on Chemical and Biological Weapons, which cites Richard McCarthy's contribution toward eliminating such weapons, focuses on the need to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and publicizes the report of U Thant's consultants on chemical and biological warfare.

1170

DEPOLLIANTS, DEFORMITIES: WHAT RISK? Medical world news, v. 11, Feb. 27, 1970: 15-17. illus. R11.M864, v. 11

Examines the growing controversy over reports that 2,3,6,7-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin, a contaminant found in the widely used herbicide, 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T), is a powerful teratogenic agent. Several laboratory and field reports are now on record that attribute fetal deformations in test animals, exposed domestic breeds, and humans to dioxin or its carrier, 2,4,5-T, but the evidence as to whether the herbicide poses any real danger to human populations is inconclusive. A lack of statistical data on birth defects in the United States and in South Vietnam, where massive quantities of 2,4,5-T are being used in the defoliant program, hampers the investigation and adds to the fear that herbicides are inflicting extensive, but undetected, genetic damage on the American and South Vietnamese populations.

1171

Hamilton, Andrew. CBW: NIXON INITIATIVE ON TREATY ANTICIPATES CONGRESSIONAL CRITICS. Science, v. 166, Dec. 5, 1969: 1249-1250. Q1.S35, v. 166

Discusses recent changes in U.S. policy on chemical and biological warfare (CBW) against a background of mounting congressional pressure for ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and criticism of U.S. CBW practices in Vietnam. "The operationally significant fact about President Nixon's new policy on CBW is that it does not directly affect U.S. practices in Vietnam."

1172

HUNTING "HOT SPOTS" IN UTAH. Nuclear news, v. 13, Feb. 1970: 20-21. illus. QC770.N75, v. 13

Describes a joint research project of the University of Utah, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory to detect and measure radioactive fallout in the environment and determine whether it poses a danger to animal life. Some scientists are predicting that the project will grow into "the most detailed and thorough radiation-ecology investigation in the world."

1173

Machta, L., K. Telegadas, and D. L. Harris. STRONTIUM-90 FALLOUT OVER LAKE MICHIGAN. Journal of geophysical research, v. 75, Feb. 20, 1970: 1092-1096. QC811.J6, v. 75

Measurements of Sr 90 in Lake Michigan water and sediments indicate that fallout is no greater over the lake than over nearby land. Excess "oceanic" fallout over land fallout is in controversy. The Lake Michigan result favors no enhancement. (Abstract supplied)

252 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

1174

Meselson, Matthew S. BEHIND THE NIXON POLICY FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 23-24, 26-34. TK9145.A84, v. 26

Edited extracts of testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Testimony on the characteristics of various chemical and biological agents under development by U.S. scientists or already in U.S. arsenals and the political and military implications of the U.S. chemical and biological warfare program. Meselson argues that for good or ill the United States is certain to play the decisive role in determining the future of these weapons. He recommends that the United States ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and calls on the administration to abandon "weapon-by-weapon or situation-by-situation analysis" in favor "of an overall policy on which decisions regarding particular weapons or particular situations can be based."

1175

Neilands, J. B. VIETNAM: PROGRESS OF CHEMICAL WAR. Asian survey, v. 10, Mar. 1970: 209-229. DS1.A492, v. 10

Questions the legality of America's chemical warfare program in Vietnam. There is evidence that antipersonnel gases and herbicides are not exempt from the Geneva Protocol and that napalm and white phosphorus, if not outlawed by the protocol, could be prohibited under the 1907 Hague Convention. Neilands laments the lack of concern within the scientific community over defoliation in Vietnam and appeals to scientists to become engaged in the problem.

1176

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS AND INFANT MORTALITY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 25, Dec. 1969: 23-34. TK9145.A84, v. 25

Contents.--Fetal and infant mortality and the environment, by Arthur R. Tamplin.--A reply, by Ernest J. Sternglass.

Challenge to Ernest J. Sternglass' thesis that fallout from nuclear weapons tests is responsible for the decrease in the rate of decline of fetal and infant mortality in the United States with a rebuttal by Sternglass. Tamplin argues that radiation dosages from fallout have never been large enough to produce the effect Sternglass attributes to them and contends that changes in fetal and infant mortality over the last 50 years are best explained by reference to changing socioeconomic conditions and medical practices.

1177

Pfeiffer, Egbert W. ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR. Peace and the sciences, Oct./Dec. 1969: 1-12. JX1901.P25, 1969

Report presented to the World Assembly for Peace, Berlin (GDR), June 21-24, 1969.

Reports on the ecological effects of defoliants, crop-killing chemicals, and conventional high explosives employed by the United States in the Vietnam War. Pfeiffer voices concern that the military effectiveness of defoliation will lead to its extensive use "in any future military operations in areas like Vietnam unless scientists establish that it is a serious threat to the ecology of a country."

1178

THE PROPHETS OF POLLUTION. Nature (London) v. 225, Jan. 31, 1970: 397-398.

Q1.N2, v. 225

Professor Ernest Sternglass complains that Nature, as well as some other scientific publications, is unwilling to give a fair hearing to his views on the effects of radioactive fallout, and he has even allowed it to be said that there is a conspiracy to silence him. The truth is somewhat different: In order to keep the channels of scholarly communication free of "spurious traffic," scientific journals have had to develop strict rules to determine the fitness of materials submitted to them for publication. So far, nothing offered this journal by Dr. Sternglass has measured up. What purpose does Dr. Sternglass hope to serve with his publications? Too often, campaigns of this kind, originating in fear of the effects of uncontrolled technology, become generalized assaults on technology, reason, and even the scientific method. It is not technology, however, but the failure to control it that is at fault. It will be difficult, indeed, to repair the damage done by those who oversimplify complex issues, feed the flames of emotionalism, or cry wolf once too often.

1179

Sládkovič, R. [AN INVESTIGATION OF THE TRANSPORT OF FALLOUT FROM THE SEVENTH CHINESE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION INTO THE ALPS] Untersuchung über den Transport des Fallout von der siebenten chinesischen Kernwaffenexplosion in den Alpenraum. Archiv für Meteorologie, Geophysik und Bioklimatologie. Serie A: Meteorologie und Geophysik, v. 18, no. 1/2, 1969: 87-110. illus.

QC851.A73, v. 18

Summaries in French and German.

The first swath of artificial radioactivity from the seventh Chinese nuclear explosion of December 24, 1967, was detected at the three mountain sites Zugspitze (2963 m.), Wank (1780 m.) and Garmisch-Partenkirchen (735 m.). Unexpectedly the said swath arrived at the Zugspitze station on the seventh day after the test, and 12 hours later at the valley station. This implies that conditions for fallout transport and downward tropopause penetration must have been exceptionally favorable in the region surrounding our stations. A meteorological

study uncovered the fact that the radioactive material had been moved from the explosion site by a relatively strong jet stream; it was also found that the fission products in question were carried downward into the troposphere by high-level subsidence in the eastern Atlantic Ocean during the period December 29, 1967, noon, to December 30, midnight (central European time). Isentropic trajectories were computed leading backward from the Zugspitze peak from December 31 to 29, 1967; it was found that the airflow originated in the said subsidence region. Computations of potential vorticity revealed the stratospheric origin of the air mass marked by the fresh fallout. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1180

Volchok, H. I., and others. OCEAN FALLOUT--THE CRATER LAKE EXPERIMENT. Journal of geophysical research, v. 75, Feb. 20, 1970: 1084-1091. QC811.J6, v. 75

By the analysis of water and sediment cores, the total inventory of strontium 90 in Crater Lake, Oregon, was determined to be 4.2 curies. In terms of surface fallout, this is equivalent to about 70 mc/km². The comparable fallout on the surrounding land area, determined from analyses of soil sections, was 58 mc/km², and a value predicted by extrapolation from other Oregon stations was 73 mc/km². Hence, no substantial difference in the efficiency of fallout collection could be attributed to the mere presence of the large water surface. (Abstract supplied)

1181

Whiteside, Thomas. DEFOLIATION. New Yorker, v. 45, Feb. 7, 1970: 32-38, 40, 43-44, 46, 49-50, 54-56, 59-60, 62, 65-69. AP2.N6763, v. 45

U.S. officials argue that U.S. defoliation and "food denial" operations in South Vietnam are innocuous. They carefully avoid characterizing the program as one of chemical or biological warfare, though it is both, and never mention that the agents being used were developed in biological warfare programs. But is the program as safe as the Government claims? Many critics think not. There have been some disturbing reports that the defoliant chemical 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid, or 2,4,5-T, may have potent fetus-deforming properties, and the Government was forced by public criticism into announcing last October that it would restrict the use of 2,4,5-T in U.S. domestic civilian applications and military operations. This announcement greatly understated the case against 2,4,5-T. It also erred in claiming that it was improbable that any human beings were endangered by present uses of the agent, for it is quite possible that pregnant Vietnamese women were then and are now receiving into their systems a percentage, by body weight, of 2,4,5-T only slightly less than that which deformed one out of every three fetuses in experimental rodents. The Defense Department made no changes in the defoliation and food-denial programs. Instead, it an-

nounced that these operations already conformed to the supposedly new policy. With equal facility, the Pentagon later deprived the U.S. decision to renounce biological warfare of any practical implication for the defoliant program by denying that herbicides were biological weapons. Neither the Government nor industry has ever conducted a thorough study of 2,4,5-T's teratogenic properties. That uncertainties can still exist on the question lends new weight to the lesson taught by the experience with thalidomide; viz, that the Government is unable to protect the citizen from manmade environmental dangers. If this is the situation "under orderly, normal medical conditions in a highly developed country, how is one ever to measure the harm that might be done to unborn children in rural Vietnam, in the midst of the malnutrition, the disease, the trauma, the poverty, and the general shambles of war?"

Economic

1182

Anderson, Richard M. ANGUISH IN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY. Harvard business review, v. 47, Nov./Dec. 1969: 162-164, 166, 169-170, 176-178. HF5001.H3, v. 47

Identifies some of the major problems confronting the U.S. defense industry and proposes changes in Government and defense industry policies to alleviate them. Anderson focuses on the lack of planning capabilities among defense industry managers and the unrealistic requirements imposed by the Government on defense contractors.

1183

Berkley, George E. THE MYTH OF WAR PROFITEERING. New republic, v. 161, Dec. 20, 1969: 15-18. AP2.N624, v. 161

Analyzes the financial status of the leading defense contractors from 1965 through 1968 and concludes that most experienced declining profits. Many of the munitions makers are therefore expanding into the more profitable civilian sector.

1184

Boulding, Kenneth E., and others. NATIONAL PRIORITIES; MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL. Washington, Public Affairs Press [1969] 176 p. UA23.N249

Contents.--Values in crisis, by Senator J. W. Fulbright.--Budgetary considerations, by Robert P. Mayo.--Maintaining economic stability, by Paul W. McCracken.--Balancing military and civilian programs, by Charles L. Schultze.--Planning for the future, by Joseph A. Califano, Jr.--Goals for America, by Walter P. Reuther.--Civilian economy prospects, by Leonard A. Lecht.--The role of military power, by John Kenneth Galbraith.--Pentagon accountability, by Senator William Proxmire.--The

effects of the war industry, by Kenneth E. Boulding.--Ultimate costs of Vietnam, by James L. Clayton.--National security considerations, by Robert C. Moot.--Maintaining military capabilities, by Malcolm W. Hoag.--Weapons development criteria, by F. M. Scherer.--The military rationale, by Merton Tyrrell.

Articles on various aspects of the problem of determining priorities among competing national security and domestic programs.

1185

Brandt, Gerhard. [ARMAMENTS AND THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Rüstung und Wirtschaft in der Bundesrepublik. In Studien zur politischen und gesellschaftlichen Situation der Bundeswehr. Witten, Eckart-Verlag, 1966. (Forschungen und Berichte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft, Bd. 21/3) p. 3-368.

UA710.S74

Edited by Georg Picht.

Contents.--pt. 1. The German Federal Republic's armaments in the tense setting of the Western military alliance: Economic motives for incorporation of the German Federal Republic into the alliance. About the organization of the Western military alliance. Economic aspects of common military policy in the alliance.--pt. 2. Armaments and private economy: The reflection of rearmament in the business community. The armaments-economy organization of economic interest groups. The armaments-policy demands of private business.--pt. 3. Revision of the armaments program, 1956-1957.--pt. 4. Characteristics of the new armaments policy (1): Manifest and latent functions of military armaments. About the size and structure of the German defense contribution. The development in time of German rearmament.--pt. 5. Characteristics of the new armaments policy (2): Domestic and foreign procurements? On the structure of the West German armaments potential. Compensation payments as a third component of the German defense contribution.--Final remarks.--List of references.--Subject index.--List of tables.

Appraises the effects of West Germany's rearmament on the country's economic system and development. Brandt considers the economic mechanism and limitations of the political-military-industrial complex and the spinoffs from civilian and defense industries. By the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in its planned defense effort, the German Federal Republic upsets the rational division of labor in NATO, where nuclear deterrence should remain in the hands of the most technologically advanced ally. It thereby reduces the credibility of its conventional deterrence against limited conflicts and war escalation and fails to contribute its share to arms control and disarmament efforts.

1186

CORPORATIONS AND THE COLD WAR. Edited by David Horowitz. New York [Monthly Review Press, 1969] 249 p. (Studies in imperialism and the cold war, v. 2)

HC110.D4C6

Includes bibliographical references.

Introduction abstracted as item 545 in v. 6, no. 2, of this bibliography.

Contents.--Introduction, by David Horowitz.--Who made American foreign policy, 1945-1963? by G. William Domhoff.--The large corporation and American foreign policy, by William Appleman Williams.--The New Deal, new frontiers, and the cold war: a re-examination of American expansion, 1933-1945, by Lloyd C. Gardner.--Business planners and America's postwar expansion, by David W. Eakins.--Economic effects of the cold war, by Joseph D. Phillips.--The militarization of the American economy, by Charles E. Nathanson.--Index.

Argues that the supercorporations have been the main influence over American foreign policy in the past few decades and that every major sector of American manufacturing has become deeply, perhaps irrevocably, militarized.

1187

THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ON THE DEFENSIVE. Humanist, v. 30, Mar./Apr. 1970: 6-13.

BL2700.H78, v. 30

Symposium based on the first "National Teach-In on World Community," held at Columbia University.

Participants: Joseph Clark, David Dellinger, Herman Kahn, Allard Lowenstein, Seymour Melman, and David Schoenbrun.

Views on the need for successful arms negotiations, congressional control of Defense Department expansion, gun control, and the place of violent dissent in American society. Kahn answered inquiries on the possibility of disarmament, and Schoenbrun urged a new internationalism to strengthen the United Nations.

1188

Fossum, Egil. SOME COMMENTS ON THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF THE MILITARY TO THE PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT OF THE POOR COUNTRIES. Bulletin of peace proposals, v. 1, no. 1, 1970: 89-95.

P&GP RR

Argues that the military has made few, if any, contributions to the development processes of accumulation, institutionalization, distribution, and mobilization in the developing countries. The issue is a political one, relating "to who has power, in whose interests they act, and what kinds of solutions are adopted."

1189

Heidt, Contrôleur général. [THE 1970 DEFENSE BUDGET] Le budget de la défense nationale pour 1970. Revue de défense nationale, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 17-33.

D410.R45, v. 26

Outlines the 1970 defense budget, which is a study more of past than of future expenditures owing to the economic crises of early 1969. Its objective is to develop to the maximum of the cur-

rent defense program rather than implement new military planning.

1190

JAPAN; 1970 BUDGET. Asian almanac, v. 8, Feb. 28, 1970: 3829-3830. DS1.A4752, v. 8

Gives a detailed breakdown of Japan's new budget, which emphasizes nonmilitary sectors although it provides for a 17.7 percent increase in defense expenditures and stresses the expansion of air and naval forces.

1191

Lens, Sidney. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. [Philadelphia] Pilgrim Press [1970] 183 p. HC110.D4L43

Contents.--Unmasking the Goliath.--Origins and purpose.--Internal imperialism.--The military syndrome.--Self-fulfilling strategies.--The labor lieutenants.--Academia in harness.--An alternative to catastrophe.--Notes.--Index.

Describes the origins, nature, and growth of the military-industrial complex in the United States. Lens proposes several measures to dismantle it: termination of military aid and an increase in economic aid conditional only on effective programs of social change, funneling of aid through an international agency, purchase of large overseas American firms by the U.S. Government as a preliminary step toward returning these firms to ownership by the native government, encouragement of regional economic and political integration, multilateral or even unilateral disarmament in preference to continuing the arms race, and emphasis on fulfilling the promises of the American Revolution as an alternative to militarism.

1192

Melman, Seymour. PENTAGON CAPITALISM; THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR. New York, McGraw-Hill [1970] 290 p. HC110.D4M4
Bibliography: p. 279-290.

Contents.--Preface.--The state-management.--How the state-management controls its empire.--Extension of control over means of production.--Extension of control over universities and research.--The science-fiction of defense and its consequences.--The Vietnam Wars program and its consequences.--The ideology of the para-state.--The cost of the para-state to American society.--1984 by 1974? Or, can the state-management be stopped?--Appendixes.

Contents that the U.S. Department of Defense directly manages the largest industrial empire in the Nation and extends its control over significant related aspects of American society. Melman argues that the organization of the present system of state management was perfected during the Kennedy administration under the guise of asserting civilian control over the military while the real

intent was to use a strengthened military for political purposes.

1193

MILITARY CUTBACKS WILL SEND TREMORS THROUGH INDUSTRY. Business week, no. 2101, Dec. 6, 1969: 91, 94, 96. illus. HF5001.B89, 1969

Estimates changes in the size and structure of U.S. defense budgets in the 1970's and analyzes their impact on military strategy, capabilities, and defense industries. Military expenditures may dip to \$69 billion by FY 1973 and then swing upward to approximately \$80 billion by the end of the decade. As U.S. commitments abroad and conventional forces are reduced, the emphasis in hardware will shift from tactical to strategic nuclear weapons, and the United States will revert to an island strategy in the Pacific and a policy of defending Europe first.

1194

Schultze, Charles L. REEXAMINING THE MILITARY BUDGET. Public interest, no. 18, winter 1970: 3-24. P&GP RR

Decisions on military programs ought to be made in a long-term, national priorities context. A priorities-conscious evaluation of the military budget should include a 5-year projection of budgetary resources and claims on those resources. This projection will indicate the amount of new resources that will be available to meet domestic needs. For the period 1969-74, this "fiscal dividend" will equal the revenue added by economic growth (\$70 billion), plus the savings from a Vietnam cease-fire and withdrawal (\$20 billion), minus the built-in growth of civilian expenditures (\$35 billion), increases in non-Vietnam military spending (\$20 billion), and the cost of proposals already before Congress, or less that \$20 billion total. Why the \$20 billion increase in non-Vietnam military spending? It might be accounted for in terms of specific spending programs or other cost factors built into the current defense budget, but there are other, more fundamental reasons for the constant growth of military budgets: the impact of technology on strategic nuclear forces, the practice among military planners of preparing against every contingency, the growing cost of weapon systems, and, most important, the circumstance that most of the decisions on which the military budget rests are seldom subjected to outside review or public debate. This means that reform must be directed toward generating "an informed discussion about the fundamentals of the military budget in the context of national priorities." To this end, it is recommended that the State Department submit to Congress an annual posture statement outlining the political situation abroad and devoting special attention to U.S. commitments, that the Defense Department include in its annual posture statement a 5-year projection of program costs and more cost data on force components and weapon systems, and that an "appropriate institution" be created within the Con-

256 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

gress to analyze these posture statements and issue an annual report thereon.

1195

Streit, Clarence. SHIFT TO ARMS IN 3 YOUTH GENERATIONS. Freedom & Union, v. 24, Oct./Nov. 1969: 2, 6-8. JX1901.F6, v. 24

Includes Representative Paul Findley's speech to Congress, June 5, 1969.

Explains recent changes in American values and the generation gap in terms of rising U.S. military expenditures. During the past 21 years the United States has spent 37 times more on arms than it spent during the youth of today's parents and 181 times more than during the youth of their grandparents.

1196

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Economics Bureau. WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1969: AND RELATED DATA FOR 120 COUNTRIES. Washington [for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1969. 26 p. (Its Publication 53)

P&GP RR

Fourth report in a continuing assessment of the size and impact of the military expenditures of the nations of the world. In 1968 and 1969 world military expenditures continued to increase, although at a somewhat slower rate. Countries outside the two major blocs spend an increasing proportion of world outlays, reflecting the accelerated arms race occurring among developing countries. Comparisons with world economic growth demonstrate that part of the world growth dividend since 1964 has gone to higher military expenditures rather than the improvement of living standards. Statistical tables estimate military expenditures and gross national product (GNP) in terms of world totals and broad groupings of countries, military expenditures and related data of other public expenditures, per capita military expenditures and related data, military expenditures and GNP for 1964-1967, and the 1967 GNP and military expenditures ranking of 30 countries.

1197

Witze, Claude. DEFENSE CUTBACK--WHAT IT MEANS TO INDUSTRY. Air Force and space digest, v. 53, Jan. 1970: 45-49. illus.

UG633.A65, v. 53

Assesses the impact on the aerospace industry of recent reductions in defense expenditures. Witze notes that most industry spokesmen remain optimistic about future prospects despite the cutbacks. The fluctuations in various aspects of the industry during the past year are examined, and employment figures are included in charts.

Ethical and social

1198

Astiz, Carlos A. THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES: THEIR ROLE AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT. Western political

quarterly, v. 22, Dec. 1969: 862-878. JAL.W4, v. 22

The history and causes of the Argentine military's involvement in politics and its present search for a new self-image and role.

1199

CONSCIENCE AND WAR: THE MORAL DILEMMA. Intercom, v. 11, Nov./Dec. 1969: 21-68.

Z7164.I8148, v. 11

Contents.--Introduction.--What is conscience?--Historical notes on conscience and conscription in America.--The individual and society.--The selective service system at present.--Religious and philosophical approaches to war.--Types of response to war and the draft.--Some special problem areas in dealing with conscience and war.--What should voluntary organizations do?--Organizations working on the problems of conscience and war.--Resources: Bibliography. Films. Records and tapes.

An analysis of the issues, together with a list of actively concerned organizations, brief bibliography, list of film distributors, and bibliography of films, recordings and tapes.

1200

HAS AMERICA BECOME A MILITARIZED SOCIETY? Center magazine, v. 3, Jan. 1970: 34-37.

P&GP RR

Contents.--We may be on our way, by Robert Gordis.--Anti-militarism is strong and growing, by Neil H. Jacoby.--We are falling fast, by Stanley K. Sheinbaum.--We are in no serious danger, by Richard Bellman.--There is little evidence, by George N. Shuster.--The militarists have not prevailed, by Adolf A. Berle.--We haven't learned to click our heels, by Milton Mayer.

Brief affirmative and negative replies to the question whether American society has been militarized.

1201

International War Crimes Tribunal, 2d, Copenhagen, 1967. WE ACCUSE! A REPORT OF THE COPENHAGEN SESSION OF THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL. Edited by John Duffett. London, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1968. 183 p. illus.

DS557.A6715 1967

Contents.--Unmasking genocide.--Vietnamese gestapo.--Diem's prisons.--A soldier's story.--Interrogating prisoners.--"So that's the way it is."--A pattern of subversion.--Napalm: what it is and what it does.--Bombing of Dai Lai.--American intervention in Laos.--Findings of the tribunal.

Statements by two former prisoners of the Saigon government, testimony by three former members

of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, and reports on the effects of napalm, the bombing of a North Vietnamese village, and U.S. intervention in Laos. The tribunal found that Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines are guilty of complicity in the U.S. aggression against Vietnam and that the United States employs weapons prohibited by international law, mistreats prisoners of war and civilians, has extended the war to Laos and Cambodia, and pursues a policy of genocide against the people of Vietnam.

1202

McDonald, Donald. MILITARISM IN AMERICA. Center magazine, v. 3, Jan. 1970: 12-33.
P&GP RR

Identifies the dominant characteristics of a militarized society, concludes that in large degree America has become such a society, and recommends a program to reverse the trend toward even greater militarization.

1203

Miraki, G. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE ARMY AND SOCIETY. New times, no. 48, Dec. 3, 1969: 15-17.
D839.N483, 1969

Without the military it is seldom possible to overthrow reactionary regimes in the developing countries. A military regime in an economically underdeveloped country may have relative freedom of maneuver for some time, but in the long run it must favor the interests of some classes and neglect those of others. In this age of transition to a classless society, it is confronted inevitably with the alternatives: capitalism or socialism. Even when led by patriotic progressives, the army cannot take the place of a party that will mobilize the masses to carry out fundamental socioeconomic restructuring.

1204

Neuhaus, Richard J. THE WAR, THE CHURCHES, AND CIVIL RELIGION. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. The sixties: radical change in American religion. Philadelphia, 1970. (Its Annals, v. 387, Jan. 1970) p. 128-140.
H1.A4, v. 387

The opinion leadership of American religion has, since 1965, succeeded in making opposition to the Vietnam war respectable, to the effective exclusion of divergent viewpoints. Dissent from this new orthodoxy is exercised by small enclaves within a few scholarly centers and by larger church bodies that have remained aloof from the modern ecumenical dynamic in church co-operation and decision-making. The reasons for positions taken on the war by such different organizations as the National Council of Churches and the Southern Baptist Convention are, in large part, extrinsic to the merits or demerits of the war itself. The majority opposition to the war has, in a way similar to majority support for the civil rights movement,

posed the problem of discontinuity with conventional Christian and Jewish piety. At the popular level, the relationship between religious devotion and specific social commitments has not been clarified effectively, resulting frequently in alienation of membership caused by "mixing politics with religion." Religious opposition to the war has more to do with what Robert Bellah has described as the American civil religion than it does with explicitly Jewish or Christian formulations of theology and ethics. The civil religion is, in turn, dependent upon the latter. The churches and synagogues face the challenge of enabling the civil religion to illuminate and guide the course of American power in the Third World. The question of American power and world revolution is central to the Vietnam debate, and, although organized religion's opposition to the war has been gratifying, little progress has been made on the required reconstruction of American civil religion. (Abstract supplied)

1205

NO CHANGE AT MIT. Nature (London) v. 226, Apr. 4, 1970: 7.
Q1.N2, v. 226

There is no sign as yet that the trend among American universities toward divesting themselves of their links with defense-oriented laboratories is over. Soon to come up for review are the University of California's relationships with the Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories, pacemakers in research on nuclear weaponry, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's links with the Draper and Lincoln Laboratories, which do important work on offensive and defensive missile systems and a variety of other defense-related technologies. The argument sometimes heard that "we want to keep the links so that we can mount intelligent opposition if the military-industrial complex gets outrageous in its claim" hardly seems applicable at California, but the situation at MIT is less clear cut. The MIT labs offer the university a unique opportunity to gain experience in applying almost limitless resources to the search for interdisciplinary solutions to big problems. So far, the university has not availed itself of this opportunity. Debate over the fate of the labs has been conducted with intelligence and proper restraint, and the longer it continues the greater is the chance that ways will be found to harness the potential of these facilities for broader work. However, the principal danger seems never to be mentioned: Divestment would put the university out of touch with laboratory science and technology and, at the same time, consign the laboratories in question to a narrower, more defense-oriented, future.

1206

Perlmutter, Amos. FROM OBSCURITY TO RULE: THE SYRIAN ARMY AND THE BA'ATH PARTY. Western political quarterly, v. 22, Dec. 1969: 827-845.
JA1.W4, v. 22

The role of the Syrian Army in politics from 1949 to the present. Despite its fratricidal

tendencies and its other sources of internal division and instability, the army has managed to preserve its heroic image as a modernizing elite and savior of the nation and now dominates Syrian society.

1207

Perlmutter, Amos. *MILITARY AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL; NATION-BUILDING AND ROLE EXPANSION*. New York, Praeger [1969] xiv, 161 p.

DS126.5.P44

Bibliography: p. [141]-151.

Contents.--pt. 1. Pre-independence defence units and their political expectations, 1909-1948: Forerunners of the Haganah, 1897-1924. The Arab revolt; catalyst of Haganah expansion. The "academies" of the future Israeli Army.--pt. 2. The Army of Israel: The era of transition. Civil-military relations; the Israeli formula. Zahal's role expansion. The institutionalization of civil-military relations in Israel. Eshkol's term of office as Defence Minister. The role of General Moshe Dayan. A garrisoned state; the Israeli solution. The military and nation-building; lessons for a comparative analysis.--Glossary.--Index.

Analyzes civil-military relations in Israel and demonstrates "in the process the persistence of civilian over military authority" in spite of the remarkable role of the Israeli military forces as an instrument of nation-building.

1208

Schall, James V. *WAR AND THE BALANCE OF POWER*. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, Jan. 15, 1970: 211-217.

PNC121.752, v. 36

Delivered at the University of San Francisco, Nov. 11, 1969.

Elevation of the avoidance of war into an unlimited virtue is morally and politically untenable. A condemnation of all war ignores the reality of sin and evil as a consequence of the God-given freedom to accept or reject God. To think there is a single moral attitude to all war is to attempt to escape the responsibility of choice between lesser and greater evils that is often imperative for improvement of the human condition. A controlled violence is sometimes the only alternative to total war. The balance of power depends on effective power, which includes religion or political ideology, since ideological and political realities are at the root of all war. Because of its impaired internal cohesiveness the United States is losing its political effectiveness as the major military power in the world. The post-war Yalta system is breaking up, and the balance is weakened, partly because of its false assumptions of the balance-of-power and containment theories. Domestic ideological trends and technology will cause the United States to embark on demilitarization after it withdraws its overseas military presence. Military protection of "Fortress America" will then be entrusted to a few hundred

thousand experts, but "the core of the present deterrence theory will remain in force." Paradoxically, elsewhere the theory of guerrilla war--viz, a remilitarization of the civilian population--will remain in vogue. After all, nuclear war "may not, in the end, turn out to be the real military issue of our times." In the world political scene today there is little to suggest that a warless millenium is at hand.

1209

Wilson, Andrew. *HOW RELEVANT ARE THE RULES OF WAR?* Current, no. 114, Jan. 1970: 3-6.

AP2.C9259, 1970

Reprinted from *The Observer* (London), Nov. 30, 1969.

Sustained by the elaborate behavioral code of mercenary armies, whose primary interest was to hold down casualties, the rules of war were widely respected for 200 years. What caused their decline was the rise of mass armies and Clausewitzian theories of warfare. World Wars I and II saw unrestricted submarine warfare, saturation bombing, and blockade widely practiced. The moral dilemmas raised by these tactics pale, however, when compared with those raised by guerrilla warfare and nuclear deterrence. Faced with these horrors, one is tempted to run to extremes--to the unilateral rejection of war as an instrument of policy or the abandonment altogether of the rules--but most Westerners will prefer to leave the moral contradictions unresolved. Perhaps the My Lai incident, which has proved that men cannot be committed to a situation "as confused and brutal as that in Vietnam without risking their moral disintegration," will provoke a more vigorous search for alternatives to violence and the threat of violence.

Other

1210

Aki, Keiiti, and others. *NEAR-FIELD AND FAR-FIELD SEISMIC EVIDENCES FOR TRIGGERING OF AN EARTHQUAKE BY THE BENHAM EXPLOSION*. In *Seismological Society of America. Bulletin*, v. 59, Dec. 1969: 2197-2207.

QE531.63, v. 59

A wide-band (0.03 to 10 cps) accelerometer system was used for recording seismic motions at a distance of 18 km from the underground nuclear explosion BENHAM. The records clearly show a unique difference in spectral structure between the radial and transverse components of horizontal motions. The source of the transverse component appears to be a more efficient radiator of long waves than the source of the radial component, strongly suggesting that the transverse component motion may not be due to transformation of P, SV or Rayleigh wave: but due to an additional source which was triggered by the explosion. Combining the result from Love wave spectra observed at Weston, Massachusetts, we arrived at the following conclusions. (1) A faulting was triggered by the explosion in such a timing that the shear waves

from the starting point of fault arrived at our station 3 seconds after the arrival of the explosion-generated shear waves. (2) The size of faulting estimated from long-period surface waves is such that the product of fault area and dislocation is about 10^{23} cm³. This value is consistent with the length, displacement and depth of faulting as suggested from field observation and aftershock studies. An alternative theory which postulates a release of high pre-existing stress (400 to 3000 bars) by the formation of a crushed region can account for the seismic moment estimated from long-period Love waves observed at a long distance. This theory, however, does not harmonize with observations on surface faulting and aftershocks. (Abstract supplied)

1211

Basham, P. W., D. H. Weichert, and F. W. Anglin. AN ANALYSIS OF THE 'BENHAM' AFTERSHOCK SEQUENCE USING CANADIAN RECORDINGS. *Journal of geophysical research*, v. 75, Mar. 10, 1970: 1545-1556. QC811.J6, v. 75

The Nevada Test Site (NTS) explosion Benham caused a series of aftershocks well distributed over the magnitude range up to $M = 4.6$, a range of particular interest to Canadian studies of detection and identification of NTS events. The results of an analysis of the aftershocks and other NTS explosions are reported here. The Yellowknife array ($\Delta = 25^\circ$) and the Canadian network ($12^\circ \leq \Delta \leq 49^\circ$) short-period facilities can detect P waves for all aftershocks larger than $M = 3.6$, but not for aftershocks smaller than $M = 3.3$; long-period facilities can detect Rayleigh waves for all aftershocks larger than $M = 4.0$. The M versus m and P -wave spectral ratio discriminants produce excellent separation between the larger aftershocks and similar body-wave magnitude NTS explosions. An rms scatter of about 80 km in latitude and 50 km in longitude of the Yellowknife array epicenters does not allow resolution of the real differences in aftershock and explosion locations. (Abstract supplied)

1212

Blume, John A. RESPONSE OF HIGHRISE BUILDINGS TO GROUND MOTION FROM UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR DETONATIONS. In *Seismological Society of America. Bulletin*, v. 59, Dec. 1969: 2345-2370. Q531.S3, v. 59

Typical data obtained thus far in the Atomic Energy Commission nuclear test program on the response of highrise Las Vegas buildings to ground motion from distant nuclear events including MICAR and BENHAM are presented, together with measured building response to distant earthquakes and to wind gusts. Major variations in response spectra are shown over the city for a specific earthquake period band to period band at the same location for different events, and statistical parameters are shown for the randomness of spectral response. The peak response of tall buildings is shown for the top levels in translation

and in orbital motion, and in the vertical plane with simultaneous multi-level measurements. The variation of peak modal response is shown with elapsed time, modal combinations are noted, and an example of time-history computed response is compared to measured response. It is shown that highrise Las Vegas buildings respond to ground motion with considerable amplification, that the fundamental modes tend to dominate the peak responses although there are exceptions, that there can be significant modification of loading conditions because of simultaneous motion in the two horizontal axes even though a building is symmetric, and that some building periods vary with amplitude and history of non-damaging prior response while others do not. In general there are indications that code earthquake design criteria are by no means conservative. (Abstract supplied)

1213

Brandon, Henry. ANATOMY OF ERROR; THE INSIDE STORY OF THE ASIAN WAR ON THE POTOMAC, 1954-1969. Boston, Gambit, 1969. 178 p. D5557.A63B7

Contents.--Foreword.--Prologue: The war that went wrong.--Truman to Kennedy: half-measures.--Johnson: the snares of continuity.--Fallacies of escalation.--Marigold: the stunted peace flower.--Harold Wilson: the penalties of distrust.--The last illusions of victory.--Revolt of the elders.--Through the maze to Paris.--Epilogue: The ultimate verdict.--Index.

Account of the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War based on interviews with many high-level U.S. policymakers. Brandon recounts how the major decisions of the war have been made and the positions of those who participated in the decision-making process.

1214

Cuffey, Joseph I. THE SOVIET ARM AND ARMS CONTROL. *Bulletin of the atomic scientists*, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 19-43. TK9145.A84, v. 26

The United States should continue to maintain a strong, secure retaliatory force but, in doing so, choose means that will not provoke a new stage in the arms race. This requires a knowledge of Soviet perceptions and motivations. The Soviet leadership has strong reasons for approving further ABM deployments but faces equally cogent arguments against deploying a comprehensive system. The alternatives to a comprehensive system would not significantly alter the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, but their impact on arms limitation efforts is another matter. An agreement permitting the defense of strategic forces with ABM's could be arranged without difficulty and without prejudice to other arms control measures. The Soviet Union, however, might insist on being allowed to protect some of its larger cities, and this could sharply reduce the chances of further arms limitations. This does not mean that a new upward spiral in the arms race is inevitable. It does mean that the

United States must act quickly to delay deployment of some of its more advanced weapons systems and to proceed with arms control talks before the Soviet Union makes any irrevocable and highly damaging decisions. The United States is going to have to accept some limitations on its own strategic forces. In the long run, however, U.S. security depends as much on the encouragement of conciliatory trends in the Soviet Union as on maintenance of its own military might.

1215

DOWNBEAT AT THE OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH. Nature (London) v. 225, Mar. 7, 1970: 895-896. illus. Q1.N2, v. 225

The U.S. Office of Naval Research (ONR), established in 1946, was the first and most enduring practical realization of the doctrine that only a National Government has the resources to support basic scientific research on an adequate scale. An outgrowth of military-civilian collaboration in World War II, it became a pioneer in the practice of sponsoring the research projects of individual investigators outside the Government. Suspicious at first, the universities soon became persuaded that the procedure offered no threat to their independence, and through outside contract awards and the work of its own laboratories ONR soon compiled an admirable record of scientific achievement, often in areas with only the most tenuous link to naval requirements. In recent years, the budget squeeze has forced a tightening up of standards of relevance, and ONR's scale of operations and proportionate share in the sponsorship of basic research have declined. Nevertheless, its range of interests is still impressive and its support to university research substantial. To many scientists, it still retains "some of the daring that endeared it to university scientists in the years after the Second World War."

1216

Dyer, M. G. MILITARY HISTORY AND WAR STUDIES IN CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES. Military Affairs, v. 33, Dec. 1969: 365-393.

E181.N55, v. 33

Surveys the rapid growth in military history and war studies in Canadian universities since World War II. Dyer regards this as a healthy phenomenon despite objections by both the professional military and peace advocates, and he foresees a continuation of the present trend.

1217

EDUCATION FOR PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. Lynn E. Weaver, editor. Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press (1972) 347 p. illus.

TA9153.E37

Developed from papers presented at the symposium "Education for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives," at the University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, Mar. 11-Apr. 2, 1969.

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.—Preface.—Foreword.—Status of nuclear explosives engineering in 1969: National policy on peaceful uses of nuclear explosives, by Gerald F. Tape. Technological development of nuclear explosives engineering, by G. W. Johnson. Gasbuggy experiment, by Fred Holzer. Future contained nuclear explosives experiments, by H. P. Coffey and G. H. Higgins. Nuclear excavation, by L. J. Vortman. The Corps of Engineers' nuclear construction research program, by Bernard C. Hughes. Nuclear explosives in water resource development, by Arthur M. Piper.—Technological requirements for nuclear explosives engineering: Technologies being used in nuclear explosives engineering in 1969, by Joseph Knox. Nuclear technology, by Wilson K. Talley. Hydrodynamics, by C. E. Leith. Seismic signal and structural response, by John A. Blume. Airblast from Flowshare projects, by Jack W. Reed. Venting and fallout prediction, by P. W. Allen. Groundwater contamination, by Frank W. Stead.—Legal problems and educational programs: The limited test ban treaty and civil nuclear engineering, by Thomas Ehrlich. Flowshare program development activities, by Fred J. Clark, Jr. A survey of university courses in nuclear civil engineering, by Paul Kruger. Nuclear explosives engineering at Michigan, by T. Kamnash. Nuclear explosives engineering at the University of Arizona, by Keaton Keller. Nuclear explosives engineering at the University of California, Davis, by Wilson K. Talley. Flowshare studies at PNNL, by Henry Comberg. Instructions in applications of nuclear devices at Iowa State University, by Paul Kruger.—University research and manpower needs: University role in nuclear explosives engineering research, by Edward Teller. Scientific applications of nuclear explosions, by W. K. Brown and G. A. Cowan. Needs of Government and industry for trained nuclear explosives engineers, by John V. Vinciguerra. Educational needs of industry, by Norman Hilberry.—Educational development: University-ABC cooperation, by G. V. Beard. Curriculum development, by Warren F. Wittig. A look into the future for Flowshare, by W. F. Libby. Summary, by Henry J. Comberg.

Depicts "the problems associated with nuclear explosives engineering education, from the technologies required to curriculum development." The objective of the symposium was to reduce the time lag between the development of university curriculums and the graduation of trained engineers.

1218

Hamilton, R. M., and J. H. Healy. AFTERGLOWS OF THE MERRIAM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 59, Dec. 1969: 2771-2781. GS311-33, v. 59

The MERRIAM nuclear explosion, a 1.1 megaton test 1.6 km beneath Pahute Mesa at the Nevada Test Site, initiated a sequence of earthquakes lasting several months. The epicenters of these shocks were located within 15 km of ground zero in several linear zones that paralleled the regional fault trends. Focal depths range from near surface to 6 km. The earthquakes are not located in the zone

of the major ground breakage. The earthquake distribution and fault plane solutions together indicate that both right-lateral strike-slip fault movement and dip-slip fault movement occurred. The explosion apparently caused the release of natural tectonic strain. (Abstract supplied)

1219

Hottinger, Arnold. HUSSEIN AND THE GUERRILLAS. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 19, Dec. 1969: 20-22. illus. D839.S9, v. 19

Outlines the background of the growing discord between the Jordanian monarchy and the Palestinian guerrillas and discusses the limits of coexistence between the two. Exaltations by the Arab press of alleged successful guerrilla operations against Israel contribute to the diminishing prestige of the Jordanian Army.

1220

Kuby, Heinz. [ATLANTIC OR EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY?] Atlantische oder europäische Sicherheitspolitik? Europa; schweizerische Zeitschrift für europäische Fragen, v. 36, Dec. 1969: 7-9, 12-15, 20. illus. P&GP RR

Asserts that the invasion of Czechoslovakia demolished the Western myth that the use of violence can no longer be a tactic of foreign policy. Kuby stresses the identical interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in giving top priority to the security of their own territories, which leaves Western and central Europe exposed to the danger of wars by proxy. Superpower continuation of power politics and the arms race makes peaceful coexistence precarious and threatens European security, on which the European countries have no decisive influence. Since a credible nuclear deterrent for Europe is missing, current West European conventional armaments are meaningless. The nonproliferation treaty would deprive the European nonnuclear powers of sovereignty over their armaments, without which they cannot adequately improve their security.

1221

Lapp, Ralph E. CORRECTING OUR POSTURE; SECRETARY LAIRD'S DEFENSE ESTIMATE, AND THE SALT TALKS. New republic, v. 162, Mar. 28, 1970: 12-15. AP2.N624, v. 162

Critical assessment of Secretary of Defense Laird's posture statement, in which Lapp advocates an adversary proceeding to subject the report "to merciless and hostile criticism." The basic asymmetry of U.S. and Soviet ABM deployments, growing Chinese nuclear threat, and advances in weapons technology could preclude a strategic arms limitation agreement.

1222

Leary, Frank. UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING: IS IT GETTING TOO DANGEROUS? Armed Forces management, v. 16, Mar. 1970: 3-36. illus. UB193.A65, v. 16

The prospects of testing multimegaton warheads beneath the Aleutian Islands has caused concern among scientists and politicians because of the sociological, environmental, and geophysical hazards. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) says that "a nuclear explosion can't trigger an earthquake of greater magnitude than its own primary shock wave," but seismologists contend that AEC data were collected in southern Nevada, which "is seismically less nervous than the Aleutians," and a multimegaton Amchitka test "could set off a king-size tsunami." Many Government officials question whether these tests are essential to the national security, and, if the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution determines that they are not it "would be correct in legislating an end to underground testing."

1223

Mahlman, J. D. LONG-TERM DEPENDENCE OF SURFACE FALLOUT FLUCTUATIONS UPON TROPOPAUSE-LEVEL CYCLOGENESIS. Archiv für Meteorologie, Geophysik und Bioklimatologie. Serie A: Meteorologie und Geophysik, v. 18, no. 3/4, 1969: 299-311. QC851.A73, v. 18

Summary in German.

The downward transport of radioactive debris from the stratosphere in association with tropopause-level cyclogenesis offers a possible physical explanation for seasonal and shorter-period surface fallout increases. To examine these possibilities, a simple circulation index which is related to the degree of cyclonic activity in the upper troposphere is compared to a time series of area-averaged fallout intensity. The comparison reveals that the spring fallout peak cannot be explained adequately by an increase in cyclonic activity at this time of year. Shorter period increases, however, are strongly related to occurrences of intense cyclogenesis in the upper troposphere. The age-corrected fallout averaged over the area of the contiguous United States reveals the existence of a regular seasonal variation with a maximum in late spring and a minimum in late fall. The spring peak in 1964 is a factor of two less in 1964 than 1963--reflecting the progressive depletion of debris following the nuclear testing moratorium of December 1962. (Abstract supplied)

1224

Molnar, Peter, Klaus Jacob, and Lynn H. Sykes. MICROEARTHQUAKE ACTIVITY IN EASTERN NEVADA AND DEATH VALLEY, CALIFORNIA, BEFORE AND AFTER THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION BENHAM. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 59, Dec. 1969: 2177-2184. QE531.S3, v. 59

Six portable, high-gain, high-frequency seismographs were operated in Nevada and California for several weeks before and after the underground nuclear explosion BENHAM to assess the possibility that earthquakes at distances of tens of kilometers or more may be triggered by large underground explosions. A pronounced increase in earthquake

activity in the vicinity of the shot point was observed immediately after the detonation and continued for more than a month after the explosion. No significant change in activity within 25 km of any of our instruments northeast of the Nevada Test Site was observed, and the activity in Death Valley recorded after the explosion did not indicate an important increase. These data imply that this particular explosion did not significantly affect the seismicity of the region studied. Throughout the period of observation the seismic activity northeast of the Nevada Test Site was low; an average of about one event per day was detected within about 25 km of each station. This suggests that the current tectonic activity of this part of Nevada is lower than that of western Nevada and of most other tectonically active regions where microearthquake studies have been made. (Abstract supplied).

1225

Moore, Raymond A. MILITARY NATION-BUILDING IN PAKISTAN AND INDIA. *World affairs*, v. 132, Dec. 1969: 219-234. JX1901.W7, v. 132

Delineates the general range of nation-building activities of the Pakistani Army and compares these practices with those of the Indian Army. Moore concludes that, while the army in India has not participated in development to the extent that it has in Pakistan, in the future the Indian Army may seek out the nonmilitary uses of military power and, if social disorder becomes chronic, move to establish a military government.

1226

Novick, Sheldon. EARTHQUAKE AT GIZA. *Environment*, v. 12, Jan./Feb. 1970: 2-12. illus. UF767.S33, v. 12

Discusses the hazards associated with the storage of 75 million gallons of radioactive wastes at the Hanford Atomic Products Operation. Novick, citing a geology report that concludes that the Hanford facilities are in an area of moderate earthquake activity, asserts that deep drilling can establish the existence of faults beneath the reactor site.

1227

Pugwash Symposium, 2d, Copenhagen, 1969. IMPLICATIONS OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS. Edited by C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup. New York, Humanities Press [1969] 246 p. (Pugwash monograph, 2) UG630.P84 1969

Includes references.

Contents.--pt. 1. The development and characteristics of anti-ballistic missile systems, by C. F. Barnaby. Arguments for and against the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, by C. F. Barnaby.--pt. 2. The arms race implications of anti-ballistic missile defences, by Nis Petersen. The interaction of ballistic missile defence, the weapons testing programme, and a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, by M. Leitenberg. Region-

by-region disarmament with anti-ballistic missiles, by David R. Ingils. Implications of superpower deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems for third countries, particularly for those in Europe, by Heik Afheldt and others. Implications for other nations--particularly in Europe--of superpower antiballistic missile deployment, by Bernard T. Feld. Some observations on the political implications of anti-ballistic missile systems, by Knud Mortensen. The impact of anti-ballistic missile deployment on the uncertainties of strategic balance, by F. A. Long. Anti-ballistic missile deployment and the doctrine of limited strategic nuclear war, by David Carlton. Anti-ballistic missile deployment and China, by M. Leitenberg. Civil defence programmes: research in the United States concerning the post-attack environment, by M. Leitenberg. Some observations on the consequences of anti-ballistic missile deployment, by M. Nita. The arms race and public opinion: a suggestion, by F. Calogero.--pt. 3. The implications of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, by C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup.--Appendix.

Analysis of the strategic, political, and military implications of ABM deployment, which emphasizes the dangers of a new arms race.

1228

Russett, Bruce M. VIETNAM AND RESTRAINTS ON AERIAL WARFARE. *Bulletin of the atomic scientists*, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 9-12.

TK9145.A84, v. 26

One of the more costly aspects of the Vietnam War may be its contribution to the erosion of restraints on aerial warfare. World War I and the smaller conflicts of the thirties saw the gradual undermining of early scruples against the use of airpower against civilians. Limits were temporarily reestablished at the beginning of World War II, but these soon gave way to the unrestricted bombing campaigns with which the war ended. Concepts of restraint were excluded from the strategic planning of the postwar era. In the 1960's, however, the development of the doctrines of tactical nuclear war, limited strategic war, and counterforce targeting seemed to indicate U.S. willingness to recognize limits on its use of airpower. The Vietnam War offered the United States an opportunity to prove its sincerity on this matter, but the results so far have been ambiguous. In both parts of Vietnam, U.S. policy appears to be a compromise between the extremes of unrestricted aerial warfare and total abstinence. It must certainly appear to the other side that the avoidance of civilian casualties is not a primary U.S. objective. It is difficult to judge whether the right precedents have been set. If they have not and the case for a countervalue strategy has been strengthened in the enemy camp, the Vietnam War may turn out to have been the greatest of tragedies for the American people.

1229

SPECIAL PAPERS ON UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE. In *Seismological Society*

of America. Bulletin, v. 59, Dec. 1969: 2167-2381.
QE531.S3, v. 59

Contents.--Residual strains associated with a nuclear explosion, by P. R. Romig and others.--Microearthquake activity in eastern Nevada and Death Valley, California, before and after the nuclear explosion BENHAM, by Peter Molnar, Klaus Jacob, and Lynn R. Sykes.--Transient and residual strains from large underground explosions, by Stewart W. Smith, Charles B. Archambeau, and William Gile.--Near-field and far-field evidences for triggering of an earthquake by the BENHAM explosion, by Keiiti Aki and others.--Geologic effects of the BENHAM underground nuclear explosion, by R. C. Bucknam.--Strain associated with the BENHAM underground nuclear explosion, by D. D. Dickey.--Subsidence related to underground nuclear explosions, Nevada test site, by F. N. Houser.--Fault displacements and motion related to nuclear explosions, by F. A. McKeown and D. D. Dickey.--Aftershocks of the BENHAM nuclear explosion, by R. M. Hamilton and J. H. Healy.--Amplitude and frequency characteristics of elastic wave types generated by the underground nuclear detonation, BOXCAR, by W. W. Hays.--Response spectra for Pahute mesa nuclear events, by Robert D. Lynch.--Seismic energy efficiency of underground nuclear detonations, by R. A. Mueller.--Analysis of seismic peak amplitudes from underground nuclear explosions, by J. R. Murphy and J. A. Lahoud.--Response of highrise buildings to ground motion from underground nuclear detonations, by John A. Blume.--Ground effects from the BOXCAR and BENHAM nuclear explosions, by W. K. Cloud and D. S. Carder.

Seismic and other effects of underground nuclear explosions.

1230

Sutton, Antony C. SOVIET EXPORT STRATEGY. Ordinance, v. 54, Nov./Dec. 1969: 297-299.
UF1.067, v. 54

Contents that the United States has become dependent on the Soviet Union for certain critical materials essential for modern warfare. The author examines the "weak-link principle" advanced in *Strategiya i Ekonomika* by the Soviet military scientist and economist A. N. Lagovskii, who notes that the United States must import a large per-

centage of its critical materials. Sutton calculates that 84 percent of all U.S. imports from the Soviet Union consist of such critical materials and concludes that this could have come about only through a deliberate plan to make the United States dependent on the Soviet Union for its supply of these materials.

1231

Sutton, Antony C. THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 96, Jan. 1970: 34-43. illus.
V1.U8, v. 96

Assesses the implications of the Soviet merchant marine for the free world. The Soviet Union's reliance on imported merchant vessels and engines signifies that the cream of Soviet naval architects, technicians, and workers are concentrating on a large naval construction program. Despite a technological gap the Russians are rapidly increasing their merchant marine fleet, which plays an important role in supporting national liberation wars. The West could inhibit the Soviet ability to fulfill its expansionary goals by halting the export of merchant ships and engines to the Soviet Union.

1232

Wildavsky, Aaron. THE POLITICS OF ABM. Commentary, v. 48, Nov. 1969: 55-63.
DS101.C63, v. 48

The ABM debate has resulted "in a heightened disposition on the part of Americans to blame one another for real and imagined errors in public policy." ABM has become a major domestic issue because it was manipulated by people primarily interested in ending the Vietnam War and because it offered a tactical opportunity to test whether a successful presidential campaign could be based on antimilitarism. Safeguard was a political mistake because the administration's foreign policy is mortgaged to Vietnam and President Nixon should realize "that he cannot subject the nation to controversy without opening the floodgates of recrimination." The debate could combine foreign and domestic disaster if it leads to continued attacks on the military and an unquestioning belief in an assured-destruction policy.

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

INTERNATIONAL LAW

1233

Berber, Friedrich. [INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WAR PREVENTION] Völkerrecht und Kriegsverhütung. Politische Studien, v. 21, Jan./Feb. 1970: 81-87.
H35.P66, v. 21

The main drawback to international law as a means of securing peace is its lack of enforcement ability in regard to well-armed sovereign states. However, the importance of this shortcoming is greatly overestimated. International law has always been based on democratic principles of equal sovereign rights, which have far greater sociological and psychological value for progress in international behavior than coercion ever can. Still, the existing legal system of peace and security inadequately induces its observance by the nations. In banning the use of force, the U.N. Charter eliminates a serious loophole in the Kellogg Pact, but the charter itself has several grave loopholes. Most proposals for reform aim at juristic perfectionism rather than "a pluralism of autonomous entities" and "an integration of freedom and common interest." A truly effective reform plan must come from a comprehensive effort in the social sciences that would avoid two extremes: legal overabstractionism and a Kennanian skepticism about the effectiveness of juristic measures. Systematic insight into the multitude and complexity of war causes should be scientifically developed. A remedy for complexity is the use of a multitude of means, acting in conjunction, none of which singly should be overestimated. These include arbitration, collective security, disarmament, institutionalization of peaceful change, the inclusion in national constitutions of the peace obligations under international law, and, most important, a process of international integration that would not destroy the independence of individual states.

1234

Bitker, Bruno V. GENOCIDE REVISITED. American Bar Association Journal, v. 56, Jan. 1970: 71-75.
LL

The U.N. Convention on Genocide was adopted unanimously by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948 and signed by the United States, but it has never been ratified by the U.S. Senate, whose Foreign Relations Committee tabled the matter two decades ago. During the Senate hearings on the proposed treaty, the American Bar Association opposed ratification on the grounds that the convention appeared to be inconsistent with basic constitutional guarantees and exceeded the Senate's treaty-making powers. There is good evidence to the contrary, however,

and certainly a nation that can protect the lives of seals and migratory birds by treaties should be able to prevent genocide by the same means. Nor would ratification diminish constitutional rights since each party to the treaty enacts and enforces the necessary legislation for its implementation. The question whether cases arising under the convention would be submitted to international adjudication could be considered on its merits at some future date. It is in the national interest for the American Bar Association to lead a movement for the convention's early ratification.

1235

Butler, William E. AMERICAN RESEARCH ON SOVIET APPROACHES TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. Columbia Law Review, v. 70, Feb. 1970: 218-235.
LL

Reviews American studies on Soviet international law to suggest areas for future research. Butler calls for exploitation of available historic data on traditional Russian approaches, development of case studies on Soviet practice, more consideration of the results of diplomatic history and comparative research in international law, and evaluation of the status of international law and the international jurist in the Soviet foreign policy process.

1236

[THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND NONMILITARY TARGETS AND MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION] Der Unterschied zwischen militärischen und nicht-militärischen Zielen und die Massenvernichtungsmittel. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 13, Nov. 15, 1969: 593.
U3.W38, v. 13

Text of the September 9, 1969, resolution of the Institut de Droit International invoking international law norms that commit governments engaged in armed conflicts to discriminate between military and nonmilitary targets; not to attack civilian populations; not to destroy entire groups of people, tracts of land, or towns and cities; and not to use means of mass destruction.

1237

Frenzke, Dietrich F. [RENUNCIATION OF FORCE AND THE ENEMY-STATE CLAUSES] Gewaltverzicht und Feindstaatenklauseln. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Jan. 25, 1970: 49-58.
D839.E86, v. 25

The invocation of the enemy-state clauses of the U.N. Charter does not threaten West Germany's security, since NATO's principal member states have repeatedly declared that the use of force by the Soviet Union or its allies in invoking such a

...would mean a basis for...for NATO. However, any future security agreement or renunciation of force between the East and the West would be meaningless if the Soviet Union or one of its allies "by an invocation of the enemy-state clauses could explicitly reserve for itself" such use of force. The clauses were originally designed to serve an imaginary U.N. security system that has been largely invalidated by postwar alliances and the admission of former enemy states to the United Nations. General international law limits the effects of those clauses. The precise limitation is a matter of controversy within the blocs as well as between them. Admission of the German Federal Republic to NATO and of the German Democratic Republic to the Warsaw Treaty Organization has changed the status of the two parts of a former enemy state inside and outside their respective blocs. The optimal solution for West Germany would be for the Communist countries to renounce explicitly privileges claimed under articles 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter in their renunciation-of-force agreements with the Federal Republic. The next best formula would be a use-of-force ban similar to those in article 2 of the U.N. Charter. A general reference to the principles of the U.N. Charter would be dangerous, since these include the enemy-state clauses. Bonn should discriminate between its Communist negotiating partners according to their status in regard to the clauses. Renunciation-of-force agreements, along with the other bilateral East-West arrangements, can help to resolve the outstanding postwar problems. A future European security treaty, which is still a distant possibility, must include a clear renunciation of the rights claimed from articles 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter.

1238

Grievies, Forest L. SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1969. xv, 266 p. illus.

JX1971.G75

Bibliography: p. [240]-256.

Partial contents.--Sovereignty and supranationalism.--Central American Court of Justice.--Permanent Court of International Justice.--International Court of Justice.--Court of the European Communities.--European Court of Human Rights.--Summary and conclusions.

Considers the development of international adjudication a prerequisite of a world order ruled by law. "On the assumption that law is a function of society rather than a constant, the international court presents itself as a possible measuring device for the minimum level of supranational integration sovereign states will tolerate."

1239

Johnson, David H. N. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE. Modern law review, v. 33, Jan. 1970: 53-62.

LL

Summarizes recent developments, stressing the International Court's recovery of the international

confidence that was shaken by the verdicts in the South-West Africa cases. The decisions in the North Sea Continental Shelf case were recognized as technically competent, although the failure to confirm the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf may have impaired the codification process undertaken by the United Nations. The confidence in the Court prevalent among Third World nations is manifest in the number of declarations recognizing the Court's jurisdiction as compulsory in cases under article 36 (2) of the Court's statute.

1240

Lillich, Richard B. FORCIBLE SELF-HELP UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. Naval War College review, v. 22, Feb. 1970: 56-65. P&GP RR

Discusses retortion, reprisal, the use of force to protect nationals, and humanitarian intervention under customary international law and under the influence of the U.N. Charter. Lillich suggests a reassessment of the original interpretation of the charter to allow the reinstitution or continued use of reprisals, forcible self-help against a prior unlawfulness, and humanitarian intervention as sanctioning instruments under international law and discusses the limitations of such measures.

1241

Lissitzyn, Oliver J. ELECTRONIC RECONNAISSANCE FROM THE HIGH SEAS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. Naval War College review, v. 22, Feb. 1970: 26-34. P&GP RR

Examines whether a coastal state has the right to interfere with foreign ships and aircraft in its contiguous zone of the high seas or air space to prevent or control foreign electronic reconnaissance from such areas and considers the present trend in relevant state practice. Lissitzyn analyzes pertinent provisions of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and the rules of universal international law and concludes that such a right neither exists nor is claimed by any state and that military reconnaissance from such zones does not violate international law. National security is not a legal justification for the existence of contiguous zones, and international law prohibits the prosecution by a coastal state of foreign personnel for such reconnaissance.

1242

Stanford, J. S. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES. University of Toronto law journal, v. 20, no. 1, 1970: 18-47.

K25.N74, v. 20

Traces the work of the International Law Commission and the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties. Stanford outlines the solutions to controversial issues in the Vienna Convention, which is now open for signature. The problems include compulsory conciliation; implications of a multiple-depositary system for the entry into force of international agreements like the partial test ban treaty when they are signed by a country

not recognised by a depositary; coercion as grounds for the invalidity, termination, withdrawal, or suspension of the operation of treaties; and the doctrine of the supremacy of international law on the international level.

1243

Stevenson, John R. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OCEANS: THE SEABEDS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 36, Apr. 1, 1970: 367-369.

PN6121.V52, v. 36

Delivered before the Philadelphia World Affairs Council and Philadelphia Bar Association, Academy of Music, Philadelphia, Feb. 18, 1970.

In addition to the classic functions of preventing conflict, providing security, and accommodating conflicting interests, international law is increasingly concerned with the promotion of common objectives and the provision of guidelines on questions previously resolved on a bilateral basis. Of three alternative approaches to jurisdiction of the seas--complete freedom of the seas with no national jurisdiction, control based on superior force, and division of the seas according to an agreed formula--only the first and third merit serious consideration. There is virtually unanimous agreement that sovereignty extends to areas adjacent to a nation's coast, although the precise limits of this sovereignty vary greatly, with most nations claiming from 3 to 12 miles. The United States supports proposals to fix the territorial limit at 12 miles, but only on condition that "freedom of transit through and over international straits and carefully defined preferential fishing rights for coastal States on the high seas" be guaranteed. The problem of the seabed requires special attention because of the vast resources of the Continental Shelf. The United States has proposed "that an internationally agreed regime for exploitation of resources beyond national jurisdiction should be established as soon as practicable" to minimize the potential for conflict.

1244

Weber, Hermann. [THE INCIDENT IN THE GULF OF TONKIN] Der Zwischenfall im Golf von Tongking. Marine Rundschau, v. 67, Jan. 1970: 1-16; Feb.: 89-103. illus. V3.M3, v. 67

Considers legal and factual aspects of the August 1964 incidents that led to the escalation of the Vietnam War. Weber concludes that, although American warships were entitled to resist the North Vietnamese attacks, the United States violated international law by its reprisals against North Vietnam.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

1245

Bailey, Sydney D. VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. Bloomington, Indiana University Press [c1969] 275 p. (Indiana University international studies) JX1977.B227

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction.--Voting in the Security Council: The Malta formula. Provisional rules of procedure.--The double veto.--The veto: The Secretary-General. Applications for membership. The "chain of events" theory. Arms control and disarmament. Eastern Europe. Suez (1956). Other vetoes.--Limiting and circumventing the veto: How useful is the veto?--Abstention and absence: Obligatory abstentions. Other abstentions. Nonparticipation in the vote. "Voluntary" abstentions or absence by a permanent member. The effect of abstentions (the so-called hidden veto).--Different kinds of consensus.--Elections and appointments: International Court of Justice. Secretary-General. Subsidiary organs.--Epilogue.--Appendices: San Francisco statement of 8 June 1945 on voting procedures in the Security Council. Voting provisions of the Charter, the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and the Provisional Rules of Procedure. Limiting the veto. Resolutions adopted and proposals vetoed in connection with matters of which the Security Council was seized on 31 December 1967. Resolutions adopted and proposals vetoed in connection with matters of which the Security Council was no longer seized on 31 December 1967. Proposals vetoed, 1946-1967. Consensus and majority; report of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 11 December 1967. Text of some presidential statements of consensus or summary. Voting on resolutions adopted by the Security Council, 1946-1967.--Select bibliography.--Notes.--Index.

Reviews the history of voting in the U.N. Security Council since 1946 to consider the questions as to the purpose of a vote, the nature of the decision, the veto as a cause or symptom of disagreement, the double veto, and the significance of the abstention and the statement of decision. Bailey emphasizes that the veto is less of an obstacle than is generally realized and that the immediate task is not to supplant the Security Council but to improve it in preparation for increased responsibilities.

1246

Bebler, Ales [interview] PRECONDITIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS RENAISSANCE. Review of international affairs, v. 20, Nov. 20, 1969: 6-8. D839.R4, v. 20

Answers questions on the achievements and failures of the United Nations. The nonaligned countries and the Third World are the principal supporters of the United Nations because it is "necessary and indispensable above all for the weak, for the economically and militarily weak, those who need external assistance and protection, those who see no prospect for their own development, prosperity and security without collective action by the international community."

1247

Červenka, Zdenek. THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND ITS CHARTER. With an introduction by Diallo Telli. New York, Praeger [1969] 253 p. JX1582.C4 1969 Includes bibliographies.

Partial contents.--Prelude to the Addis Ababa conference.--The Addis Ababa Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of Independent African States.--Political and legal analysis of the main provisions of the charter.--The peaceful settlement of disputes.--The relationship between the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations.--International Court of Justice and the South West Africa case.--The regional and political groups and their compatibility with the charter of the OAU.--The Rhodesian crisis.--The OAU and the Nigerian crisis.--Conclusion.--Appendices.--Index.

Political and legal interpretations of the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), including principles, operations, and major organs. This expanded translation of the January 1968 Czech original includes discussions of the issues involved in the Nigerian, Rhodesian, and South-West African situations from the point of view of OAU principles and objectives.

1248

Hassler, Alfred. BEYOND ALL SEPARATISM. Fellowship, v. 35, Nov. 1969: 7-9.

JX1901.F45, v. 35

The age of separation is ended. Man's most urgent task is to find effective ways to transcend the barriers of nation, ideology, and religion. The interdependence of peace and justice is a problem, the solution to which will require vast changes in man's thinking, institutions, and social processes. There is reason for hope in the progress of science and technology and in the revolt of youth against violence and separatism. Pacifists face special responsibilities. Nonviolent confrontation is no longer enough and may even contribute to disastrous social disintegration. New ways of creating and building must be discovered and new symbols, new organizations, and a new moral and political consciousness created. The project of a new world organization to stand as a symbol of the world community and promote and coordinate the essential work of education and persuasion will seem grandiose and impractical only to those who are incapable of escaping from older modes of thought. It is of the utmost urgency that men begin now the work of constructing the community of man.

1249

Johnson, Harold S., and Baljit Singh. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION; A CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY. East Lansing, Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1969. 261 p. (Michigan State University. Asian Studies Center. South Asia series. Occasional paper, no. 11)

Z6461.J63

Contents.--Preface.--Approaches to the study of international organization: General. Historical. Legal-constitutional. Institutional. Theoretical. Quantitative techniques.--The foundations of the international system: General. Historical. Ideological. Legal. Political. Economic.

Social.--The participants in international organization: Nation-states. Regional blocs. Political parties and interest groups. Personal participation. Interaction.--International institutionalization: Legal framework. Constitutional framework. Decision-making. Administrative behavior.--Finances.--The dynamics of international organization: Management of power. Functionalism. Processes of development. Protection of rights.--The progress of international organization: Political stability. Economic and social development. Constitutional evolution. Contemporary problems. Trends in evolution.--Bibliographical aids.

Surveys major studies published from 1945 to 1966.

1250

Maheu, René. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TECHNIQUES AND ETHICS. New Delhi, Indian Council for Cultural Relations [1968] 61 p. (Azad memorial lectures, 1965) JX1995.M34

Illustrates from Maheu's experience with UNESCO the concept of international cooperation as both technique and ethic. The first lecture describes UNESCO action in sectors of modern civilization like communication and exchange, where international cooperation is a technical necessity and a requirement for efficient action. The second lecture points out that, since UNESCO's basic mission is working with the minds of men, it is essentially an ethical organization.

1251

THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; STUDIES IN MULTILATERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AGENCIES. Edited by Robert W. Cox. New York, Praeger [1970, c1969] 319 p. HC59.7.I56 1970

"Papers . . . originally prepared either for a round table on the political role of international economic organization convened under the auspices of the International Political Science Association at Grenoble, September 1966, or for the same item on the agenda of the I.P.S.A. Congress in Brussels, September 1967. The authors have in many cases revised them in the light of discussions and comments."

London ed. published in 1969 has title: International Organization: World Politics. Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Foreword, by Robert W. Cox.--List of contributors.--List of abbreviations.--Preface, by Jacques Freymond.--Introduction: perspectives and problems, by Robert W. Cox.--pt. 1. International organisations in the context of world politics: Economic development aid and international political stability, by Inis L. Claude, Jr. The political role of regional economic organisations in Latin America, by Gustavo Lagos. New states and functional international organisations; a preliminary report, by Harold Karan Jacobson. Policy processes and international organisation tasks, by James Patrick Sevell.--pt. 2. Political development; external influences and internal processes:

Political development assistance by United Nations organisations, by Walter P. C. Laves. Multilateral aid and influence on government policies, by Leon Gordenker. Toward a theory of conflict behaviour in Latin America, by Raymond Tanter. The functional role of labour as a predeterminant of aid, by Willard A. Beling. Ventures in polity shaping; external assistance to labour movements in developing countries, by Harold Karan Jacobson. Economic planning as a political process in developing countries, by Norman Scott. The impact of foreign aid upon the political role of the armed forces in developing countries, by William F. Gutteridge.--pt. 3. The politics of international trade and liquidity: The meaning of multilateral surveillance, by Susan Strange. The general agreement on tariffs and trade; pressures and strategies for task expansion, by Gerard Curzon. The creation of UNCTAD, by Charles L. Robertson. The politics of liquidity, by Richard N. Gardner. Commentary, by William Diebold, Jr.--Conclusion: a prospective view, by Robert W. Cox.--Contributors' biographies.--Index.

Study of the political processes and consequences of the relationship between international social and economic organizations and the international system and the nation-states. Concrete cases of the work of these agencies in the political development of new nations and international monetary and trade politics are analyzed from different standpoints and with different methods. "Cutting across these themes are more theoretical concerns for the consequences of task expansion, the factors promoting international integration and those promoting nation-building and national integration."

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

1252
Harbottle, Michael N. PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING. Cosantoir, v. 29, Dec. 1969: 418-429. illus. UIC8, v. 29

Distinguishes between the functions of peacekeeping and peacemaking by U.N. forces. Harbottle stresses the necessity for U.N. peacekeeping forces to rely on negotiation and arbitration rather than force or the threat of force to achieve their goal of peacemaking. He describes the organization and logistics of U.N. peacekeeping forces and assesses their role in Cyprus.

1253
Oliveira, Kleber F. de. CAN A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE BE A GUEST FORCE? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Apr. 1970: 94-98. illus. 26723.U35, v. 50

The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) entered Egypt in 1956 only after obtaining the consent of the Egyptian Government. Throughout its

existence the force was recognized as a guest on Egyptian soil. In the beginning this state of affairs was thought to be of little consequence, and, in fact, it caused no major problems during the early years. As time passed, however, the awkwardness of the situation began to manifest itself in the force's apparent loss of impartiality, in its constantly diminishing freedom to accomplish its mission without undue influence from the host state, in a gradual erosion of its prestige, and, in general, in a sharp decline in its effectiveness. Ultimately, the guest status of the force led to its dissolution at a critical moment in 1967. The best way to avoid a repetition of the UNEF experience would be to put the next force's operating area under U.N. administration. Agreements could be negotiated with both sides to guarantee its operational and administrative freedom. At a minimum, the force commander should be briefed on the difficulties he is bound to encounter if he is forced to accept a guest-host relationship.

1254
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE XXIST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS. International review of the Red Cross, no. 104, Nov. 1969: 608-638. HV560.156, 1969

Texts of resolutions on topics like prisoners of war, war crimes and crimes against humanity, weapons of mass destruction, the rules of warfare, the role of the Red Cross in world peace, and disaster relief.

1255
Weiner, Robert. THE USSR AND UN PEACEKEEPING. Orbis, v. 13, fall 1969: 915-930. D839.068, v. 13

The Soviet Union refused to support the U.N. operations in the Congo and the U.N. Emergency Force on constitutional and financial grounds and because they represented Western attempts to colonize all of the Middle East and Africa. Adherence to a strict interpretation of the U.N. Charter led the Soviet Union to argue for Security Council control over peacekeeping operations and stress using all the means available in chapter VI of the charter to resolve cases of international conflict. "The Soviet Union checked against the hasty utilization of U.N. forces under Chapter VII in the interests of the West." The Soviet Union contended that expenses for peacekeeping operations should be borne by the "aggressors" against the Congo and Egypt. It suggested other methods to finance operations like voluntary contributions or payments by the countries directly involved. The unresolved financial crisis enabled the Russians to achieve their objective of forcing the United Nations to rely on the unsatisfactory method of voluntary financing. Until the superpowers arrive at an agreement to finance these operations, the United Nations will be handicapped in resolving peacekeeping problems.

OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

1250
Ansell, Robert C. **PEACE ON THE MARCH; TRANSNATIONAL PARTICIPATION.** New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. (1969) 209 p. (New perspectives in political science, 19) JCR63.A5
Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--Preface.--Acknowledgments.--Beyond political realism.--Transnational participation.--Study, teaching, and research abroad.--Settlement abroad and its aftermath.--International assistance.--Service in foreign missions.--Residence abroad for business reasons.--Residence abroad in military service.--Participation in international non-governmental organizations.--United Nations Secretariats.--The balance sheet of influence.--Policies for peace.--Index.

Hypothesizes that the amount and kind of transnational participation--that is, the playing of a role in a group that involves people from different nations--can subtly but significantly influence international relations. Selective encouragement of the most fruitful types of transnational participation will not produce substantive solutions for conflicts but can create the atmosphere and suggest the procedures for their attainment.

1251
Benko, Vlado. **THESES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY.** Review of international affairs, v. 20, Nov. 20, 1969: 1-4. D839.R4, v. 20

A European security system cannot be constituted by ignoring the United States and the Soviet Union, and it cannot be directed against them. However, elimination of the bloc structures is a necessary precondition for its organization. While military power is being concentrated in the international community today, political power is increasingly diffused. The dynamics of the Soviet-American-Chinese political triangle will further encourage the internal and external mobility of the allied states. The intervention in Czechoslovakia was "a supremely harmful act" not only as a violation of national sovereignty but also because it lessened the prospects for European security. In the transitional period preceding the organization of European security, the international operations of the neutral and non-aligned states should be expanded. Unobstructed communication over open boundaries between individuals and non-governmental groups can create possibilities for consensus. The proposed conference on European security might be reinforced by founding a permanent commission to cooperate closely with the United Nations.

1252
DISARMAMENT FIRST COMMITTEE RECEIVES SIX DRAFT
FOR CONSIDERATION. US monthly chronicle, v. 6, Dec.
1969: 14-17. D1977.A1U64, v. 6

Summarizes the contents of and debates on resolutions urging adherence to the nuclear test ban treaty and its extension to ban underground testing; prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons; ratification by all states of the 1925 Geneva Protocol; and a moratorium on the further testing and deployment of new strategic weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union.

1259
Galtung, Johan. **SEVEN THESES ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE.** Bulletin of peace proposals, v. 1, no. 1, 1970: 75-78. P&GP RR

Offers "some theses about conditions for the success of the conference, and the system it should aim at creating, as seen from the point of view of general peace theory, not from the vantage point of any of the contending blocs."

1260
Galtung, Johan. **VIOLENCE, PEACE, AND PEACE RESEARCH.** Journal of peace research, no. 3, 1969: 167-191. AS9.J6, 1969

Develops a typology of violence and assesses its significance for peace and peace research. Just as there are two types of violence, personal violence and social injustice, there are two types of peace--the absence of personal violence, negative peace, and social justice, positive peace. Peace research must concern itself with both types of violence and both types of peace, giving due emphasis to each type and taking into account the relationships between them. Otherwise, peace research will degenerate into a rationalization of right- or left-wing extremism.

1261
Hallstein, Walter. **[THE INCOMPLETE FEDERAL STATE; EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES AND REALIZATIONS]** Der unvollendete Bundesstaat; europäische Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse. Düsseldorf, Econ Verlag [1969] 283 p. D1060.H28
In cooperation with Hans H. Götz and Karl-Heinz Narjes.

Partial contents.--Foreword.--What we build on.--Law instead of power.--Organs of the community.--Motive forces and counterforces.--European economic policy.--The world around us.--Political union.

Expounds the political integration of Europe and discusses progress toward European federation. Hallstein considers the problems of collective security in Europe and concludes that experiences of the European Economic Community can help a future European armaments community.

1262
Ispahani, M. A. H. **PAKISTAN AND NEW REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.** Pakistan horizon, v. 22, no. 3, 1969: 199-217. DSJ76.P32, v. 22

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organisation ineffectively met Pakistan's security needs. Military alliances foster global competition, regional instability, and military rivalry. The Asian collective security organization proposed by the Soviet Union, with tacit U.S. approval, would perpetuate the status quo in South Asia and jeopardize Pakistan's friendly relations with China. However, it will never be executed, since certain countries, including Pakistan, will not join. The emergence of China as a powerful third world power is necessary to protect the interests of the Afro-Asian nations, given a Soviet-U.S. agreement to divide the world into "spheres of influence and exploitation."

1263

Korhonen, Keijo. THE FINNISH INITIATIVE FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. War/peace report, v. 10, Feb. 1970: 8-10.

JX1901.W38, v. 10

Finland has proposed a series of regional tension-producing plans like a European security conference and a Nordic nuclear-free zone because the success of its neutral policy depends upon European peace and stability. The initiative on European security came after the Czechoslovak invasion when a general feeling developed that something should be done to prevent more tension, and it differed from the Warsaw Pact proposal in substance and in principle. If the Finnish initiative causes Europeans to realize that they must examine outdated concepts and doctrines critically and recognize new alternatives, it will fulfill its task.

1264

Lückert, Heinz-Rolf. [ASPECTS OF A PSYCHOLOGY TO SECURE THE PEACE] Aspekte einer Psychologie der Friedenssicherung. Politische Studien, v. 21, Jan./Feb. 1970: 18-32.

H35.P66, v. 21

Asserts that peace can be secured through education and politics, considers pertinent pedagogic innovations and behavioral models, and discusses the theory of aggression. Education and politics should not aim to create "tension-free states of peace" since conflict and struggle embody "constructive moments of personal and social dynamics." They should rather try to channel irrational aggressiveness, which is not a primary human need, into "spiritual" competition and struggle that can be resolved rationally. Politics should develop systems of conflict resolution and international institutions powerful enough to codify law and secure peace.

1265

Mahncke, Dieter. [WHAT IS PEACE RESEARCH?] Was ist Friedensforschung? Europa-Archiv, v. 24, Nov. 23, 1969: 795-802.

D839.L86, v. 24

The notion of peace research can apply to any research designed to contribute to peace. So far its prime concern has been how to prevent a direct

war between the superpowers or an escalation of other wars into such a war. Few groups of peace researchers opposed to this limitation of effort see dangers to man's survival inherent in a system that depends on nuclear deterrence. One of the common objectives of the new groups is the discovery of methods of settling conflicts peacefully. Most peace researchers of the new brand pursue a gradual integration of all mankind into one world community, where all military conflicts will be "domesticated." The new Scandinavian group divides all violence into "personal," physical violence between individuals or groups and "structural" violence, which denotes the injustice inherent in a social system like the economic abyss between the developed and underdeveloped nations. Positive peace, in the Scandinavian view, means the total absence of structural violence and not just of wars. Peace research differs from traditional political science by focusing on a concept of peace that requires a broad interdisciplinary effort. Since present arms control and disarmament measures offer no security against a nuclear disaster caused by the irrational behavior of governments, political science should reexamine its own priorities.

1266

Pickus, Robert. ARM AND A WORLD WITHOUT WAR. With the editorial assistance of David Luse. [Berkeley, Calif., World Without War Publication, 1969] 86 p.

UG633.P52

Bibliography: p. 83-86.

Partial contents.--U.S. initiatives for a world without war.--An issued centered approach.--A world without war approach.--Who will make the decision?--Queries for organizational leaders.--Policy stands: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Federation of American Scientists. Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Council for a Liveable World. Questions and answers on the ABM, prepared by the White House for the Republican National Committee. Freedom House.

Discusses why the American approach is so often inadequate to the problem of preventing war. The military has an essential role in protecting the American people and should not be subverted by simplistic isolationism and antimilitarism, but "the attack on the swollen role of the military in American life [is] surely warranted," and the present antimilitary climate could secure Communist agreement on the basic steps toward establishing a world without war. Pickus outlines the six essential ingredients of such a world and determines the U.S. role in promoting world peace.

1267

Pinder, John, and Roy Pryor. EUROPE AFTER DE GAULLE: TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969. 191 p. (Penguin special)

D1060.P496

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. Europe today: crisis of a system: The failure of the nation-state.

Community Europe, a partial response.--pt. 2. Britain and Europe: The political challenge. The economic issues.--pt. 3. Towards the United States of Europe: Europe after De Gaulle; a new start. A modern economy for Europe. Towards equality with America. Russia; defence and détente. Europe, catalyst for a uniting world. The political structure of a United States of Europe. A strategy for Britain.

Assesses Great Britain's role in the construction of a new Europe, outlines the purposes and structure of a united Europe, and suggests a strategy for its achievement.

1268

Risse, Heinz T., and Reinhold Lehmann. [TO PLAN THE PEACE. POSSIBILITIES OF A PEACE POLICY IN EUROPE] Den Frieden planen. Möglichkeiten einer Friedenspolitik in Europa. [Mainz] Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag [1969] 158 p.

BT736.4.R53

Contents.--Editors' preface.--Foreword, by Julius Cardinal Döpfner.--Requirements of church peace work, by Julius Cardinal Döpfner.--World problems in a new perspective, by Bernard Cardinal Alfrink.--A scientific theory of peace and a Christian peace theology, by Robert Bosc.--Rostrum discussion 1. Europe in the East-West conflict. Détente policy and peace settlements, by Johan Galtung (the chairman), Ernst Otto Czempiel (introduction), Adrian F. Manning, Milan Prucha, Dieter Senghaas.--Rostrum discussion 2. Europe in the North-South conflict. Relationship with Third World countries, by Paul Abrecht (chairman), Heinrich Krauss (introduction), Philippe de la Chapelle, Maurice Dewulf, Alfred Horné.--Rostrum discussion 3. Education for peace, by Adolf M. Däumling (chairman), Paul Teunissen (introduction), Pierre Brachin, Joseph Goffinet, Christel Küpper.--Public rostrum-discussion. Peace policy in Europe, by Bernard Cardinal Alfrink and Arsen Jovanović.--What can Pax Christi do for peace? The Speyer declaration by the International Council of the Pax Christi Movement.--Krefeld declaration on political engagement by the 1969 Annual Assembly of the German Section of Pax Christi.--Subject index.

Speeches, papers, and discussions at the Tenth International Congress of the Catholic peace movement Pax Christi. The Congress, held in November 1968 in Speyer, West Germany, dealt with the movement's best possible contribution to the development of institutions and behavior to promote peace.

1269

Strauss, Franz J. CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE; A PROGRAMME FOR EUROPE. With a foreword by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Translated from the German by Henry Fox. New York, Atheneum, 1970. 175 p.

D1058.8783 1970

Originally published as *Herausforderung und Antwort*. D1058.878

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Foreword, by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber.--The rise and decline of Europe.--Fresh start and 'containment.'--From the degeneration of war to the 'pax atomica.'--Relaxation of tension among the Great Powers.--Is there a 'yellow peril'?--Relaxation of tension in Europe.--A Europe of the nations?--Germany; a European problem.--The science and technology gap.--Security for Europe.--Mastering the future.--Postscript.--Acknowledgements.

Presents the idea of a united Germany within a united Europe powerful enough to command the respect of the Soviet Union and the United States. Strauss criticizes the flexible response strategy and nuclear nonproliferation treaty for being based on unrealistic premises or serving only the superpower interests. Western Europe, by its emancipation from American security policy, improvement of its own defense posture, and its efforts to weaken Soviet influence, could induce East-West détente in Europe and free European unification.

1270

Tatu, Michel. EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE: WHAT'S IN IT FOR WHOM? Interplay, v. 3, Feb. 1970: 4-8. P&G RR

Translated by Ormond de Kay, Jr.

A European security conference would help the Soviet Union preserve the status quo in Europe represented by the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, gain recognition for East Germany, and divert attention from the European Economic Community (EEC) negotiations. Despite the disadvantages of participating in a European conference, the West should accept the theory of such a conference and present counterproposals. First, although the question of a balanced reduction of forces belongs to negotiations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, "it goes straight to the heart of the problem of 'security'" and should be inscribed on a European conference agenda. Second, even if the status quo is preserved, the West should demand a relaxation of the restrictions on communications between the Germans and more intellectual and cultural exchanges. Finally, it should make explicit that the principle of renunciation of force applies within an alliance system and proclaim that alliances are not immutable and that European states have a right to neutrality. The Russians are unlikely to accept the majority of these demands, but the West would be wrong not to present them since it is the Soviet Union that wants a conference. The best way to increase the chances for such a conference is to be patient and demand minimal concessions from Moscow.

IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1271

Berkman, Richard L. THE ROAD TO WISDOM. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 96, Mar. 1970: 59-63. illus.
V1.U8, v. 96

Discusses the insignificant role of history and historians in American foreign policy formulation. Berkman concludes that, "if top-level decision-makers paid more attention to the discipline of history . . . it is more likely that they would hold a broader perspective on issues, open more alternatives for policy, and blunder less frequently than they now do."

1272

Burns, Richard D., and Donald Urquidí. DISARMAMENT IN PERSPECTIVE: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS, 1919-1939. With the assistance of Arthur L. Smith, Jr., and Seymour Chapin. [Los Angeles?]. 1968. 4 v. JX1974.B78
"Contract ACDA/RS-55."

Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by California State College at Los Angeles Foundation.

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--v. 1. Disarmament and the peace settlement.--v. 2. Demilitarization of frontiers, islands and straits.--v. 3. Limitation of seapower.--v. 4. Conclusions.

Historical inquiry into each signed agreement of the period to determine the initiation of the proposal, whether as the result of articulated policy or as a compromise in arranging general political settlements; the negotiatory process, particularly the roles of statesmen, public opinion, and military professionals; the extent of compliance, efforts at revision, and effect on national security; and the development of the significant features of each agreement.

1273

Cromwell, William C. POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP; NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES. Edited by William C. Cromwell. With contributions by Nigel Forman and Joseph Joffe. Bruges, College of Europe [1969] 458 p. (Studies in contemporary European issues, 3) D1065.U5C7
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface.--The United States, by William C. Cromwell: The formative period. The Kennedy administration and Atlantic partnership. The

requirements of American defence policy. Atlantic partnership and alliance nuclear arrangements. The indivisibility of Atlantic security. United States-European security perspectives outside the North Atlantic area. Atlantic partnership, European unity, and peaceful engagement. Conclusion. --Great Britain and Atlantic community, by Nigel Forman: Introduction. Suez operation. Nassau agreement. Britain and Europe. Britain and the world.--Germany and the Atlantic alliance; the politics of dependence, 1961-1968, by Joseph Joffe: Introduction; the foreign policy of Anpassung. The "open status quo," neither reunification nor two German states. Détente, the breakdown of the Junktim. De Gaulle or the "Grand Design"; Germany between France and the United States. Atlantic partnership, an old policy inspired by new hopes. Nuclear armament, strategy and control; German dilemmas revisited. New departures overcoming the status quo via its acceptance.

Papers prepared during 1965-66 at the College of Europe, which deal with the political problems between Europe and the United States and between European states with respect to integration.

1274

Fontaine, André. HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR. New York, Pantheon Books [1969] 2 v. maps. D421.F613

Translation of Histoire de la Guerre Froide. Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--v. 1. From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917-1950, translated by D. D. Paige.--v. 2. From the Korean War to present, translated by Renaud Bruce.

Argues that the 1963 test ban treaty "marks the provisional termination of a 'cold war' which historians will probably see more and more as the Third World War." For the first time since the October Revolution, the Soviet Union "placed the conclusion of an accord with 'imperialism' before the maintenance of the unity in the socialistic bloc."

1275

[FORECASTS FOR EUROPE: THE SEVENTIES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST] Prognosen für Europa; die siebziger Jahre zwischen Ost und West [Herausgeber: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik] Opladen, C. W. Leske, 1968. 140 p. (Aktuelle Aussenpolitik) D649.P7

Contents.--pt. 1. Questionnaire.--pt. 2. Country reports: United States, by Hans B. Meyer. Great Britain, by Curt Gasteyger. France, by Walter Schütze. Italy, by Eduard Geilinger.

Yugoslavia, by Carl-Gustav Ströhm. Czechoslovakia, by Eberhard Schulz. Poland, by Hans-Jacob Stehle. German Democratic Republic, by Ernst Richert. The Soviet Union, by Boris Meissner. China, by Joachim Glaubitz.--pt. 3. Concluding remarks.--Index of names.

Determines the probable future attitudes toward West Germany of 10 countries after brief analysis of the stability of each country's regime, its socioeconomic development, national interests, and views on the dominant factors in world politics, the future of the alliance system, and German reunification.

1276

Gupta, Sisir. *THE THIRD WORLD AND THE GREAT POWERS. In American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia. Protagonists, power, and the Third World: essays on the changing international system. Philadelphia, 1969. (Its Annals, v. 386, Nov. 1969) p. 54-63.*

H1.A4, v. 386

The Third World has made no attempt to evolve a common and consistent attitude to the momentous changes in world politics that have occurred during this decade. The importance and influence of these countries in international affairs has declined, and they have not participated in the processes which led to the Soviet-American *détente* or the loosening of the two blocs. In many ways, the changes that have occurred in interbloc and intrabloc relationships are those that the countries of the Third World always regarded as desirable. But the essence of the Third World's problem is that the structural changes in world politics have not been carried forward to the extent that would make them meaningful for poor and weak nations. The inadequacies of the present system are apparent from the steps taken by the two superpowers in the field of disarmament and in their responses to certain types of local conflicts. What is most alarming from the viewpoint of the Third World is that the present system could easily lead to the replacement of the old concept of one world by a new concept of an inner and an outer world relegating the nations of developing areas to the status of a peripheral element in international politics. It is obviously in the interest of the Third World to convert the present search for stability in great-power relations and a minimal world order into a search for global peace and stability and a maximal world order. (Abstract supplied)

1277

Köhle, Klaus. [THE PROBLEM OF PEACE IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY SINCE ANTIQUITY] *Das Friedensproblem im staatsrechtlichen Denken seit der Antike. Politische Studien, v. 21, Jan./Feb. 1970: 5-17.*

H35.P66, v. 21

Considers selected theories of peace since ancient Greece and Rome. Köhle notes that the depiction of man's continuous intellectual striving to establish and maintain peace can help contemporary peace research.

1278

Riencourt, Amaury de. *THE AMERICAN EMPIRE. New York, Dial Press, 1968. xviii, 366 p.*

E741.R52

Contents.--Introduction.--The roots.--The suicide of Europe.--Pearl Harbor: the genesis of empire.--Cold war: the establishment of empire.--The tools of empire.--The road to Suez.--Death and transfiguration of the Commonwealth.--Frontier across the Pacific.--The Hawaiianization of the Orient.--Latins, guerillas, and anarchists.--Race and Africa.--Empire and nation-state: the future of Europe.--Economic hegemony.--The great condominium.--Bibliography.--Notes and references.--Index.

Traces "the development of the American empire" and examines its impact on the rest of the world. The origins of American imperialism lie in the aggressive and expansionist ethos that dominated the Nation's early history; given this history and the self-destruction of Europe as the center of world power, the emergence of the United States as an imperial power was inevitable.

1279

Rodolfo, Claudine. [THE PERSIAN GULF: THE PRESENT SITUATION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES] *Le golfe persique: situation actuelle et perspectives d'avenir. Politique étrangère, no. 5/6, 1969: 631-665.*

JX3.P6, '1969

The Persian Gulf area is particularly interesting from an economic and strategic point of view. Moreover, the calling into question of a situation more than a century old--the quasi-exclusive presence of Great Britain--is a turning point in its history. The author believes it would be appropriate to give a historical, geographic, and economic summary of this part of the world. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

1280

Rougeron, Camille. [MISSILES: DISARMAMENT OF THE SEABED] *Missiles: le désarmement du fond des mers. Science et vie, v. 117, Feb. 1970: 126-133.*

T2.S3, v. 117

Summarizes the events of the current arms race, including the development of the ICBM, the ABM, and the multiple independent reentry vehicle and arms limitation agreements like the partial test ban and outer space treaties and the seabed accord. U.S. superiority in nuclear submarines may be surpassed in 1970 if Soviet development continues at its present pace.

1281

Schneider, Fernand T. [20 YEARS OF NATO] *Les vingt ans de L'OTAN. Revue militaire suisse, v. 114, Dec. 1969: 543-554.*

U2.R5, v. 114

Divides NATO's history into three stages: the foundation of the alliance under the American

atomic umbrella, the interval after France's withdrawal, and the period after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Although the alliance has prevented a third world war, the French withdrawal has contributed to its deterioration. Nevertheless, it has withstood the test of time and kept the peace in Europe.

1282

Williams, G. Mennen. AFRICA FOR THE AFRICANS. Grand Rapids, Eerdmans [1969] 218 p. map (on lining papers) DT31.W53

Contents.--Foreword.--pt. 1. The art of the possible: The hope of a continent. Democracy, socialism, one-party government, and nonalignment. Military coups. Bright spots. Communist competition. The Congo.--pt. 2. White supremacy: Southern Rhodesia. The Portuguese territories. South Africa.--pt. 3. U.S. policy: American policy toward Africa. U.S. trade, investment, and assistance. The Peace Corps; something not there before.--Epilogue.--Index.

Analyzes U.S. policy toward Africa between 1961 and 1966, focusing on Africa's struggle to fulfill the desire of its people for freedom and a better standard of living.

1283

Williams, William A. THE ROOTS OF THE MODERN AMERICAN EMPIRE; A STUDY OF THE GROWTH AND SHAPING OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN A MARKETPLACE SOCIETY. New York, Random House [1969] xxiv, 547 p. HC105.W54

Contents.--Preface: Notes on the relevance of history, and for an autobiography of this book.--Introduction: A survey of the territory.--The tradition of expansion undergoes a mutation.--Progress, depression, and competitive bidding create a coalition for the expansion of the marketplace.--The belief in the necessity of expanding the marketplace and the coming of the Civil War.--Recent enemies share a similar fate and in rising anger confront the metropolis.--Economic troubles intensify existing difficulties and generate a rising demand for larger markets and cheaper transportation.--While the country concentrates on markets and transportation the metropolis manipulates the monetary system.--A massive depression intensifies and extends the movement for overseas market expansion.--An export bonanza turns America toward imperialism.--The redefinition of the American marketplace and the American security perimeter.--The closing of the continental frontier, like the closing of the European markets, turns America toward imperialism.--Persistent economic troubles and unresponsive metropolitan leadership arouse the farmers and consolidate the consensus on overseas economic expansion.--Metropolitan Republicans commit themselves to market expansion to hold the Western farm businessmen and sustain the system.--Metropolitan Democrats lose control of their party to the agricultural businessmen.--The climactic debate over silver or reciprocity as the best method of expanding the American

marketplace.--Onward to war for the free American marketplace.--Through the Open Door to empire.--From empire to community.--Bibliography.--Notes.--Index.

Traces the role of American farmers in the development of U.S. foreign policy during the latter half of the 19th century. Williams argues that the then agricultural majority evolved a marketplace conception of the world in keeping with its pursuit of the widest possible access to markets for the disposal of its surplus produce, which preceded and decisively influenced the formation of a similarly expansionist conception among American industrialists and led to an increasingly imperialistic foreign policy.

1284

Wolf, John B. THE BEAR AND THE DRAGON. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Nov. 1969: 84-91. illus. V1.U8, v. 95

Traces Soviet expansion in central Asia by examining Sino-Soviet border treaties. The need for an overland route to link European and Asiatic Soviet settlements, the strategic implications of a harbor on the Sea of Okhotsk, and the extension of the railroad network in North America stimulated this expansion. Wolf claims that the Soviet Union "will resort to whatever savagery is necessary to protect its interests in this . . . region" and concludes that the Sino-Soviet conflict "has developed along lines similar to those which led to the Russo-Japanese War."

1285

Wolfe, Gene. THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORY UPON SEAPOWER. Naval War College review, v. 22, Jan. 1970: 63-67. P&GP RR

Briefly reflects upon significant trends in naval history and predicts "that the strategic value of all that water out there will become more and more apparent as contemporary history goes on."

GENERAL ANALYSES

1286

[THE ARMS RACE AND ARMS CONTROL] Rüstungswettlauf und Rüstungskontrolle. Moderne Welt, v. 10, no. 4, 1969: 339-411. D839.M58, v. 10

Contents.--The theme: the arms race and arms control, by Peter Coulmas.--Traffic rules for an arms race, by Theo Sommer.--The European security system; initial positions at a security conference, by Claudia von Braunmühl.--China's rise to a nuclear power, by Ernst Kux.--Research report: the concept of arms control, by Helga Haftendorn.

Questions the future development of arms control and disarmament in light of the performance by the international community to date. The strategic arms limitation talks signify the first real

chance for a substantial settlement in the area. The authors discuss differences and points of consensus between nations and experts on the control of strategic and conventional arms and armaments, trace China's nuclear program and Chinese proposals to limit the use of nuclear weapons, and supply an extensive annotated bibliography on the subject.

1287

Baer-Kaupert, Friedrich-Wilhelm. [THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS] Die Zukunft des europäisch-amerikanischen Verhältnisses. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Feb. 25, 1970: 129-136.
D839.E86, v. 25

In its pursuit of détente, Western Europe could easily neglect its relations with the United States, which remains a determining factor for the scope of its Eastern policies. To avoid unnecessary friction with the United States, Western Europe should become aware that, in the American view, Europe is but one of many regions to be fit into a global security system that alone can secure peace. The system is defined mostly in terms of America's military security and a modified Truman doctrine, which reduces Europe to Western Europe. American foreign policy, traditionally dominated by the Nation's foreign trade policy, is now learning to stand on its own. The process is more difficult because Americans resent imperialism; their messianism of the American way of life combined with their latent imperialism leads to self-deception, overcommitment, and conflict escalation; and U.S. involvement in European affairs contradicts their isolationist traditions. Their neoisolationism is in fact noninterventionism, and they consider Asia at least as important as Europe. The United States will remain Western Europe's reliable ally as long as the identity of U.S. foreign policy goals is unimpaired by Western Europe's possible unwillingness to defend itself. As the world's strongest power, seriously concerned with East-West détente, nuclear nonproliferation, and strategic arms limitation, America cannot afford to lose interest in such a crucial area as Europe. Regional détente between Eastern and Western Europe would be compatible with Washington's policy to base American security on both the Atlantic alliance and Soviet-American accommodation. In terms of American national interest, the concession of Western Europe to the East would be tantamount to the abandonment of American democracy. The United States will remain concerned with the credibility of Western defense; it will, however, be more flexible toward European policies and continue its efforts to make rivalry with the Soviet Union less ideological, and its economic interests will still play an important role in its foreign policy. To maintain or increase its influence on world politics, Western Europe must develop a design for European unification devoid of any traditional superstate idea and anti-Americanism.

1288

Barber, James A. THE OBJECTIVES OF ARMS CONTROL. Naval War College review, v. 22, Feb. 1970: 35-43.
P&GP RR

Considers the basic objectives of arms control--reduction of the probability, intensity, and duration of war; improvement of position relative to potential opponents; reduction of security costs; and achievement of nonmilitary objectives--their interaction and feasibility. "Although arms control can be highly beneficial, all arms control is not necessarily good, and it can be dangerous to assume that it is."

1289

Bundy, McGeorge. AMERICA'S ENDURING LINKS WITH EUROPE; NO DANGER OF SELL-OUT TO THE SOVIET UNION. Round table, the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 237, Jan. 1970: 7-16. AP4.R6, 1970

The beginning of the strategic arms limitation talks inaugurates a new phase in European-American relations. However, nothing about the changing shape of the Soviet-U.S. arms equation modifies the American commitment toward Europe; nothing about the commitment requires an American position toward strategic missiles that differs in any way from what is required in the interests of the Americans themselves. The tendency toward parity of Soviet and U.S. nuclear strength was inevitable from the first. It has not been America's superiority in nuclear weapons that safeguarded Europe, but the American conviction that European and American safety were indivisible and the very concrete expression given that conviction by the stationing of American troops in Europe. The range and meaning of the gradual withdrawal of Europe from the geopolitics of other countries and the gradual interpenetration of the economies of the Atlantic world are not always clearly understood. The serious political horizon for Europe is increasingly limited to Europe and to the set of issues that relates to the making of Europe itself. "Europe can now have no decisive foreign policy except that of the future of Europe." President Nixon has repeated recently the thought of all American Presidents: "Americans cannot unify Europe: Europeans must do so." While Europeans are seeking a new approach to unity, American discretion becomes important. Americans cannot unify Europe, but they cannot be expected to be patient "while all the special costs of unification are exported westward." Agriculture is one of the fields in which the politics of Europe may strain the politics of the United States.

1290

Chalfont, Arthur Gwynne Jones, baron [interview] ARMS LIMITATION--THE BRITISH VIEW. New scientist, v. 44, Dec. 25, 1969: 632-635. illus.
Q1.N52, v. 44

Answers questions on the British approach to the strategic arms limitation talks, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle and ABM deployment and limitation, seismic monitoring of underground nuclear tests, the nonproliferation treaty, arms control and European security, chemical and biological weapons, and arms limitation on the seabed.

1291

THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF EUROPE; ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL TRENDS [by] Robert H. Beck [and others] Assisted by Jean Belden Taber. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press [c1970] 286 p. D1060.C44 1970

Contents.--Introduction.--Anniversaries and balance sheets, by John G. Turnbull and Jean Belden Taber.--The Western crisis of the sixties, by Harold C. Deutsch.--The course of economic integration, by John G. Turnbull.--Constraints and potential in agriculture, by Philip M. Raup.--The harmonization of education, by Robert H. Beck.--The integration of people, by Arnold M. Rose.--The changing structure of Europe.--Notes.--Selected readings.--Index.

Investigates the major economic, social, educational, political, and military issues in the context of European integration.

1292

Clemens, Walter C. SOVIET EUROPEAN POLICY IN THE 1970'S. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Apr. 1970: 52-64. illus.

26723.U35, v. 50

In order of decreasing probability, the Soviet Union may choose to adopt a status quo, interdependence (i.e., cooperative), forward (i.e., aggressive), or isolationist foreign policy vis-a-vis Europe. An interdependence policy would conduce most to progress in arms control at the strategic or regional level. A forward policy would be the most harmful, though the extent of the damage would depend on whether the Soviet Union chose indirect or militant implementing tactics. A status quo strategy would not hinder progress in strategic arms control but would put serious obstacles in the way of regional arrangements, the one possible exception being a regional freeze on nuclear or conventional forces. Isolationism, on the other hand, would be compatible with arms control agreements in Europe but might lead to a buildup of strategic arsenals, an intensification of weapons testing programs, and a general reluctance on both sides to accept strategic arms limitations. These observations lead to two conclusions. First, as might be expected, regional arms control issues are more sensitive to Soviet European policy than are strategic arms control issues. Second, with the exception of the leftist forward strategy, any of the projected Soviet postures would be compatible with a wide range of regional and strategic arms control arrangements. A word of warning, however: Arrangements arising out of a rightist forward strategy might bear too many of the marks of cynicism and, being unstable, jeopardize U.S. and European security and world peace. The West must learn to distinguish between Soviet arms control initiatives that rest on an acceptance of East-West interdependence and those motivated by the desire to force the United States out of Europe and extend Soviet hegemony.

1293

[FOREIGN, MILITARY, AIR, AND SEA NEWS] Revue de défense nationale, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 145-173. D410.R45, v. 26

Contents.--International organization news, by René Jacquot.--Military news, by Jean Serre.--Aeronautical news, by Lieutenant-colonel Baujard.--Maritime news, by Jean Labayle.--Overseas news, by François Nora.

Reviews events of the past quarter with special attention to the strategic arms limitation talks, Japan's military air potential, and the strength of the Israeli and the Egyptian Navies.

1294

Galbraith, John Kenneth. MAKING FOREIGN POLICY; THE INFLUENCE OF MEN AND EVENTS. Current, no. 113, Dec. 1969: 54-61. AP2.C9259, 1969
"From 'It's Lucky Men Don't Control Events,' The Washington Post, Oct. 12, 1969."

The notion that individuals play a primary role in the making of foreign policy is a myth. Circumstance makes foreign policy, and bureaucracy accommodates action to circumstance. It is circumstance that has taught the superpowers that they are not as overwhelmingly superior to third parties as they once thought themselves to be, and it is circumstance that is causing the two economic systems, capitalist and Communist, to converge. To the first development can be traced a decline in evangelism on both sides in the cold war; to the second, an erosion of the idea that conflict between East and West is inevitable. One factor, however, is the strongly functional role that military expenditures have come to play in advanced economies. Today the military budget sustains a large and powerful industry, and the military services themselves are entrenched in the bureaucracy. This military-industrial complex cannot openly favor a continuation of the arms race, but it can respond with dizzying speed to any Soviet behavior that seems to justify one, or even use its control over intelligence to invent justification. And, since there is a Soviet counterpart to the U.S. military-industrial estate, it is likely that the necessary arguments for more armaments will always be forthcoming. Fortunately, in the United States more and more people are beginning to see the arms race in just these terms. As one consequence, military budgets are being examined with unprecedented thoroughness. Even more significant has been the breakup of the cold war alliance between liberals and the military and diplomatic professionals. As a result of this event, the movement to resist military domination and support arms control agreements has achieved new strength. However, the actions and attitudes of the superpowers are mutually reinforcing. The issue of arms control is not between governments but between opposing political forces within the two states. The outlook for a favorable outcome is good in the United States, and, as to the Soviet Union, one can only hope.

1295

Gasteyger, Curt. [EUROPE OF THE SEVENTIES] Das Europa der siebziger Jahre. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 7, Nov./Dec. 1969: 447-458. P&P RR

Outlines the present state and principal tendencies of European policy. Gasteyger considers prospects for superpower accommodation in Europe, possible reduction of American commitments, the Soviet Union's policy, Soviet-East European and Soviet-German relations, the German Federal Republic's Eastern policy, French foreign and defense policies, British-European relations, new forms of West European cooperation, East-West détente, and the Atlantic alliance. Western Europe's central task in the coming decade is to create a lasting and credible link between the German question and the European security problem; find a balanced relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union; rely on the "alliance form" that would secure proper West European influence on U.S. European policy, contribute to improved relations with Eastern Europe, and make Western defense preparedness continuously credible to the Soviet Union; and find forms of European cooperation that would express a growing European personality without negative anti-American motivation.

1296

Kapur, Ashok. CHINA, ARMS CONTROL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. China report, v. 5, Nov./Dec. 1969: 1-11. DS777.55.C4484, v. 5

Analyzes Communist China's nuclear weapons program, military doctrine, strategic objectives, and statements on the partial test ban treaty, nuclear-free zones, and the nonproliferation treaty. Kapur concludes that Peking's changing attitude toward arms control and disarmament reflects shifting strategic military priorities. Although some Western estimates suggest that China cannot revolutionize the global balance of power, it has already influenced the Soviet-American détente.

1297

Koch, Claus. [THE ORGANIZED ABSENCE OF PEACE] Die organisierte Friedlosigkeit. Merkur, deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken, v. 23, Nov. 1969: 1027-1040. AP30.M43, v. 23

The Kennedy era doctrine of arms control interprets reciprocity of interests as a rationale of nuclear strategy and nuclear war prevention. It has proved successful in practice because of the superpowers' explicit or tacit agreement to comply with its rules, yet the steadily growing complexity of the balance conspires against its endurance. Other factors that damage the environmental prerequisites of the present deterrence system are the potential multipolar undersea armaments and escalation of new biological and chemical weapons. The expected rewards of peaceful undersea programs and freedom of the seas darken prospects for maintaining the undersea area as the strategic realm

of the two powers, which is the aim of the Soviet and American proposals to ban nuclear weapons on the seabed. In Ab Abschreckung und Frieden--Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit, Dieter Senghaas criticizes the "arms control school" for its "deterrence scholasticism." He doubts that China, as a nuclear power, will follow the self-denying rules of the deterrence game, which requires ever-new stimulants for armaments and drives its participants to autism. Contemporary peace research is preoccupied with stabilizing the present system of the absence of peace, owing to the influence of the arms control school. Pragmatically oriented peace planning has produced no politically effective concepts of peace and no original techniques for large-scale war prevention. As the President of the German Federal Republic pointed out, "the causes of war are to be sought in social systems and forms of government." Herein are the real problems for peace research.

1298

Kuczynski, Jürgen. [WORLD ARMAMENTS EXPENDITURES] Weltrüstungsausgaben. Weltbühne, v. 24, Dec. 16, 1969: 1577-1579. AP30.W33, v. 24

Reviews the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research's Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1968/69 and "Probleme einer Statistik der Rüstungen" (Problems of a Statistics of Armaments) by R. Wagenführ, which was published in Statistische Hefte, v. 10, no. 3, 1969. Kuczynski points out that arms control efforts in recent years have brought about disproportionately small results in comparison to the great progress in armaments, defense expenditures, and defense research and development.

1299

Kudriavtsev, V. AT THE ASIAN PEOPLES' EXPENSE. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 21, Dec. 23, 1969: 21-22. D839.C87, v. 21
Translated from Izvestia, Nov. 27, 1969. Slav RM

In the Sato-Nixon talks the discussion of Okinawa was subordinated to the major question of American imperialism's method of exploiting Japan. The "common values" of which the final communique speaks are to be expressed in the creation of a system of joint Japanese and U.S. responsibility to reorganize and strengthen neocolonialist rule in Asia. While retaining its Armed Forces in Asia and providing a nuclear shield, the United States plots to use Asians themselves for the maintenance of American supremacy. Japan sees its assignment of providing economic aid as an opportunity to take over the Asian markets. However, U.S. capital has penetrated the Japanese economy so far that it will be American monopolies in Japanese guise that control Asian economies. Sato has begun to talk of the next problem of Japanese diplomacy, the "northern territories." There neither is nor can be such a problem.

1300

Scanlan, James P. DISARMAMENT AND THE USSR. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Mar. 1970: 29-42. illus. 26723.U35, v. 50

Nearly 53 years after the Bolshevik revolution, sufficient evidence is available to establish some important propositions about Soviet behavior on disarmament matters. These are "that there is a Soviet commitment to international disarmament as an ideal"; "that Soviet interest has shifted from general and complete disarmament to specific arms control measures"; that the Soviet commitment has not been confined to the level of ideals but has descended to a willingness, "under certain circumstances, to conclude specific arms control agreements"; that "the Soviet Union is seriously interested in further specific arms control measures"; and, negatively, that "the Soviet Union will not accept an unfavorable position militarily vis-a-vis any other power and, in particular, vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China." One would be foolish to expect any really drastic breakthroughs on disarmament. On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that the Soviet leaders will continue their commitment to the painstaking negotiation of limited agreements dealing with specific issues. Good possibilities are a seabed treaty and "a series of mutual accommodations with the United States in offensive and defensive missile systems, probably beginning with a qualified freeze on the development and deployment of some new systems, and followed by some cutbacks in existing systems."

1301

Schneider, Mark B. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Mar. 1970: 20-28. illus. 26723.U35, v. 50

Which is preferable as foundation for a U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation agreement--an assured-destruction or damage-limitation capability? Though most arms control advocates in the United States prefer the assured-destruction alternative, analysis will show that an agreement based on it would be the most difficult to negotiate and the least productive of national security. Far better would be an agreement based explicitly on damage limitation. "Its goal would be to reduce the disparity between a first and second strike, not by producing . . . second-strike forces that can . . . retaliate with genocidal effects, but by allowing both sides to . . . reduce the consequences even of a first strike to very low levels." A damage-limiting approach to arms control does have drawbacks. For instance, the value of strategic forces as a deterrent to local wars would be reduced. However, as long as damage-limiting capabilities were less than absolute, some deterrent value would remain; beyond this, local contingencies could be dealt with by local forces using low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. The approach would also increase the value of unconventional means of nuclear weapons delivery. This is a more difficult problem. Efforts

could be made to reduce vulnerability to this type of attack or to develop an unconventional capability of one's own as a deterrent, but otherwise one must reconcile oneself to less than a full damage-denial capability. It should be pointed out, however, that an assured-destruction-oriented posture would also be vulnerable to unconventional attack. Thus, despite its drawbacks, damage denial or damage limitation is still the most advantageous approach to arms control for the United States.

1302

Smith, Gerard C. THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACHIEVEMENT. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 62, Mar. 16, 1970: 354-358.

JX232.A33, v. 62

"Made before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Feb. 17," 1970.

Reviews the achievements of the past decade in arms control and disarmament and discusses the outlook for progress in limiting strategic arms or on any of the measures before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

1303

SOVIET-AMERICAN RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Jacob C. Hurewitz. New York, published for the Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, by Praeger [1969] 250 p.

DS63.2.R9S6 1969

Contents.--Prefatory note.--Origins of the rivalry, by J. C. Hurewitz.--Struggle for military supremacy: Strategy and arms levels 1945-1967, by Geoffrey Kemp. Arms transfers and arms control, by Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss. The Sixth Fleet and American diplomacy, by J. C. Wylie. The changing military balance, by Laurence W. Martin. Military elements in regional unrest, by I. William Zartman.--Economic competition in the 1970s: Declining American involvement, by Gardner Patterson. Soviet trade and aid policies, by Franklyn D. Holzman. Regional economies in the 1970s, by Charles Issawi.--Cultural contest: The "cultural contest," by Charles Frankel. Soviet cultural effort, by Frederick C. Barghoorn. Internal contest in the Middle East, by John S. Badeau.--Quest for stability: Britain, France, and the last phase of the Eastern question, by Elie Kedourie. American search for partners, by John C. Campbell. Soviet search for security, by Philip E. Mosely. Persistence of regional quarrels, by Malcolm H. Kerr.--Contributors.--Selected bibliography, by Sylvia Kowitz.--Index.

Outlines the scope and impact of Soviet-American rivalry in the Near East, delineates the problems the superpowers face in this region, and assesses the results of alternative policies that the superpowers may pursue in the future.

1304

Tomala, Mieczyslaw. [POLISH VIEW OF SOME PROBLEMS OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE] Einige Probleme der Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa aus polnischer Sicht. Europa; schweizerische Zeitschrift für europäische Fragen, v. 36, Dec. 1969: 3-6. map. P&GP RR

Contents that "for the first time in centuries the shape of interstate boundaries" in Europe "agrees with the situation and interests of all European peoples and with the requirements of European security." Recognition by all European states of the existing boundaries and their accession to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty are essential for that security. To stop the dangerous arms race and create a viable peace in Europe, a collective security system should be established by an all-European security conference, which should consider proposals for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Europe and all-European cooperation in many fields. A European security treaty should include renunciation of the use and threat of violence and should commit all signatories to respect sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence; settle their disputes peacefully; and not to interfere in one another's internal affairs.

1305

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. REPORT. 8th; 1968. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969] 73 p. (Its Publication 51) JX1974.A1U52, no. 51

Contents.--Introduction.--Nonproliferation.--Nuclear arms race.--Arms control measures for the seabed.--Chemical and biological warfare.--Mutual European force reductions.--Conventional arms transfers.--Impact of reduced defense expenditure on the American economy.--Field tests in support of arms control verification.--Agency operations.--Appendixes.

Report on the operations of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the eighth year of its statutory task "to develop recommendations and negotiate measures to lessen the threat of war and bring the arms race under control." International negotiations on arms control and disarmament matters occurring during 1968 include the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) draft nonproliferation treaty, the 14th session of the ENDC, the conference of nonnuclear-weapon countries, the 23rd session of the U.N. General Assembly, and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

1306

Bara, Herbert F. A PERSONAL VIEW OF THE ARMS RACE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, Mar. 1970: 27-31. TK9145.A84, v. 26

Based on a commencement address presented at the California Institute of Technology, June 1969.

Despite a general awareness of the dangers of continuing the arms race, formal arms control agreements have been difficult to achieve, primarily because of three stumbling blocks. First, the Soviet Union has generally favored an immediate halt to some phase of the arms race, leaving the details of enforcement to be worked out later, while the United States has emphasized the necessity for prior agreement on procedural questions. Second, the United States has insisted on extensive onsite inspections, a concept the Soviet Union usually rejects out of hand. Third, the U.S. superiority in strategic weapons has made the Soviet Union reluctant to agree to a halt that would leave the status quo intact, while the United States has been unwilling to reduce its stockpiles for the sake of agreement. The limited test ban treaty of 1963 exemplifies these problems. In 1958 the Soviet Union announced a unilateral halt to its nuclear testing and called upon the United States to do the same, but the latter, which was then in the midst of a series of tests, rejected the offer pending agreement on policing procedures. Subsequent talks between the two Governments hinged on agreement on the methods of detecting underground tests, a problem that was eventually "solved" only because it was bypassed. Both sides engaged in "worst case analysis" or "erring on the side of military safety," two phrases that have been the motto of the arms race. Each side exaggerates the other's capabilities and intentions and minimizes its own, thus making further progress in arms control highly improbable. The paralyzing effect of this approach is now compounded by multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles and ABM's, which threaten to bring about a new spiral in the arms race and to "severely inhibit if not entirely prevent further steps toward arms control."

1307

Yost, Charles W. U.S. DISCUSSES PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 61, Dec. 22, 1969: 600-606. JX232.A33, v. 61

Statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 17, 1969.

U.S. views on the strategic arms limitation talks, nonproliferation treaty, efforts to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, control of chemical and biological weapons, prohibition of underground nuclear testing, prevention of an arms race on the seabed, and expansion of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to 26 members.

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

NEGOTIATION

1308

Brown, Neville. *AN UNSTABLE BALANCE OF TERROR?*
World today, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 38-46.
D410.W63, v. 26

The influence of the military in Soviet decisionmaking and the trend in the United States toward a "Fortress America" strategy sharply reduce the prospects that the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) will lead to an "acceptable blueprint for comprehensive strategic disarmament." Even a moratorium on specific weapons systems will be difficult to achieve given Soviet and, to a lesser extent, American attitudes toward onsite inspection. And there are other problems; viz, the circumstance "that NATO and the Warsaw Pact have different patterns of nuclear deterrence in the European theatre" and the complications introduced into the power balance by Communist China. The achievements of SALT "will lie not in definitive and permanent agreements but in understandings that are tacit, tentative, and piecemeal," which means that policies of restraint and moderation will be required of both superpowers regardless of the outcome of SALT. This raises an interesting question: Will restraint and moderation be at all possible in the strategic environment that the new weapons technology is creating? The multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle may not be as destabilizing as is generally feared. What about ABM? U.S. officials argue that a hard-point defense will lend additional stability to the strategic balance, but how long can pressures to expand the system to protect the population be resisted? If SALT leads to a moratorium on ABM, the anti-ABM case would be strengthened immeasurably. However, whether a moratorium is agreed to or not, it will continue to be true that "the progressive modernization of [its] retaliatory forces in general, and [its] ballistic-missile submarines in particular, would probably be the simplest and, in the long run, the safest way for the U.S. to preserve strategic deterrence," and the same is true for the Soviet Union.

1309

Bunn, George. *MISSILE LIMITATION: BY TREATY OR OTHERWISE?* Columbia law review, v. 70, Jan. 1970: 1-47.
LL

The arms race will not be ended with a single comprehensive, lasting treaty. Given the division of power over foreign policy between the Congress and the President, the problem becomes the erection of a mechanism for a prolonged dialog that will permit sensitive flexibility and elicit congressional support. The evolution of the North

Atlantic Council from a forum designed for consultation into an organization in which the executive branch can negotiate broad agreements at its discretion without submission for senatorial consent is relevant in this connection. Congressional approval of executive discretion and NATO decision-making power was fostered by executive branch briefing of key committees and members, congressional participation in some NATO affairs, and the unquestioned efficiency of the "watchdog" committees. The same kind of congressional support and the same degree of executive freedom are desirable if the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) are to achieve the necessary flexibility. Perhaps they can be won in the same way. A broad exchange of information on national military programs is necessary as a check on the intelligence estimates that will determine the initial bases for American and Soviet negotiating positions. Pending treaty negotiation and ratification, executive action to halt further escalation may take the form of a moratorium or of an executive agreement. To implement or revise these measures and provide a continuing forum for strategic dialog, a preparatory commission can be established. The treaty itself when accepted must permit change by executive action without treaty amendment or withdrawal and without clear and explicit congressional approval. Congressional support can be secured by congressional involvement in the arms limitation talks. More important than congressional advisers to the American delegation would be the creation of a single committee, "diligent, responsible, and discreet."

1310

Dougherty, James E. *A NUCLEAR ARMS AGREEMENT: WHAT SHAPE MIGHT IT TAKE?* War/peace report, v. 9, Dec. 1969: 8-11, 16-18.

JX1901.W38, v. 9

Adapted from a statement at St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia, during the Fourth International Arms Control Symposium, Oct. 17-19, 1969, sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Pittsburgh, and St. Joseph's College.

The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) might lead to a series of limited formal or informal agreements rather than a single comprehensive treaty. While a general political settlement cannot be part of the formal negotiations, progress toward an effective arms arrangement will have to be paralleled by improved U.S.-Soviet relations globally. As the outcome of nuclear exchanges becomes more difficult to predict and factions favoring first strikes decline in numbers and influence, the leadership in both countries will rely increasingly on mutual deterrence. Since neither Government is overly concerned with mild fluctuations in the balance of strategic forces because

they are temporary, correctable, and familiar, SALT is not perceived as an urgent matter of national survival. Economic problems may override security requirements if both powers are ready to accept the futility of pursuing security through superiority. If the superpowers do not start moving toward an effective strategic arms limitation agreement, mounting pressures for proliferation of national nuclear forces will eventually undermine the viability of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. SALT will also provide an opportunity to standardize strategic and technical concepts to minimize the semantic confusion that could lead to a catastrophic misinterpretation of intentions. The superpowers might engage in trade-off bargaining to cancel out advantages and disadvantages and ultimately establish negotiated force levels. Research and development and weapons deployments would continue except in the field of land-based missiles, which is the optimum starting point for a freeze agreement.

- 1311
Elder, Joseph W. VIETNAM: THE OTHER SIDE IS RESPONDING. *Progressive*, v. 34, Feb. 1970: 12-16. AP2.P8655, v. 34

Contents that the Vietnamese against whom the United States is fighting have responded to President Nixon's peace overtures but that so far their responses have been either ignored or rejected. Elder bases his contention on information obtained during two visits to North Vietnam in June and October 1969. On both occasions North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh stressed that the formation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government represented an important step toward resolution of the Vietnam War through free and open elections. Elder urges the Nixon administration to take advantage of this opportunity.

- 1312
Callagher, Matthew P. THE UNEASY BALANCE: SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MISSILE TALKS. *Interplay*, v. 3, Dec. 1969/Jan. 1970: 21-25. P&P PR

The decisive issue confronting Soviet leaders as they approach the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) is whether to continue to compete militarily with the United States or seek a relaxation of the arms race by diplomatic means, but they must also consider the domestic political and economic effects of their decisions. The strategic position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States and the prospect of expending valuable scientific and technological resources in a renewal of strategic arms competition on a higher level favor at least a temporary tapering off of the arms race. However, human inertia and the disinclination of great powers to limit their power militate against agreement, as do the possible effects of an agreement on Soviet security arrangements in Europe since these arrangements are justified on the basis of a Western threat. There are bound to be differences of opinion

within the Soviet leadership on the desirability of a strategic arms agreement. Kosygin is publicly identified as the leader of a group that favors an agreement for economic reasons and apparently has the support of a large body of scientists and technicians and the arms control professionals, members of the bureaucracy having a direct personal interest in agreement. Opposition to these groups, which seem to have a dominant influence on Soviet policymakers at present, centers around the military establishment, particularly those branches involved in strategic missile systems. These conflicting viewpoints will compel the Soviet leadership to proceed cautiously at the SALT talks and will probably be at least as important a consideration as the relative advantages and disadvantages of specific strategic arms limitation proposals.

- 1313
Getler, Michael. ARMS CONTROL AND THE SS-9. *Space/aeronautics*, v. 52, Nov. 1969: 38-47. illus. TL501.A8187, v. 52
In a section entitled "Strategic Defense."

Failure to limit the deployment of the Soviet SS-9 could doom the strategic arms limitation talks and push the superpowers into a new arms race. Unless the Russians agree to limit SS-9 deployment, President Nixon will have to expand Safeguard, deploy all 550 Minuteman III missiles, and launch an underwater long-range missile system. The United States could offer to limit its multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRV) in return for a Soviet agreement not to deploy an ABM, but this would require mutual onsite inspection because of the difficulty in verifying a unilateral ban on MIRV or ABM. Further, an ABM-MIRV tradeoff is possible only as part of a wider agreement limiting the number of large-payload missiles, and without this limitation Russian sincerity in reaching an arms control agreement must be doubted.

- 1314
Hamilton, Andrew. STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS: WHAT IS NEGOTIABLE? *Science*, v. 167, Mar. 27, 1970: 1707-1708. Q1.S35, v. 167

Outlines in the context of the strategic arms limitation talks the arguments for and against the ABM and the multiple independent reentry vehicle and President Nixon's three negotiating strategies. A unilateral moratorium on weapon deployments is ruled out, while the possibility of a mutual agreement for a freeze "has been made to seem alight . . . for reasons that remain obscure."

- 1315
THE INDIRECT MEASUREMENT OF UTILITY. (By) R. J. Aumann (and others) Princeton, N.J., Mathematics, 1968. 2 v. illus. QA269.15

"Final report F-6222; contract ACDA/ST-143."
"Prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency."
Bibliography: v. 2, p. 376-383.

Contents.--Editor's preface.--Introduction.--
 Topic I. Repeated games of incomplete information: Repeated games of incomplete information; the zero-sum extensive case, by Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler. Repeated games of incomplete information; an approach to the non-zero-sum case, by Robert J. Aumann, Michael Maschler, and R. E. Stearns.--Topic II. Bargaining games of incomplete information. A generalized Nash solution for two-person bargaining games with incomplete information, by John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten. Application of bargaining I-games to cold-war competition, by Reinhard Selten and John P. Mayberry.--Topic III. Stability in n-player games: On the existence of cooperative solutions to a class of n-person games, by Herbert Scarf.--
 Topic IV. Taxonomy of simple games: The variety of Nash bargaining solutions to 2-by-2 cardinal games, by John P. Mayberry. The variety of 2-by-2 ordinal two-player games, by John P. Mayberry.--
 References.--Index.

Investigates several approaches to the indirect measurement of an opponent's utility. The authors offer three general principles relevant to the problems of negotiations: It is possible for a participant in negotiations to be too well informed; there are circumstances in which inspection is of special benefit to the nation being inspected; and models of international negotiations and disarmament must be open ended and extendible.

1316

Jonas, Anne M. THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS; KEEPING HOPE IN LINE WITH REALITY. Air Force and space digest, v. 53, Mar. 1970: 39-42.

UG633.A65, v. 53

Until tangible progress is made in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), the superpowers should maintain credible second-strike forces, and, as long as the Soviet Union continues its weapons production, the United States should respond in kind or risk precipitating undesirable shifts in the strategic equation. The construction and deployment of Soviet offensive missiles have proceeded more rapidly than U.S. intelligence had estimated. According to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, the United States has experienced a "six-month slippage" in the Safeguard program. President Nixon has asked for funds to begin work on the second phase of the Safeguard program, which is designed to protect additional Minuteman missiles and provide for some area defense against a "light" nuclear attack from China or any other Communist country. However, there are pressures to cut the defense budget further although it makes up only 7 percent of the gross national product. The United States "cannot cut defense spending at the expense of (its) strategic nuclear deterrent, SALT notwithstanding," because this deterrent is "the protective shield under which all (its) other activities occur, including domestic attacks on pollution, crime, and other internal problems." This deterrent should be maintained during SALT because the interactions between strategic weapon development, fiscal, and negotiatory deadlines have become significant.

1317

Kyle, Keith. PUTTING SALT ON MIRVS. Listener, v. 82, Dec. 11, 1969: 813-814. illus.

AP4.L4165, v. 82

Western defense analysts and politicians are becoming increasingly concerned about the effect of the multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) on the prospects for arms control. Although Senators and scientists have opposed MIRV, the U.S. Government is preparing to "mirv" a significant portion of its offensive missile force, which will lessen deterrent stability, place a premium on first strikes, and make it virtually impossible to police an arms limitation agreement without onsite inspection. The administration opted to limit Safeguard deployment to a few Minuteman sites so as not to provoke the Russians into a new and more costly round in the arms race just as the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) were starting. While many scientific leaders argue that Safeguard would probably be technically ineffective, very costly, and accelerate the arms race, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard claimed that Safeguard would enhance mutual deterrence and facilitate negotiations on arms limitation. If arms control is to remain a realistic goal, then "either both (ABM's and MIRV's) must be banned or a way found of breaking the link between the two."

1318

Lapp, Ralph E. CAN SALT STOP MIRV? New York times magazine, Feb. 1, 1970: 14-15, 38, 40, 42, 45. illus.

AF2.W6575, 1970

When the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) becomes operational in October, the arms race will enter a new and deadly phase. The appearance of this new weapon indicates that the second-strike capability of the superpowers may be on the verge of transformation into a first-strike capability. Not surprisingly, the question of what to do about MIRV has become a major item on the agenda of the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks. Some observers believe that a major goal of the negotiators should be an agreement to ban all further testing of MIRV. Unfortunately, testing has gone beyond the point where a cutoff would make a real difference. Two major difficulties face the Soviet and American negotiators. First, there is the matter of inspection, which MIRV complicates enormously. Second, there is the difficulty of the asymmetry in power between the Soviet SS-9 and the U.S. Minuteman III and Poseidon. To avoid these difficulties, all land-based strategic missiles might be eliminated, leaving only sea-based systems like Poseidon. Under this kind of arrangement, a limitation on MIRV itself becomes unnecessary. The submarine, whose size and, consequently, missile-carrying capacity would be limited, becomes the first stage of the strategic missile and the unit of firepower in arms limitation calculations. One thing is clear: MIRV is not the ultimate weapons system. "The United States and the Soviet Union are perched on a narrow plank separating the destructive technologies of the past decade from

2.4 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

those of the seventies," and, unless the arms race is brought under control very soon, new weapons systems will vastly multiply the difficulties of arms limitation.

1319
Luchsinger, Fred. DIALOGUE BETWEEN GIANTS (editorial). All Swiss review of world affairs, v. 19, Dec. 1969: 2-3. 1839.89, v. 19

Contents that recent marked quantitative shifts in the Soviet-American picture of currently available weapons systems threaten to upset the existing balance of power, which could be restored by a far costlier arms race at a "higher" technological level. The strategic arms limitation talks will show whether both sides consider the alternatives equally frightening. To facilitate the talks the United States is trying to keep the subject matter free of political contamination, but "the exceedingly complex arms question . . . cannot be separated . . . from the policies of the great powers"; e.g., in regard to military alliances. The question is whether Moscow strives for genuine agreement to prevent a new arms race or wants a bilateral understanding merely as a vehicle of its traditional policy to divide the West.

1320
MILD THAW ON DISARMAMENT. Nature (London) v. 225, Jan. 17, 1970: 211-212.

Q1.N2, v. 225

So far the superpowers' major achievement in their joint effort to control the strategic arms race seems to be the discovery of a common way of conceptualizing the problems of strategic defense. This is no small gain, and the United States should be given full credit for its leading role in elaborating the new language of deterrence. Today this language is a key element in international stability. But what are the chances that something more tangible will come out of the strategic arms limitation talks? Many are hoping for an agreement to stop the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, but this appears to be out of reach because of the inspection issue. An agreement to limit ABM's may be more feasible, but both sides are likely to proceed with great caution. Then why not a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests? Research has shown that seismic monitoring of a test ban would be quite safe, and the agreement would not only put a restraint on nuclear weapons technology but also serve to convince the nonnuclear states that the nuclear powers will accept some limitation on their freedom of action.

1321
Moss, Norman. A PINCH OF SALT. New statesman, v. 79, Jan. 9, 1970: 37.

AP4.N64, v. 79

Since a ban on ABM deployment and multiple warhead testing is unlikely, "the best that can be hoped for now is an agreed ceiling on nuclear

arms, higher than the present level." The superpowers might negotiate an agreement on the number of ICBM's or agree to limit the total payload of a missile force or the number and positioning of ABM's. However, the most important function of the strategic arms limitation talks may be that they represent one stage of a forum for exchanging views on strategic matters. Each side could come to assess its own and the other's nuclear capabilities in the same way and arrive at an understanding that could reduce fears of a first-strike capability and limit vertical proliferation more effectively than any formal treaty.

1322
Nixon, Richard M., Pres. U.S. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS OPEN AT HELSINKI. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 61, Dec. 15, 1969: 543-544.

JX232.A33, v. 61

"Message . . . to Gerard C. Smith, Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the preliminary U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic arms limitation talks at Helsinki, which was read by Ambassador Smith at the opening session of the talks on November 17, 1969.

Outlines the U.S. approach to the negotiations. The President stresses the great importance of the talks but argues that there is a need for separate efforts to solve tension-producing political disputes. He announces that the United States "will be guided by the concept of maintaining 'sufficiency' in the forces required to protect [itself] and [its] allies"; that it intends to approach the negotiations "seriously, carefully, and purposefully" and avoid "polemics and extraneous matters"; and that it is prepared to discuss "limitations on all offensive and defensive systems."

1323
Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. Congressional record [daily ed.] 91st Congress, 1st session, v. 115, Nov. 18, 1969: S14519-S14522. J11.R52, v. 115

Address delivered Nov. 10, 1969, at the University of Chicago; inserted into the Record by Senator George S. McGovern.

The strategy of damage limitation, which the United States and the Soviet Union accept as an alternative to deterrence, creates a dilemma since the measures each side must take to minimize damage are qualitatively the same as those that provide a first-strike capability. The strategies of deterrence and damage limitation effectively countermand one another. Progress in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) thus depends on agreement to reduce strategic arms to the minimum level required for deterrence. The debate on the ABM and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) reveals the ambiguity in the U.S. position. The Nixon administration rightly rejected the city-oriented Sentinel ABM system, but its own Safeguard system, which is ostensibly designed

to protect Minuteman missiles, can easily be construed as the first phase of a city defense system; i.e., it can serve either a deterrent or damage-limiting role. MIRV is similarly ambivalent since it can function either as a penetration aid or, with improved accuracy, as a potential first-strike weapon. Because the ABM and MIRV constitute an inextricable part of a renewed arms race, it is "clear that a small step in arms limitation may be harder to negotiate and be in fact more dangerous to U.S. and also Soviet security than a large step The more restrictive the SALT treaty can be on the further evolution of MIRV's and ABM, the more substantial will be the success of the treaty in achieving stability." The problems of enforcing a strategic arms limitation treaty support this conclusion. While it might be possible for either side to cheat on an agreement to restrict ABM and MIRV and thereby acquire an advantage, it would be virtually impossible to design, develop, test, and deploy a reliable new weapons system without being detected. The "one way" conservatism of the U.S. military is misleading because it supposes the worst imaginable case for the United States and an incredible performance on the part of the Soviet Union, thus obscuring the actual risks involved. Two important conclusions follow from this: a more comprehensive prohibition reduces the problem of cheating, and a freeze on existing weapons systems is easier to enforce than an agreement to limit their further development.

1324

Reineke, Wolfgang. [ARMAMENTS POLICY AS A STRATEGY OF PEACE] Rüstungspolitik als Friedensstrategie. Politische Studien, v. 21, Jan./Feb. 1970: 66-80. H35.P66, v. 21

Considers disarmament and arms control negotiations since 1945 to point out the extent to which the uncertainty about the gap in the strategic balance of power can adversely influence negotiations and détente. Aggressive Soviet strategy should be countered with a combination of flexible politico-military deterrence and a peaceful political offensive. An interim goal of such a strategy should be a West European defense community and its long-term goal, a general European security system.

1325

Smith, Gerard C., and Llewellyn Thompson. AMBASSADOR SMITH DISCUSSES STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 62, Jan. 26, 1970: 84-86. JX232.A33, v. 62

"Transcript of a news conference held at the White House on December 29," 1969.

Responds to questions on the U.S.-Soviet talks, which are scheduled to begin on April 16, 1970, at Vienna, Austria. Matters discussed are the probable agenda, the prospect for success, Soviet motives for agreeing to the discussions, and U.S. policy on the issues that are likely to be raised.

1326

TWO POWER STANDARD [editorial] Round table, the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 237, Jan. 1970: 3-6. AP4.R6, 1970

The approach to the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) is historically unique since in the United States, at least, it was those responsible for security who generated the initial energy required. "Energy in any government which comes from this source (especially, as is rarely the case, if it leads to the saving of money) is usually able to carry the nation with it." The talks are also original and important because they mark Soviet achievement of the long-pursued objective of persuading the world that the U.S.S.R. is one of two powers of a wholly special character. This fact is reason enough for the Soviet Union to enter into SALT with great seriousness, and "it can be expected to show every interest in formalizing and making permanent the arrangement." The American position is that, where strategic nuclear weapons are concerned, the interests of the United States and its allies coincide and that elsewhere the interests of the allies are permanently and irrevocably local, limited, and specialized. It is true that Western Europe, like the United States itself, today seems reluctant to venture to influence a world of independent states, but is this drift inevitable and irreversible? The Soviet Union's effort to assert some kind of parity with the United States has enough truth to make it reasonable in the ordering of international life. However, since the United States leads a dominant coalition and the Soviet Union leads "almost nothing but itself," this should not mean parity on a world scale. The desire for a sane organization of weapons with the Russians should not obscure the central fact that the real American power base is the great Western security and trading system. The structure of the SALT talks and of their sequels could conceal this fundamental reality and induce the Americans to consider a Soviet-American condominium.

1327

US, SOVIET UNION TO HOLD PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF "STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS." Survey of China mainland press, no. 4536, Nov. 13, 1969: 27-28. DS777.55.U52, 1969
Hsin hua t'ung hsün shé [New China News Agency] release, English, Peking, Nov. 5, 1969. DS777.55.H656, 1969

Asserts that the strategic arms limitation talks demonstrate that the United States and the Soviet Union are vying for nuclear superiority and colluding in an anti-Chinese military alliance. Since the conclusion of the partial test ban treaty, the superpowers have increased the production of nuclear weapons, which proves that their nuclear efforts for strategic arms limitation are only attempts to conceal their hostile intentions.

1328

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION CONCLUDE PRELIMINARY STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 62, Jan. 12, 1970: 28-29.

JX232.A33, v. 62

U.S. and Soviet statements "made on December 22 at the final public session of the preliminary strategic arms limitation talks at Helsinki . . . together with the text of a communique issued at the close of the talks that day."

Joint announcement of the intention to resume discussions in Vienna, Austria, on April 16, 1970, and in Helsinki again at a later date. As a result of the preliminary talks, "each side is able better to understand the views of the other with respect to the problems under consideration," and "an understanding was reached on the general range of questions which will be the subject of further US-Soviet exchanges."

REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

Escalation

1329

Devillers, Philippe. [PERSPECTIVES OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT AFTER HO CHI MINH'S DEATH; HANOI AND THE "VIETNAMIZATION" OF WAR] Perspektiven des Vietnam-Konflikts nach dem Tode Ho Chi Minhs; Hanoi und die "Vietnamisierung" des Krieges. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Jan. 25, 1970: 59-70.

D839.E86, v. 25

Contents that Hanoi's policy toward the reunification of Vietnam is based on the deep nationalism or the Vietnamese people, which is rooted in ancient tradition and a long struggle against Chinese and white colonialism. Devillers considers the history of Vietnam since the end of World War II, the legal basis of the North Vietnamese government, Hanoi's arguments for a solution of the Vietnamese question, and America's Vietnamese policy. The American decision on the Vietnamization of the war caused Hanoi, "the Provisional Government in the South," the Alliance of National Forces, and the Liberation Front to join forces for a prolonged national-liberation struggle. After Ho Chi Minh's death, the unity of these groups has been reinforced, and all traces of their political dependence on Peking or Moscow have disappeared. Without a radical change in Washington's and Saigon's policies, an early viable solution to the conflict is unlikely.

Conventional arms transfers

1330

Barrett, Raymond J. ARMS DILEMMA FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Apr. 1970: 28-35. illus.

Z6723.U35, v. 50

The case against U.S. military aid is anything but airtight. It must be conceded to the critics that defense programs in developing countries often absorb resources that might be devoted to economic development and that U.S. arms shipments abroad sometimes increase the dangers of militarism and regional arms races. Congress certainly had these arguments in mind when it chose to penalize recipients of foreign aid who divert scarce resources to military programs. However, U.S. military assistance has enabled a number of countries adjacent to the Soviet Union and Communist China to improve their ability to withstand Communist pressures and others to strengthen their defenses against internal subversion. In both cases, this was accomplished at a lower cost in terms of diverted development resources than would otherwise have been possible. A look at some specific problems in the military aid programs for the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and Latin America leads to the general conclusion that, while it is desirable to avoid supplying sophisticated, expensive military hardware to developing countries, a rigid adherence to this policy may in a given case reduce rather than enhance the prospects for peace. Rigidity must be avoided and each case dealt with on its own terms. In this regard, the U.S. record so far has been good.

1331

Cottrell, Alvin J. THE ROLE OF AIR POWER IN THE MILITARY BALANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST--THE FUNCTION OF THE PHANTOM. New Middle East, no. 19, Apr. 1970: 12-16. illus.

DS63.L.N48, 1970

While it is difficult to determine precisely what constitutes a military balance, it is clear that airpower is the key to the balance of forces between Israel and the Arabs. Israel depends on the superiority of its pilots and aircraft--primarily Mirages and Phantoms--to compensate for the larger but less well equipped and trained Arab air forces. The deep penetration capabilities of the Phantom and its high payload make it ideally suited for Israeli purposes. Egypt has already pressured the Soviet Union for MiG-23's to counter the Israeli Phantoms and may even request Soviet pilots to fly them. Domestic unrest and the possibility of a military coup heighten the danger of military provocation by the Egyptians, a danger that would greatly increase if Egypt acquired an advantage in airpower.

1332

Evron, Yair. FRENCH ARMS POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. World today, v. 26, Feb. 1970: 82-89.

D410.W63, v. 26

After 1955, France emerged as the main supplier of arms to Israel and one of that country's staunchest international supporters. The level of arms transactions between the two countries remained high until 1969, when, following the Israeli attack on the Beirut airport, De Gaulle imposed a total embargo on arms shipments to Israel. The motive for the arms embargo was political, the

aim being to force Israel to adopt a specific policy desired by France. From this point of view, it was a failure: Israel, having secured in the United States a new and apparently more satisfactory source of arms, continued on the same course as before. This result illustrates the inability of a medium-sized power to secure political influence through arms sales. The threat to stop arms shipments has little impact when it is generally known that the slack will be taken up by the super-powers. Besides failing in its original purpose, the embargo had other negative consequences. Israel, convinced that it could no longer depend upon outside sources for arms, embarked on a program of making itself self-sufficient in weapons production, with the result "that the ability of the outside Powers to impose comprehensive arms control measures on the Middle East, which in any case was never very plausible, diminished still further." Arms embargoes in the Middle East usually have had the effect of accelerating the local arms race because the more uncertain the arms market becomes, the greater becomes the pressures on belligerents to buy weapons immediately and in as large a quantity as possible. At one time it was rumored that the Pompidou government had resumed the sale of arms to Israel. Under attack at home and abroad, the French Government has tried to justify its policy with arguments that are confused and unconvincing. It appears, though, that financial considerations and Libyan oil are looming larger in French calculations. Meanwhile, the arms embargo against Israel has become something of a symbol; whether it will be lifted remains to be seen.

1333

Flatley, Thomas W. LATIN-AMERICAN ARMED FORCES IN THE 1960'S--A REVIEW. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Apr. 1970: 10-19. illus.

Z6723.U35, v. 50

The Kennedy administration determined the direction of Latin American military developments in the 1960's when it decided to shift the emphasis of U.S.-supported military preparations from defense against external attack to the maintenance of internal security. Each country faced its own peculiar problems, of course, and attacked them with means thought to be most appropriate, but, in general, the stress was on restructuring military units rather than increasing their strength to create light, rapid reaction forces for suppressing insurrection. Throughout the area moderate improvements in training and material were effected. Concurrently, the ratio of military forces to population declined, and the percentage of the gross national product applied to military expenditures remained the lowest of any area in the world. There were nine successful suppressions of insurrection and eight military coups d'etat against constitutional governments. In recent years, a modest trend toward increased hemispheric military cooperation has appeared. An apparent movement away from exclusive dependence on the United States for arms can be attributed to

legislative restrictions on U.S. participation in the arms trade and to the exhaustion of U.S. military equipment surpluses.

1334

Harrigan, Anthony. INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE IN THE SEVENTIES. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Apr. 1970: 3-9. illus.

Z6723.U35, v. 50

The new intensity of Communist attacks on established institutions and the growing seapower of the Soviet Union confront the inter-American security system with unprecedented internal and external defense problems. In the face of these threats, defense arrangements for this hemisphere must be modernized. The report of the Rockefeller mission to Latin America contains some of the most striking modernization proposals to have appeared in a long while. New military equipment is a major requirement. Contrary to widespread notions, Latin America spends a smaller percentage of its gross national product for defense than any other area except sub-Saharan Africa. The United States should meet all reasonable requests for small arms, command and control equipment, and vehicles and should modify the Conte and Symington amendments to military aid legislation to permit the sale without penalty of larger and more sophisticated equipment. The projected U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia should enable the United States to give greater attention to the problems of Latin America, which, in light of the intensified Soviet and Cuban campaign of subversion, can no longer be considered a strategic outback. The diversity of the Latin American nations must be recognized and greater respect paid to their needs and values as they see them. Recent indications are that the Nixon administration is moving in the right direction on all these points.

1335

Joshua, Wynfred. ARMS FOR THE LOVE OF ALLAH. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 96, Mar. 1970: 30-39. illus.

V1.U8, v. 96

Analyzes Soviet military aid programs and policies in the Near East. Since military aid has been the most effective lever for establishing Soviet influence in the region, the program can be expected to continue.

1336

Kemp, Geoffrey. ARMS TRAFFIC AND THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS. International conciliation, no. 577, Mar. 1970: 3-80. JX1907.A8, 1970

Contents.--The arms dilemma.--Magnitude of arms supplies.--Criteria determining weapons effectiveness.--Greater arms control?--Some practical alternatives.--Summary.--Selected bibliography.--Appendixes.

Diagnoses the problem of the increasing arms traffic from industrial to Third World countries.

Kemp finds that the increase in arms sales since World War II stems from the increasing demands of the recipient countries, not from the salesmanship or pressure of arms producers. He concludes that arms transfers involve many variables and may contribute to either stability or instability depending on local conditions.

1337

Powell, Craig. THE DRUMBEAT IS MUFFLED FOR U.S. ARMS SALES ABROAD. *Armed Forces management*, v. 16, Feb 1970: 40-42. illus.

UB153.A65, v. 16

Interview with Leonard A. Alne, International Security Affairs Director for International Sales Negotiations, to clear the air about U.S. military export sales, which are being maintained at "a low level profile." Powell outlines the extent to which the defense establishment is willing to participate in foreign sales and debates whether its conservative policy should continue.

Nuclear proliferation

1338

Barnaby, C. F. THE GAS CENTRIFUGE PROJECT. *Science Journal*, v. 5A, Aug. 1969: 54-59. illus.

Q1.S57, v. 5A

Compares the gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge methods of enriching uranium against the background of a recent agreement between the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the Netherlands to cooperate in building gas centrifuge plants; analyzes economic and political arguments in support of the centrifuge concept; and proposes several schemes for controlling reactor fuel supplies under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision. Barnaby concludes that gas centrifuges represent a very serious threat to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and that "it is difficult to formulate a convincing argument for the current plans to develop gas centrifuge plants."

1339

Buffum, William B. FOSTERING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. In *U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin*, v. 61, Dec. 29, 1969: 637-640.

JX232.A33, v. 61

"Made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the General Assembly on Nov. 28," 1969.

The U.S. position on some aspects of the effort to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Buffum's remarks relate to reports submitted by the Secretary General on the implementation of the recommendations of the conference of nonnuclear-weapon states, a proposal to establish an international nuclear explosives service within the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the contributions of nuclear technology to progress in developing countries.

1340

Burns, E. L. M. THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: ITS NEGOTIATION AND PROSPECTS. *International organization*, v. 23, autumn 1969: 788-807.

JX1901.I55, v. 23

An article-by-article examination of the major problems encountered in the negotiation of the nonproliferation treaty, together with a summary of developments in the arms control field since the treaty was opened for signature. Nuclear sharing arrangements like the U.S.-sponsored multilateral force, treaty inspection and verification procedures, and proposals to use nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes were the most troublesome issues faced by the negotiators. Current prospects for the treaty would be greatly improved by success in the strategic arms limitation talks and a threat from the superpowers to refuse assistance with nuclear energy programs to states that do not ratify.

1341

Conference of Non-nuclear-weapon States, Geneva, 1968. DOCUMENTATION ON THE GERMAN CONTRIBUTION. [Bonn] Press and Information Office of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany [1968] 32 p.

JX1974.7.C577 1968

Partial contents.--Introduction.--Documentation: Speech by Willy Brandt. 2. Conference Resolution on the Prohibition of the Use of Force. 3. Statement to introduce the German draft resolution on the prohibition of the use of force, made by Swidbert Schnippenkoetter. 4. Working paper on safeguards, presented by the German delegation. 5. Statement made by Ambassador Schnippenkoetter in the First Committee. 6. Statement made by Ambassador Schnippenkoetter in the Second Committee. 7. Statement made by Rolf Remisch. 8. Explanatory remarks by Ambassador Schnippenkoetter on the German vote. 9. Conference document on Ambassador Schnippenkoetter's letter to the Executive Secretary of the Conference and addendum to Conference document on Germany's nuclear renunciation. 10. Conference document on the joint letter addressed to the President of the Conference by the heads of the delegations of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 11. Resolution adopted by the Conference on 27 September 1968 regarding the simplification of safeguards, inclusion of nuclear-weapon countries in the safeguards system, reciprocity of controls, etc. 12. Extract from a speech by Willy Brandt.

Collection of speeches and documents originating in German participation in the Geneva Conference of Nonnuclear-Weapon States of Aug. 29-Sept. 28, 1968, the first conference of this kind in which the Federal Republic of Germany participated on an equal footing with other nations. "The Federal [German] Government will make judicious use of the results of the Conference in its purposive efforts to further the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as well as international co-operation in nuclear matters."

1342

JAPAN IS 94TH NATION TO SIGN NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. In U.S. Department of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 62, Mar. 2, 1970: 228-229. JX232.A33, v. 62

Remarks by Japanese Ambassador Takeso Shimoda and U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers at a ceremony in Washington, D.C., marking Japan's signature of the nonproliferation treaty. Shimoda reminds the nuclear-weapon states of their special responsibility to pursue nuclear disarmament, notes that the treaty cannot be interpreted as restricting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and warns that his Government, before ratifying the treaty, "will pay particular attention to developments in disarmament negotiations and progress in the implementation of the U.N. Security Council resolution on the security of non-nuclear-weapon states" and "give full consideration to the matters pertaining to non-discriminatory treatment to be given to non-nuclear-weapon states in any aspect of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, especially to equal treatment in stipulation and application of safeguard clauses." Rogers concurs that the nuclear-weapon states bear special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament and points to the strategic arms limitation talks as a step toward fulfillment of the responsibility.

1343

Mark, W. [SWITZERLAND AND THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY] Die Schweiz und der Atomsperrvertrag. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärschrift, v. 135, Dec. 1969: 751-753. U3.A43, v. 135

The nonproliferation treaty seeks to limit the number of nuclear-weapon states. Several factors can make this limitation detrimental to Swiss security or deprive the entire treaty of purpose. First, the existence of small nuclear powers may prevent the conflicts that global nuclear deterrence is unable to prevent. Second, the treaty pertains only to weapons based on fissionable materials. It may soon be possible to develop hydrogen bombs using detonators triggered by lasers pumped by argon bombs, which would be easily available to almost every nation. Finally, Swiss accession to the treaty can induce military conflicts to expand into Switzerland. Swiss renunciation of nuclear weapons would determine the credibility of the nation's defense posture, which is essential for the maintenance of Swiss neutrality. Most important for the nation now is the retention of its freedom of choice in regard to armaments.

1344

Perl, Verdun. TEST BAN TREATY UNDER REVIEW. Pax et libertas, v. 34, Oct./Dec. 1969: 42-43. P&GP NR

Discusses the problems of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy against the background of a report that the superpowers want to relax the 1963 test ban treaty for their own industrial purposes.

The hazards of radioactive fallout, the difficulties of disposing of radioactive waste, and the problem of the residues of plutonium and uranium-235 are studied.

1345

PRESIDENT NIXON RATIFIES NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 61, Dec. 15, 1969: 544-545. JX232.A33, v. 61

Remarks by President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers on November 24, 1969, at the signing of the instrument of ratification of the nonproliferation treaty.

1346

Qeester, George H. INDIA CONTEMPLATES THE BOMB. Bulletin of the atomic scientists v. 26, Jan. 1970: 13-16, 49. TK1945.A84, v. 26

India will probably become the sixth nuclear power. Its move toward nuclear weaponry would make it easier for other countries to refuse to sign the nonproliferation treaty (NPT), foster Pakistani acquisition, and possibly leave India without technical nuclear assistance under the terms of the NPT. However, India's nuclear program has vastly improved, and its rejection of the NPT signals that it may no longer require outside help. In fact, India may get all the foreign assistance it needs to build its fourth power reactor without signing the NPT. The acquisition of cheap plutonium bombs and crude delivery systems could force Chinese planners to contemplate the possibility of losing a city to Indian retaliation. However, if China were to attack India, the likelihood of American and Soviet assistance would make an Indian bomb redundant. But unspecific assurances from the superpowers have made Indians suspect superpower guarantees. A "peaceful bomb" could provide the Congress Party with the national focus needed to distinguish it from all that is divisive and regional in India. Moreover, such an achievement before the 1972 elections would substantially enhance the party's stature.

1347

Rogers, William P. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SIGNS NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 61, Dec. 15, 1969: 545. JX232.A33, v. 61

Statement by Secretary Rogers on Nov. 28, 1969, during the ceremony at which the Federal Republic of Germany signed the nonproliferation treaty.

Guarantees that the United States recognizes the obligations imposed upon it by the nonproliferation treaty to seek restraints on strategic nuclear armaments; that "articles 53 and 107 of the United Nations Charter confer no right to intervene by force unilaterally in the Federal Republic of Germany"; that in its relations with the Federal Republic the United States intends to follow the principles of article 2 of the U.N. Charter;

that, "as a full and equal partner in the North Atlantic Treaty, the Federal Republic is of course protected by that treaty, under which an armed attack upon any party would be met by an immediate Allied response in the form of self-defense measures"; and, quoting President Nixon, that "the American commitment to NATO will remain in force and it will remain strong."

1348

Rosenbaum, H. Jon, and Glenn M. Cooper. **BRAZIL AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.** International affairs (London) v. 46, Jan. 1970: 74-90. JX1153, v. 46

Brazil, although a leader in nuclear arms limitation, has refused to sign the nonproliferation treaty (NPT), which could restrict the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are indispensable to development of Brazil's natural resources. The Government opposes the NPT because it would not protect Brazil from an attack, and officials point to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as evidence. Brazilians resent that the nonnuclear powers were not consulted on the NPT and protest that it is asymmetrical: The nonnuclear nations are being asked to trust in promises of nuclear assistance, while the nuclear powers give up nothing. Finally, some Brazilian officials are unimpressed by the amount of U.S. nuclear assistance and believe that Brazil would not lose very much if it did not sign the treaty. The general public supports the Government's NPT policy, but others maintain that the policy jeopardizes Brazil's pacific image, alienates its neighbors, and frustrates its hope of becoming the major power in Latin America. Critics contend that an independent nuclear program "will be the most expensive and longest road to the development of Brazil's atomic potential," costing billions of dollars, when the Government could buy nuclear explosives at cost from the United States. Brazil has a choice between adherence to or rejection of the treaty: It could, like India, wait several years to see whether the treaty will be effective. Under this formula the nuclear powers could add incentives to sign by offering nuclear assistance. This formula would be unworkable, however, if Brazil continues its present nuclear course in violation of the NPT.

1349

TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ENTERS INTO FORCE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 62, Mar. 30, 1970: 410-412. JX232.A33, v. 62

Remarks by President Richard M. Nixon, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, and Department of State Legal Adviser John R. Stevenson on the occasion of the nonproliferation treaty's entering into force. President Nixon expresses the hope that the treaty will be followed by success in the strategic arms limitation talks and progress in reducing the political tensions that breed armaments.

1350

Williams, Shelton L. **THE U.S., INDIA, AND THE BOMB.** Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press [1969] 86 p. (Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research. Studies in International affairs, no. 12) JX1974.7.W54

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--American nonproliferation policy.--The changing Indian perspective.--The NPT: the Indian position.--The nuclear debate.--Notes.

Analyzes Indo-American relations in the light of U.S. nonproliferation policy, sentiment in India toward the nonproliferation treaty, and the basic arguments in the Indian nuclear debate. Williams asserts that the fate of NATO and the U.S.-Japanese security treaty could play an important role in India's nuclear decision and that, given its technical capacity and growing sense of insecurity, India may find it politically impossible to avoid acquiring the bomb.

Other (accidental war, command and control of weapons, etc.)

1351

Loomis, Richard T. **THE WHITE HOUSE TELEPHONE AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT.** In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 95, Dec. 1969: 63-73. illus. V1.U8, v. 95

Traces the use of the telephone in crisis management by U.S. Presidents since William McKinley. Loomis notes that the Cuban missile crisis provided the first test for nuclear-age crisis management and concludes that the President needs swift and reliable communications to respond to international and domestic threats.

REGIONAL

Tension areas

1352

Amalrik, Andrei. **WILL THE USSR SURVIVE UNTIL 1984?** Survey, no. 73, autumn 1969: 47-79. DK1.8549, 1969

The Soviet regime will inevitably be undermined by two contradictory internal forces: the efforts toward construction of the middle classes and the destructive movement of the lower classes. This internal disintegration will be accompanied by an increasingly arbitrary foreign policy. Because Communist China is caught up in the same historical dynamics and is tempted by the undeveloped expanses of Siberia and the Soviet Far East, a war can be expected in which China will have many advantages. The actual date will be determined by China's stockpiling of nuclear weapons, but most probably it will fall between 1975 and 1980. While a Soviet preventive nuclear attack is possible, a long-drawn, exhausting partisan war over a 7000-kilometer frontier seems more probable.

Soviet concentration on the eastern borders will be a signal for the reunification of Germany, the desovietization of Eastern Europe, and the revival of the nationalism of the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. Serious defeats at the front will cause major outbursts of popular discontent sometime between 1980 and 1985. Because there is no mature democratic movement, power is liable to pass into the hands of extremists. If the middle classes do survive and assume control, some type of federation might be set up and accepted by Russia's neighbors. The imminent destruction of the Russian Empire, the "Third Rome," must be considered in the context of the overall threat today to the social values of the "world city."

1353

Gittings, John. *HOW THEY LOST CHINA*. Far Eastern economic review, v. 66, Nov. 13, 1969: 371-374. illus. BCH11.F18, v. 66

Reports on conversations with Russians living in areas adjacent to the scene of Sino-Soviet border incidents. Gittings compares their attitude to that of Americans who were dismayed by what they regarded as Chinese ingratitude for the good will and assistance rendered to prerevolutionary China.

1354

Hammarakjeld Forum, 13th. New York, Dec. 4-5, 1968. *THE MIDDLE EAST: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE; BACKGROUND PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS*. Quincy Wright, author of the working paper. Isaac Shapiro, editor. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Published for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Oceana Publications, 1969. 113 p.

JX1977.2.W4835 1968

Bibliography: p. 87-107.

Partial contents.—pt. 1. The working paper. [1] Historical background. [2] Situation since World War II. [3] Position of the belligerents. [4] United Nations action. [5] Legal issues: Balfour Declaration. Partition of Palestine. Jerusalem. State of war alleged by Arabs. Boundaries. Jordan waters. Refugees. Suez Canal. Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran. United Nations Emergency Force. Withdrawal of Israeli forces. Role of the United Nations. Determination of aggression. [6] Prospects of the future. [7] Notes.—pt. 2. The forum proceedings. [1] Participants: Quincy Wright, Roger Fisher, Nathaniel Lorch, Yoram Dinstein, John J. McCloy, Abdullah El-Erian, Mohammed H. El-Parra, Irving M. Engel, Stephen M. Schwabel. [2] Professor Fisher. [3] Ambassador Lorch. [4] Dr. Dinstein. [5] Mr. McCloy. [6] Ambassador El-Erian. [7] Ambassador El-Parra. [8] Mr. Engel. [9] Mr. Schwabel. [10] Questions from the audience: December 4, 1968. December 5, 1968.

Sponsored in the belief that "public discussion of the issues relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict by representatives of the major participants in that conflict as well as by others with special knowledge and views on the subject could contribute to the ultimate peaceful resolution of these issues."

1355

Hottinger, Arnold. [THE ROLE OF THE FEDAYEEN IN ARAB POLITICS] Die Rolle der Fedayin in der arabischen Politik. Europa-Archiv, v. 24, Dec. 25, 1969: 863-870. D839.E86, v. 24

Distinguishes three main groups of Arab guerrillas, Fatah, the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the People's Democratic Front. The Arab guerrillas, who have been unable so far to achieve any important military success, have vastly increased their influence in Arab countries since the 6-day war. They now exert often irresistible pressure on or share power with the Governments of Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Hottinger discusses guerrilla warfare conducted from those countries against Israel and describes the revolutionary indoctrination of the Arabs.

1356

Leifer, Michael. *THE PHILIPPINE CLAIM TO SABAH*. Zug, Inter Documentation [1968] 75 p. (Null monographs on South-East Asia, no. 1) JX4084.832L4

Bibliographical footnotes.

Focuses on the political and nonlegal aspects of the presentation of the Philippine claim to Sabah and the subsequent progress of the suit. The prosecution of the Philippine claim probably originated in President Macapagal's desire for his country to establish its Asian identity and assume a leading role in regional affairs. While the claim to Sabah made the Philippines a party to the dispute over Malaysia, Leifer contends that in the end it has only impaired the relationships between natural political allies.

1357

Mettler, Eric. *ON CHINA'S PERIPHERY*. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 19, Jan. 1970: 11-18. D839.B9, v. 19

Reports on the political and military situations of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos vis-à-vis Communist China. Mettler discusses China's relations with Southeast Asia, Japan's military future, and the Vietnam War. The approaching American disengagement in the area may cause a vacuum that is difficult to fill through regional cooperation.

1358

NEW FACTOR IN SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT. Peking informers, v. 19, Nov. 16, 1969: 1-2. D8701.P38, v. 19

Asserts that the border clashes were not caused by ideological, political, or territorial differences but rather by China's discovery of immense, high-grade petroleum deposits on Chepao and other Ussuri River islands, which the Russians have attempted to seize. Renewed confrontations over the oil deposits are possible, and Moscow's demand that areas north of the Great Wall be incorporated into its sphere of influence is further evidence that the petroleum issue is central to the current crisis.

292 ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

1359
Perret-Gentil, Jacques. [MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT IN 1969] Aspects militaires du conflit sino-soviétique en 1969 [by] J. Perret [pseud.] Est & Ouest, v. 22, Feb. 15, 1970: 19-22. D839.A822, v. 22

Chronicles Sino-Soviet border incidents during 1969, estimates the strength of each country's armed forces, and speculates on future action.

1360
Rahul. NO SINO-SOVIET WAR. China report, v. 5, Sept./Oct. 1969: 18-20.

D8777.55.C4464, v. 5

Contents that a major offensive by either Russia or China "seems highly improbable." A preemptive Soviet attack might cause a large-scale counter-attack, which would lead to either a conventional war in China or an all-out Soviet nuclear strike--neither of which would be to Russia's advantage. The United States would certainly not remain neutral while China is annihilated. Despite the "sabre rattling," Moscow has initiated recent diplomatic contacts and may eventually effect a modus vivendi with Peking.

1361
Rhee, T. C. SINO-SOVIET MILITARY CONFLICT AND THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER. World today, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 29-37. DA10.W63, v. 26

What are the prospects for a large-scale military clash between the Soviet Union and Communist China, and what would be its consequences? The growth of Chinese military power and the widely accepted belief that the Chinese leadership is irrational may have convinced Soviet leaders that the times are propitious for a military solution to their dispute with China. The Chinese, however, faced with political confusion and economic weakness at home, dependent for their security upon a purged and disorganized armed force, worried about the vulnerability of their nascent nuclear force, and fully aware that the Soviet Union is tightening its control within the Communist bloc, have reacted to the developing crisis with great caution. Nevertheless, the opportunities for miscalculation are numerous. Either a surgical strike against selected targets, followed by a bid for a political settlement, or a conventional armored thrust designed to achieve a comparable result are the two most probable scenarios of Soviet intervention. The first alternative suffers from serious drawbacks relating to the use of nuclear weapons, the second raises the danger of protracted war. A successful surgical strike and political settlement would result in a drastic shift in the Asian balance of power and constitute a major breakthrough in world Sovietization. With Communist China out of the way, the Soviet Union could drop its policy of peaceful coexistence and intensify its confrontation with the United States. A quick victory on the ground would have a similar result. Protracted war would give the United States more time to prepare for the outcome

but would still be destabilizing and harmful to Western interests. The nuclear stalemate is already a risky affair, but "a Russo-Chinese conflict would have the final unsettling effect."

1362
Said, Edward W. A PALESTINIAN VOICE. Columbia forum, v. 12, winter 1969: 24-31. AB30.C59, v. 12

The increasing self-awareness of the Palestinian Arabs is the source of Palestinianism, a political movement "that is being built out of a reassertion of Palestine's multi-racial and multi-religious history." After the battle at Karamah the Palestinian accepted his national past, and he now fights "to dramatize the disjunction of his history in Palestine before 1948 with his history at the peripheries" since then. His priorities have become first the Israeli occupation, next his dispersion among other Arabs, and only last his Arabism. The purpose of Palestinianism is the "full integration of the Arab Palestinian with lands and, more importantly, with political processes that for 22 years have either systematically excluded him or made him a more and more intractable prisoner."

1363
THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER DISPUTE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 50, Jan. 1970: 77-83. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 50

Though the Sino-Soviet border dispute has led to many earlier conflicts between the two powers, evidence indicates that the present confrontation, which has been in the making for several years, is much more serious than any of those of the past. While it is certainly true that the Kremlin leaders have given little indication that they want to see current tensions relaxed, the Chinese Communists have been anything but conciliatory. For a long time, the Chinese refused a Soviet offer to discuss the dispute and may have agreed to hold talks only after Soviet statements hinting at a preemptive nuclear strike against Chinese targets had convinced them of the need to cool things off. Communist China wants the Soviet Union to acknowledge that the treaties fixing the borders between the two empires are "unequal" and should be renegotiated; the Soviet Union is unwilling to acknowledge this. The discussions in Peking have reduced tensions along the border for the time being, but a real rapprochement between the two powers is most improbable.

1364
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. New York, Scribner (1969) 120 p. (Keesing's research report (33)) D8740.5.A855 1969
"By the editorial staff of Keesing's Contemporary Archives."

Contents.--Introduction.--The period of friendship and cooperation, 1949-55.--The beginnings of

disagreement, 1956-59.--The beginning of open controversy, 1960-62.--The conflict intensifies, 1962-64.--The post-Khrushchev period, 1964-66.--The period of the cultural revolution.--Frontier disputes and armed clashes, 1960-69.--Select bibliography.

Traces Sino-Soviet relations since 1949 by describing subsequent periods of cooperation and disagreement and the ideological controversy that led to increasingly bitter polemics and border clashes.

Disengagement, neutralization, etc.

1365

Andrén, Nils B. [SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY AND THE NORDIC BALANCE OF POWER] Die schwedische Sicherheitspolitik und das nordische Gleichgewicht. Europa-Archiv, v. 24, Dec. 10, 1969: 823-832. D839.E86, v. 24

The different wartime experiences of the Scandinavian countries with the policy of "isolated neutrality" influence their present situation and future development. Since World War II all Scandinavian countries have desired a strong defense. Isolated neutrality remains a realistic policy choice only for strongly armed Sweden, which nevertheless realizes the interdependence of its and the area's security. There are three alternatives to the present Swedish security policy: dependence on NATO, dependence on the Soviet Union, or an unarmed or weakly armed neutrality. The first policy would increase tensions in northern Europe and cause Finland to join the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It would be impossible for Norway and Denmark to receive optimal protection from NATO under today's advantageous conditions without risk of provoking the Soviet Union. For Sweden to depend on the Soviet Union would necessitate American presence in Norway and Denmark, which would adversely affect the Baltic defense of West Germany and add to tensions. The third alternative would be totally unacceptable because in case of war a disarmed country would instantly become a battlefield. Therefore, Sweden has decided to continue its isolated neutrality, supported by strong armaments.

1366

Elster, James M. THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN ALLIANCE. Naval War College review, v. 22, Jan. 1970: 19-39. PACP 88

Bibliographical references included in "Footnotes": p. 38-39.

Assesses the crisis in U.S.-Japanese relations, focusing on economic, military, and strategic issues, and discusses policy options and future prospects. Elster concludes that "the dominant thrust of Japanese policy today is not toward the sharing of containment burdens in Asia, but toward a gradual military disengagement from the United States."

1367

Frei, Daniel. [NEUTRALIZED ZONES. AN ATTEMPT TOWARD A STRATEGIC POWER-POLITICS THEORY] Neutralisierte Zonen. Versuch einer strategisch-machtpolitischen Theorie. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit, v. 19, Dec. 1969: 665-675.

U3.W485, v. 19

Develops seven "strategic power-politics hypotheses about the stability of neutralized zones, which demonstrate that truly successful neutralization can be realized only under very special conditions" like the politico-military insignificance and high domestic political stability of the neutralized territory and equal advantages for the conflicting parties by the establishment of a neutral zone.

1368

Griffith, William E. ZERO HOUR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. Reader's digest, v. 96, Jan. 1970: 49-53. AP2.R255, v. 96

To ease the tense military situation and re-establish American influence in the Arab world, the United States and other Western Powers should maintain naval superiority over the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, assist those Arab States in which the United States has important interests, and reaffirm America's commitment to help Israel, while reserving the right to oppose another preemptive war. The United States should also persuade the Israelis to agree to international control over Jerusalem and abandon their paramilitary agricultural settlements in occupied territory. The United States should propose an impartial peace plan calling for the evacuation of all territory seized in the 1967 war except for the Golan Heights, deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force, and self-determination for the Arabs. "We Americans cannot solve the Middle East crisis; we can defuse it."

1369

Hull, Roger H. THE PARIS ACCORDS. American Bar Association Journal, v. 56, Jan. 1970: 34-36. LI

The Geneva accords of 1954 offer a workable basis for settlement of the Vietnam War provided that all parties agree to be bound by them. As an initial step, the Paris accords, the 1970 equivalent of the Geneva accords, could provide for the regrouping of opposing forces behind lines reflecting de facto control of territory, including withdrawal from relatively isolated pockets of strength. Elections to establish a new government for the south could follow, although preferably in less than the 2-year interval specified in the Geneva accords. A second stage of elections could be held at a later date on the question of reunification. As an indication of good faith, the United States could implement some features of an armistice--e.g., partial regrouping--unilaterally, but it should not withdraw its troops from Vietnam.

prior to elections since this would amount to forfeiting the objective for which it has fought in Vietnam; viz, the right of the South Vietnamese to decide their own destiny.

- 1370
Karjalainen, Ahti. [FINLAND'S SHARE IN BUILDING EUROPEAN SECURITY] Finnlands Anteil am Aufbau der europäischen Sicherheit. Europa-Archiv, v. 25, Jan. 25, 1970: 43-48.

D839.E86, v. 25

Points to the relationship of the superpowers as the single most important factor influencing Finnish security. Finland's postwar foreign policy has given it the stable position of an active neutral state. For this it has relied on relations of mutual trust with the Soviet Union and a close legal, cultural, and social cooperation with other Scandinavian countries. A treaty of 1948 with the Soviet Union aims to prevent Finnish territory from being used for an attack against the Russians. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty, if ratified, will realize President Kekkonen's 1963 plan to make Scandinavia a nuclear-free zone. Another Finnish idea is the creation of a neutral zone between Finland and Norway to prevent foreign countries from using Finnish or Norwegian territory for their own purposes. Realizing that the situation in central Europe can greatly affect its security, Finland now wants to help eliminate tensions and stabilize relations in that area. Since it maintains equally good relations with the East and the West, it proposes to serve as host for a European security conference.

- 1371
Maysrath, Hans, and Hans C. Binswanger. [THE NEUTRAL NATIONS IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION; CONTROVERSIES—CONFRONTATIONS—ALTERNATIVES] Die Neutrales in der europäischen Integration; Kontroversen—Konfrontationen—Alternativen. In Österreichische Gesellschaft für Ausenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen. Schriftenreihe, v. 5. Wien, W. Braumüller (1970) 496 p.

P&GP 88

Partial contents.—Foreword.—pt. 1. General questions of neutrality: International law problems of neutrality and the policy of neutrality, by Waldemar Hummer. Changes in the political conditions of neutrality, by Hans Maysrath.—pt. 2. Political aspects of European integration: Schuman's or De Gaulle's Europe? by Alois Niklin. Perspectives of the political unification of Europe in the neutrals' view, by Jean-Claude Favet. Interstate or supranational principles of integration in the small states' view, by Hans Christoph Binswanger.—Recapitulation, by Hans Maysrath.—Final observations: strategy and tactics in the integration policy in the neutrals' view, by Hans Maysrath and Hans Christoph Binswanger.—List of authors.—index.

Considers Swiss and Austrian principles and policies of neutrality in the context of postwar tea-

dencies toward the economic and political integration of Western Europe and the unification of Europe and discusses the role of Eastern Europe in European integration and the European security system.

- 1372
Standish, J. P. PURSUIT OF PEACE IN THE PERSIAN GULF. World affairs, v. 132, Dec. 1969: 235-244. map.

JX1901.W7, v. 132

The history of the Persian Gulf area indicates that a unifying force is necessary for its control and protection. The proposed British withdrawal means either the substitution of another and alien power or disruptive anarchy. Long covetous of a warm-water port and of domination in the Middle East, the Soviet Union now stands patiently in the background. Before creating a power vacuum East of Suez, the British Government should ask what alternative safeguards have been devised and whether it has fulfilled its moral obligations.

- 1373
Tierney, John J. THE NICARAGUAN EXPERIENCE AND UNITED STATES CARIBBEAN POLICY. World affairs, v. 132, Dec. 1969: 195-208.

JX1901.W7, v. 132

History of U.S. nonintervention in the Caribbean, which is analyzed as a case study in the implementation of policy principles and programs that is still relevant for an understanding of the nature and development of general regional policies. Tierney concludes that global priorities should determine regional policies, that the formulation of regional policy involves not only objective reality but the statesmen's perceptions, and that practical experience in the local situation is more important than intellectual analysis.

- 1374
Wahlbäck, Krister. FINNISH FOREIGN POLICY: SOME COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES. Cooperation and conflict, no. 4, 1969: 262-298.

P&GP 88

Discusses the foreign policy doctrines of Finland, using Max Jakobson's Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War as a starting point. Wahlbäck examines Finnish policy from a comparative perspective to throw some light on the dilemmas of neutrality and the impact of foreign relations on domestic policy.

OUTER SPACE

- 1375
Waldheim, Kurt. OUTER SPACE AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION. A LECTURE DELIVERED ON JULY 29, 1968, ON THE OCCASION OF THE OPENING OF THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR FOR DIPLOMATS IN KLESHEIN CASTLE

Weltraum und internationale Zusammenarbeit. Vortrag gehalten am 29. Juli 1968 anlässlich der Eröffnung des 11. Internationalen Diplomatenseminars auf Schloss Klesheim. [Wien] Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Abteilung Presse u. Information [1968] 10 p.
JX1963.U14

Contents that the Soviet-American space race is influenced partly by the military potential of pertinent scientific and technological progress. The exploration promises, however, to bring about a new era in industrial economic development and civilization. Waldheim discusses the international law aspects of space exploration and fundamentals and institutions of international cooperation in the technological use of space for broadcasting, meteorology, and navigational control.

VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

Violation, inspection, verification

1376

Crangle, Robert D. SPYING, THE CIA AND THE NEW TECHNOLOGY. Ripon forum, v. 6, Feb. 1970: 7-14.
P&P BR
"Abstracted from a paper."

Examines the "new intelligence methodology"—its capabilities, organisational requisites, dangers, and advantages and disadvantages in comparison with the older, agent-oriented methodology. The new espionage techniques are the outgrowth of a whole new technology of information gathering and manipulation—data processing, electronics, photography, overhead surveillance, and seismology.

1377

Hamilton, Andrew. ARMS TALKS: IN-GROUP DEBATE ON THE TECHNICAL ISSUES. Science, v. 168, Apr. 10, 1970: 234-236. Q1.S35, v. 168

Describes current discussions within the Government concerning the verification problem in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and emphasizes the Defense Department's insistence on stringent inspection standards. Liberal arms control specialists fear that the Pentagon, which they see as being uniformly unsympathetic to ending the arms race, will use its superior technical resources to support an anticontrol bias and dominate the SALT review.

1378

International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research. Seismic Study Group. SEISMIC METHODS FOR MONITORING UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS; AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS AND OUTLOOK. Report by a study group; rapporteur Dr. David Davies. Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell (1969) 99 p. illus. (Stockholm papers, no. 2)

UD465.5.133 1969

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.—Preface.—Summary of report of SIPRI seismic study group.—Introduction: seismological outlines.—The detection and location of seismic events.—The discrimination of earthquakes and explosions.—Conclusions that may be drawn from seismological work and other topics.—Appendixes: Seismologically important nuclear explosions. Decoupling. Amplitude/yield relationships. The magnitude problem. Complexity. Possible uses of decision theory in underground test ban control. Some studies of the capability of a 44 station network. Historical note.

Reports data leading to the general scientific agreement that signals generated by explosions can be distinguished from those generated by earthquakes. The ability to identify explosion activity positively opens up new possibilities in seismic verification. The existing Western seismic network can now achieve positive identification down to a level of 20 to 60 kilotons exploded in granite. Identification of explosions down to 10 kilotons in granite is now possible and should be achieved routinely with the improved equipment becoming available. The present state of the art is such that the possibility of seismic verification in the 2 to 10 kiloton range can profitably be explored.

1379

Kaila, K. L. DECAY RATE OF P-WAVE AMPLITUDES FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND THE MAGNITUDE RELATIONS IN THE EPICENTRAL DISTANCE RANGE 1° TO 98°. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 50, Apr. 1970: 447-460.

QE531.S3, v. 60

References: p. 459-460.

Study of the decay rate with epicentral distance of P-wave amplitudes from nuclear explosions in the distance range 1° to 98° has revealed that instead of the continuous amplitude curve of Gutenberg, the amplitudes are most appropriately represented by six discontinuous curves. Corresponding to these six amplitude decay curves, magnitude relations were worked out. The new magnitude relations yield consistent magnitudes for nuclear explosions as well as earthquakes independent of epicentral distance over the entire distance range of 1° to 98°. The magnitude values are however slightly shifted towards the higher side by 0.22 magnitude unit (at $M = 4.5$) as compared to those predicted by the Gutenberg-Richter method. Magnitudes are evaluated for Logan, Blanca and Salmon explosions using the new magnitude relations, and they agree fairly well with the published magnitudes for these events determined by other workers using the Gutenberg-Richter method. These amplitude decay curves when compared with the travel-time curves of Carder (1964) do show a reasonable correspondence between the starting points of amplitude curves and the distances where the deeply refracted phases from plausible velocity discontinuities in the mantle start appearing as first arrivals on the surface of the Earth. (Abstract supplied)

1380

Reed, Jack W. OPERATION PRAIRIE FLAT, AIRBLAST PROJECT LN-106, MICROBAROGRAPH MEASUREMENTS, FINAL REPORT: "DISTRIBUTION OF AIRBLAST AMPLITUDES IN THE OZONOSPHERE SOUND RINGS." Albuquerque, N.M.: Sandia Laboratories, 1969. 47 p. (Sandia Laboratories SC-M-69-33)

Sci RR
Microfiche TID-4500

Eighteen microbarographs recorded airblast from PRAIRIE FLAT and three 1.2-ton HE blasts. Sensors were spaced at 1- and 2-mile intervals at distances from 119 to 141 miles west of the bursts, to record ozonosphere ducted propagations, hopefully in a caustic. Results showed that there were humps in the amplitude-versus-distance curve which were observed to pass through the array and changed from shot to shot. These appear to be the caustic, which was broken up by atmospheric irregularities, and resulted in approximately double amplitudes over 6- to 8-mile bands. Amplitudes were proportional to the 0.425 power of the apparent blast yield, which was close to the 0.40 value previously measured. (Abstract supplied)

1381

Seed, H. Bolton, and I. M. Idriss. ANALYSES OF GROUND MOTIONS AT UNION BAY, SEATTLE, DURING EARTHQUAKES AND DISTANT NUCLEAR BLASTS. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 60, Feb. 1970: 125-136.

QE531.S3, v. 60

References: p. 136.

Recordings of accelerations at three different depths within the soil profile at Union Bay were obtained during a mild nearby earthquake and three distant nuclear blast events. These recordings were made by instruments which had been placed in peat 10 feet below the ground surface, in clay 61 feet below the ground surface and in glacial till 105 feet below the ground surface. Accelerations in the EW, NS and vertical directions were recorded simultaneously at these three depths. Using an equivalent linear variable damping lumped-mass solution, incorporating strain-dependent material properties for the peat and clay layers, the motions throughout the deposits were computed. The recorded accelerations in the glacial till were used as input base motion. Comparisons of the time histories of accelerations, maximum accelerations and spectral values of the motions recorded during the nearby earthquake with the corresponding computed motions indicated a high degree of agreement. The maximum accelerations recorded during the distant nuclear blast events also compared well with the computed accelerations. (Abstract supplied)

1382

Varghese, T. G., and Vijai Kumar. DETECTION AND LOCATION OF AN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR EXPLOSION BY MICROBAROGRAPH ARRAYS. Nature (London) v. 225, Jan. 17, 1970: 259-261.

Q1.N2, v. 225

Reports on the use of two sensitive, tripartite, microbarograph arrays to detect and locate the Communist Chinese thermonuclear test of December 27, 1968. The results "suggest the possibility of locating large atmospheric explosions by a group of well separated microbarograph arrays, and of accentuating their acoustic gravity wave signals by phased summation using an array with an aperture of 25 to 30 km and spacing of 5 km."

Enforcement

1383

Gupta, D. [THE KARLSRUHE PROJECT FOR THE CONTROL OF THE FLOW OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL] Das Projekt Spaltstoffflusskontrolle in Karlsruhe. Atomwirtschaft--Atomtechnik, v. 15, Jan. 1970: 35-41. illus. TK90001.A97, v. 15

The sole purpose of a supervisory system is to discover or prevent any diversion of fissionable material from the peaceful to the non-peaceful sector. An optimum combination of three measures must be applied for this purpose, namely the tightness of nuclear plants with respect to their content of fissionable material, the quantity balance of fissionable material for the overall fuel cycle, and surveillance, i.e. the mechanical or human observation of events which are connected with the quantity of fissionable material. A system of international interest for the control of the flow of fissionable material is being worked out and tested in the nuclear research centre Karlsruhe with the cooperation of various foreign institutes. So far four integral experiments have been carried out, two in a plutonium fabrication plant under the supervision of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center and two in the Eurochemic processing plant in Mol. The results of the experiments at the first plant, which are described here, show that a modern monitoring system can be introduced using available instrumentation into an existing commercial plant after certain additional work has been carried out. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1384

Miranda, Ugo. SAFEGUARD AND CONTROL TECHNIQUES FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS. Euro-spectra, v. 8, Dec. 1969: 112-118. illus. QC788.E9, v. 8

Describes Euratom control objectives, types and quantities of materials supervised, control structure, and monitoring devices and techniques. While the Euratom safeguards mechanism is not a police system, it can detect the misappropriations of fissile materials for military purposes. New surveillance techniques, based on various legal and technical concepts, are being developed.

CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1385

Carter, Luther J. SWORDS INTO PLOUGHSHARES: HANFORD MAKES THE SWITCH. Science, v. 167, Mar. 6, 1970: 1357-1358, 1360-1361. illus.
Q1.835, v. 167

Describes the Atomic Energy Commission's successful plan to convert the Hanford plutonium works from weapons material production to peaceful research, using new contracts to attract investment in nuclear and nonnuclear projects in the Richland, Wash., area. Carter concludes that Hanford could become a major nuclear power center for the Northwest.

OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

1386

CONFERENCE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION, VIENNA, 29 NOVEMBER-1 DECEMBER 1969; REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS. In International Institute for Peace. Active co-existence, no. 22, Oct./Dec. 1969: 1-78.
P&GP RR

Contents.--List of participants at the Vienna Conference.--Communique.--Opening address by Maurice Lambilliotte (Belgium).--Vienna Declaration.--Commission no. 1. Present territorial realities in Europe (borders and the two German states): Report by Dr. Arvidson (Sweden). Report of Commission.--Commission no. 2. Search for ways and means which would lead to the establishment of collective security in Europe and render the existence of the military groupings useless: Report by Stanislaw Trepczynski (Poland). Report of the Commission.--Commission no. 3. Armaments and disarmament (report of the Commission).--Commission no. 4. Different forms of co-operation in Europe: Report by Charles Roger (reporter from the European League of Economic Co-operation to the East-West round tables held in Brussels in May 1965 and February 1967). Report of the Commission.--Report of the young participants in the meeting.

Reports and recommendations of a conference on the problems of European security and cooperation.

1387

Feld, Bernard T. SCIENTIST'S ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 26, Jan. 1970: 7-8, 47-48. TX9145.A84, v. 26

A deterrent posture that depends exclusively on maintenance of an assured-destruction capability is inherently unstable. Acceptance of the concepts of parity, sufficiency, and arms control is also required if stability is to be achieved. The strategic arms limitation talks signify superpower acceptance of the arms control principle, but the practical issues are still to be faced. A particularly urgent problem is that of technological

change. The question arises whether it is possible to work out arrangements fast enough to keep pace with technological innovation. ARM and the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle illustrate the difficulties. Scientists have found it all too easy to rationalize their participation in defense research and development. Today, however, in light of the evidence that military research has become counterproductive, "the most useful and patriotic thing scientists can do is to withhold their talents from the weapons field." This would not bring military research in the United States to a halt, nor is that the intention. What it might do is equalize the pace of development of new weapons systems and the mechanisms for their control.

1388

Holzer, Horst. [SOCIOLOGY AND PEACE RESEARCH; A DISCUSSION OF PREMISES AND TASKS] Soziologie und Friedensforschung; Diskussion von Prämissen und Aufgaben. Politische Studien, v. 21, Jan./Feb. 1970: 51-65. H35.P66, v. 21

Underlines the importance of the professional integrity of sociologists for peace research and discusses theoretical and practical aspects of their inquiry.

1389

Jenisch, Uwe. [MODELS FOR AN ORDER OF THE USE OF THE DEEP SEAS] Modelle zur Ordnung der Tiefseeebenutzung. Aussenpolitik, v. 20, Dec. 1969: 709-720. D839.A885, v. 20

Considers the general problems of securing peaceful use of the undersea area, outlines its present legal regime, and discusses a number of proposals for the resolution of these problems in international law, including international control and the Soviet-American draft treaty on arms limitation on the seabed and ocean floor. Jenisch describes U.N. efforts that may pave the way to an undersea disarmament agreement.

1390

Landauer, Carl. GERMANY: ILLUSIONS AND DILEMMAS. New York, Harcourt, Brace & World [1969] 360 p. DD261.4.L35
Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. 281-351).

Contents.--Preface.--The German state of mind and the facts of history.--The constellation of forces in domestic politics.--Some special issues of foreign policy.--Changes in the world scene and their impact on the German problem.--An American policy for Germany.--Remnants of the perfectionist illusion.--Postscript: Czechoslovakia, France, China.--Notes.--Index of names.--Index of subjects.

Discusses the German question in the context of West German domestic politics and international relations, particularly U.S.-Soviet and East German-West German relations.

1391

Leonard, James F. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 62, Jan. 26, 1970: 95-99. JX232.A33, v. 62

"Statement made on December 10 in Committee I (Political and Security) of the United Nations General Assembly . . . together with the texts of resolutions adopted by Committee I on December 10 and by the General Assembly on December 16."

U.S. objections to a proposed General Assembly resolution that would declare the use of "any chemical agents of warfare--chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid--which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals or plants" or "any biological agents of warfare--living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them--which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants" contrary to international law as embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The United States considers "it inappropriate for the General Assembly to attempt to interpret international law as embodied in the Geneva protocol, or any other treaty, by means of a resolution" and does not believe that "the conclusion contained in the resolution with respect to what is prohibited under generally recognized rules of international law as embodied in the Geneva protocol can be justified."

1392

Marx, Werner. [THE CONCERN OF THE GREAT. AN INADEQUATE DRAFT FOR CONTROL OF THE SEABED] Das Geschäft der Grossen. Unzulänglicher Entwurf über die Kontrolle des Meeresbodens. Christ und Welt, v. 22, Oct. 24, 1969: 7.

BR4.C37, v. 22

Criticizes the West German Foreign Ministry for promising its support to the Soviet-American draft treaty banning nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the ocean floor. The proposed treaty neither contributes to disarmament nor provides for sanctions against its violation. It provides for grossly inadequate verification machinery and discriminates against the nonnuclear-weapon states by giving the superpowers a right to veto treaty amendments.

1393

Meselson, Matthew, and Paul Doty. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. In American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Bulletin, v. 23, Jan. 1970: 2-14. AS36.A48516, v. 23

Summary of addresses delivered to the November 1969 meeting of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Remarks on U.S. chemical and biological warfare policy. Both men urge the United States to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and to accept the view that the ban imposed by that agreement does extend to the use of herbicides and tear gases.

1394

Metzger, Peter. PROJECT GASBUGGY AND CATCH-85. New York Times magazine, Feb. 22, 1970: 26-27, 79-80, 82-84. illus. AP2.N6575, 1970

Every nuclear explosion--even a peaceful one--produces radioactivity, and this raises the question whether the benefits promised by Project Plowshare can be expected to outweigh the hazards of radioactive pollution. The people of Colorado were brought face to face with this question just last year, when it became known that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was preparing to move its experiments on the feasibility of using nuclear explosives to release natural gases to their state. The first such experiment, the Gasbuggy shot, conducted in New Mexico, released no radioactivity into the atmosphere at the time of the explosion, but, in disposing of radioactive gases trapped underground, a substantial amount of radioactive krypton-85 was released into the atmosphere. Assurances by the AEC that adequate precautions would be taken in the Colorado tests did little to quiet the misgivings of those Coloradans who were aware the AEC has all too frequently failed to assume its responsibility for protecting the public from radiation hazards incident upon its operations. The AEC hopes to derive substantial economic benefits from its Plowshare experiments, yet investigation will show that none of these programs is likely ever to be economical. In assessing the cost of Plowshare, one must consider the impact of Plowshare experiments on the nuclear test ban treaty, which "prohibits any nuclear explosion that will release radioactive debris across national borders." Project Schooner, a cratering experiment, produced detectable increases of radiation in Canada and Mexico, a clear violation of the test ban. Continuation of this practice is certain to erode the standards established by the test ban treaty. How can the public protect itself from the AEC's irresponsibility? The best solution would be "to institute the same system of checks and balances over the A.E.C. that all other governmental institutions must live with." The AEC's self-regulatory status must be terminated. The facts concerning AEC's Plowshare plans must be put before the public and the question whether the benefits will outweigh the hazards decided by the people and not a technological elite.

1395

Nelson, Gaylord. OUR GERM-WARFARE PLANS. Pageant, v. 25, Nov. 1969: 84-91.

AP2.P2434, v. 25

"As told to James C. G. Conniff."

Includes a statement by Representative Richard D. McCarthy.

Criticizes America's ill-defined policy on chemical and biological warfare (CBW) and the mismanagement and excessive secrecy surrounding CBW programs. A congressional investigation is necessary to determine the facts and hazards involved before additional accidents occur. Instead of deescalating the arms race, the United States is spending

\$350 to \$600 million a year on CBW and only \$9 to \$10 million annually on disarmament affairs. Renunciation of CBW and ratification of the Geneva Protocol would enhance U.S. national security and go far toward ending the arms race that threatens world peace and the survival of man.

1396

Nixon, Richard M., Pres. U.S. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 61, Dec. 15, 1969: 541-543.

JX232.A33, v. 61

"Statement . . . issued on November 25, together with the texts of the Geneva protocol of 1925 and a revised draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare, which was submitted by the United Kingdom to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on August 26," 1969.

Announces changes in U.S. policy on the manufacture and use of chemical and biological weapons. The United States "reaffirms its oft-repeated renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons" and "extends this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals." It "shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons and all other methods of biological warfare" and "will confine its biological research to defensive measures, such as immunization and safety measures." The United States "associates itself with the principles and objectives of the United Kingdom draft convention, which would ban the use of biological methods of warfare," but will seek "to clarify specific provisions of the draft to assure that necessary safeguards are included." In addition, "the administration will submit to the Senate, for its advice and consent to ratification, the Geneva protocol of 1925, which prohibits the first use in war of 'asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare.'"

1397

PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEA-BED: COMMITTEE CONCLUDES GENERAL DEBATE. UN monthly chronicle, v. 6, Dec. 1969: 60-66. JX1977.A1U564, v. 6

Outlines five draft resolutions concerned with defining the status of the seabed and ocean floor in international law and limiting the exercise of national sovereignty over these areas pending the establishment of an international regime to govern them. The reports and recommendations of two subcommittees of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction are also summarized.

1398

Phillips, Christopher H. U.S. EXPLAINS ITS VOTES ON SEABED RESOLUTIONS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 62, Jan. 26, 1970: 89-95. JX232.A33, v. 62

"Statements . . . made in Committee I (Political and Security) on December 2 and in plenary

session on December 15, together with the texts of resolutions adopted by the committee on December 2 and by the Assembly on December 15," 1970.

Explains U.S. opposition to a proposed General Assembly resolution declaring that, pending the establishment of an international regime for the seabed, "states and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction" and that "no claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be recognized." Adoption of this resolution would retard the progress of seabed technology and encourage states to extend national claims into areas of the seabed not under any national jurisdiction at present.

1399

PRESIDENT NIXON URGES SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY ON GENOCIDE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 62, Mar. 16, 1970: 350-353.

JX232.A33, v. 62

President Richard M. Nixon's message requesting Senate advice and consent to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, together with Secretary of State William P. Rogers' report to the President recommending this action and the text of the convention.

1400

Rosenhead, Jonathan. CBW AND DISARMAMENT. Labour monthly, v. 52, Jan. 1970: 15-18. HD4805.L25, v. 52

President Nixon's announcement that he intends to seek ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was a welcome reversal of the U.S. stand on chemical and biological warfare, but the new policy is not all it seems to be. When its terms are related to the present state of the art in chemical and biological weapons and to current disarmament discussions, serious deficiencies come to light. In keeping with its decision to treat chemical and biological weapons as separate disarmament issues, Great Britain has submitted a draft treaty to the Geneva Conference that would ban the production, stockpiling, or use of biological weapons. The advantage of this procedure is that, since biological weapons are still militarily ineffective, it may be possible to agree to ban them; the drawback is that the treaty would do nothing about chemical weapons, which are militarily effective and are, in fact, being used in Vietnam. The major defect in the new U.S. policy is that U.S. interpretation also excludes these chemical weapons, herbicides and riot-control gases, from the ban laid down by the Geneva Protocol. These chemicals do not offer "the humane 'war without death' advertised by propagandists for CBW." One of their major functions is to render conventional weapons more lethal. In addition, there are indications from Vietnam that

the herbicides being used there in the defoliation program have powerful teratogenic properties, yet "these are the weapons which President Nixon proposes to continue using."

1401

Scheel, Walter. ["I AM NOT NERVOUS"; SPIEGEL'S INTERVIEW WITH WALTER SCHEEL, THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S FOREIGN MINISTER] "Ich bin nicht nervös"; SPIEGEL-Gespräch mit Bundesaußenminister Walter Scheel. Spiegel, v. 23, Dec. 29, 1969: 28-30. illus. AP30.866, v. 23

Asserts that Bonn seeks nondiscriminatory "contractual settlements with the German Democratic Republic to improve the German internal situation" without undermining the principle that the two German states are not foreign countries to each other. This does not exclude the possibility of treaties in international law between the two states, but it does exclude international law recognition, even by estoppel, of the German Democratic Republic by the German Federal Republic. In Bonn's negotiations with Poland and the German Democratic Republic, it tries to refrain from radical demands that would ruin the chances of accommodation. Since the Soviet interests in European security parallel those of other nuclear powers, a good chance exists for progress in West German-East European talks.

1402

Schulte, Ludwig. [POLITICAL CONSULTATION AND THE GUARANTEE OF PEACE] Politische Konsultation und Friedenssicherung. Aussenpolitik, v. 21, Jan. 1970: 9-18. D839.A885, v. 21

Considers the importance of Western multilateral communications for improved political communication with the East. Since adequate consultations between NATO members were not held before conclusion of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the European partners of the United States cannot agree on a satisfactory interpretation of the treaty. The process of consultation itself can induce the creation of new international institutions and West European integration. It can contribute to détente and eliminate the vicious circle of bipolar deterrence, in which "one side's gain has always been the other side's loss." Nevertheless, deterrence and security are not mutually exclusive since security "presupposes the deterrence potential . . . as a strategic barrier" to prevent the system of threats.

1403

TEXT OF PROPOSED TREATY BETWEEN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC. Democratic German report, v. 19, Jan. 14, 1970: 2. DD261.D3, v. 19

Provides for the establishment of normal, equal relations between the two German states; mutual recognition by the parties of their territorial integrity; recognition of existing European boundaries, particularly the Oder-Neisse Line; renunciation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons;

one; establishment of embassies in each other's capitals; respect for the status of West Berlin as an independent political entity; and immediate efforts by each party for U.N. membership. The treaty would be binding for 10 years.

1404

Tomlin, IU. KEEPING THE SEA-BED OUT OF THE ARMS RACE. International affairs (Moscow) no. 1, Jan. 1970: 41-45. D839.I465, 1970

Describes Conference of the Committee on Disarmament discussion of the joint Soviet-American draft treaty that was submitted on Oct. 7, 1969, in which the Committee considered the scope of the prohibition under the treaty, the area of the seabed and ocean floor covered, and the control measures envisaged.

1405

TOWARDS A BETTER USE OF THE OCEANS; A STUDY AND PROGNOSIS. Stockholm, International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, 1968. 322 p. JX4408.T68 1968

Contents.--Preface.--The symposium: List of participants. Summary of the discussions, with recommendations.--W. T. Burke: "Contemporary legal problems in ocean development."--Comments on Professor Burke's paper: R. Biersenek. I. Brownlie. W. M. Chayman. C. Girard. E. J. Manner. R. R. Neild. S. Oda.--Annex.

Examines acquisition of mineral resources, acquisition and control of marine fishery resources, military uses of the Continental Shelf and the seabed, and scientific research in the oceans. The discussion focused on the problems that resulted from the elastic definition of the Continental Shelf made in the Geneva Convention of 1958, the need for a moratorium on present national claims, and the possibility of an international structure for future management and exploitation of the oceans.

1406

Ulbricht, Walter. BACKGROUND TO GDR PROPOSALS; EXTRACTS FROM WALTER ULBRICHT'S KEYNOTE TO SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE. Democratic German report, v. 19, Jan. 14, 1970: 3-7. DD261.D3, v. 19

Emphasizes that the history of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic makes it mandatory for the two states to recognize each other as fully separate states in international law. Since Germany has been comprised of a number of states throughout most of its history, German reunification into one state cannot be a historical necessity. Ulbricht requests West Germany to recognize existing boundaries in Europe; renounce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and participate readily in disarmament agreements as a contribution to European peace and security. West German Chancellor Brandt's efforts to improve relations with East Germany have been grossly insufficient.

1407

Ulbricht, Walter. PEACE AND SECURITY MUST BE BASED ON INTERNATIONAL LAW; THE FOCAL POINTS OF INTEREST: GDR DRAFT TREATY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES. GDR review, v. 15, Mar. 1970: 34-37. illus.

DD261.02, v. 15

Summary of and excerpts from a January 1970 press conference.

Discusses the East German draft treaty on improvement of relations with West Germany and criticizes West German Chancellor Willy Brandt for his unrealistic approach to the unity of the German nation and refusal to establish normal diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic. The renunciation-of-force agreement proposed by Bonn can never become an internationally valid treaty until its parties, the two German states, recognize each other under international law.

1408

US, SOVIET UNION COOK UP NEW FRAUD OF SO-CALLED PROHIBITION OF EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON SEA-BED AND OCEAN FLOOR. Survey of China mainland press, no. 4526, Oct. 29, 1969: 31.

DS777.55.U52, 1969

Hsin hua t'ung hsin shi [New China News Agency] release, English, Peking, Oct. 22, 1969.

DS777.55.H656, 1969

Denounces the draft treaty as a joint effort by the superpowers to maintain their nuclear monopoly and dominate the ocean floor. The treaty would legalize the hostile activities of U.S. and Soviet nuclear-armed submarines and enable both powers to build military bases on the seabed under the guise of conventional weapons emplacements and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

1409

Wegner, Herbert. ["THERE IS NO FOUNDERING"; SPIEGEL'S INTERVIEW WITH HERBERT WEGNER, CHAIRMAN OF THE PARLIAMENTARY GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY] "Es gibt kein Scheitern"; SPIEGEL-Gespräch mit dem SPD-Fraktionsvorsitzenden Herbert Wegner. Spiegel, v. 24, Jan. 26, 1970: 24-27. illus.

AP30.866, v. 24

Response to questions on changes in the German Federal Republic's Eastern policy, particularly its efforts toward West German-East German accommodation. Wegner considers desired contractual arrangements with the German Democratic Republic and possible bilateral renunciation-of-force agreements with the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and underlines the difference between the West German Government and opposition views on the development of West German-East German relations.

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